An Appraisal of Qāḍi Sa īd's Ideas in the Science of the Soul

Qāḍi Sa‘īd, a post-Sadraian philosopher, has developed philosophical ideas opposite to those of Mulla Sadra and Ibn Sina. In the realm of knowledge, he does not consider knowledge to be by representation (huṣūli), nor by presence (huḍūri), rather does he suggest a new meaning for presence without further explaination. In the field of human soul, he follows Ibn Sina in considering its origination to be incorporeal, and on the issue of resurrection, he rejects both Ibn Sina and Mulla Sarda and suggests a new solution.This article reviews the three issues in Qāḍi Sa‘īd’s ideas, and shows some of the antagonisms that exist in his thought. For instance, all his stances on these issues are based on substantial motion and the principality of existence. This is while, he accepts the union of the intellect with the intelligible, and the union of the subject of the perception with its object, and at the same time, he rejects substantial motion. He also bluntly rejects the principality of existence, and accepts the principality of quiddity.