Causal Inference and Proofs of Theism in Hume's Philosophy of Religion

Using probability calculus, David Hume attempts to judge religious beliefs properly. He, in using this calculus, relies on especial views about causation and causal inference. For him, specific causal relationships between phenomena appear to us through frequent observation of the succession or coexistence of certain phenomena. The result of this observation is a natural, unavoidable association between those phenomena. All associations of this sort are not of the same force and intensity; they are forceful if the observations occur incessantly and steadily, otherwise they are less forceful. The probability calculus helps us to show the probability of the occurrence of a certain phenomenon in case of observing each of the coexisting phenomena. To do this calculation, Hume pays special attention to variables such as posterior probability (or conditional probability) and prior probability, which can be considered as the primitive form of a law or formula known nowadays as Bayes’ theorem. Using Bayes’s theorem, Hume arrives at the conclusion that the Argument from design can not be fruitful, nor can be the Argument from miracles. The present article, which indeed deals with a discussion of Hume’s philosophy of religion, proves that Hume, in this conclusion, is subject to fallacy and begging the question.