The Nature and Moral Prescript of Dissimulation

Dissimulation means hiding one's main intention by using words with meanings seemingly different from those intended by the speaker. Some consider dissimulation the same as lying. They, then, regard it permissible only where lying is permissible. Some others consider dissimulation as absolutely permitted. This disagreement originates from disagreement on the criterion for what lying is: what is said is untrue, or what the speaker means is untrue. Since the speaker – in using dissimulation – has not meant any untrue meaning by what he says, and what he says cannot be considered a lie without considering his intention, dissimulation is not the same as lying. As to the prescript regarding dissimulation, we must consider various types of dissimulation in terms of the speaker's intention. If by dissimulation we mean hiding one's intention in saying something, without deceiving the audience through special words or deceptive signs, then the dissimulation is permissible; this is because hiding one's main intention is not by itself an immoral action, except under other secondary rupics. But if by dissimulation we mean deceiving the audience and the speaker is to make the audience understand something untrue, then the dissimulation is an instance of deception and not permissible, except for those cases where deception is permitted.