Some inconsistencies within Descarte's Dualism

Using his method of skeptical doubt, Descartes confidently asserts that reality can be divided into two distinct substances: (1) corporeal substance, which comprises all types of extended objects, e.g., the body, a desk, a leaf, etc.; 2) incorporeal or thinking substance; e.g. the mind, soul, or thinking thing. The objection raised by Descarte's contemporaries is how it is possible for two distinct substances such as mind and body, to interact; a problem to which our contemporary thinkers continue to struggle. Although Descartes always held that his original position on dualism was a coherent one, he proposed clarifications throughout his life meant in response to his contemporarie's objections regarding the mind-body problem. In replying the objections about interaction, Descartes also appealed to the union of the mind and body in human beings. The present paper begins with Descarte's early portrayal of mind and body which led to objections against the problem of interaction. It will then deals with Descarte's replies to these objections and with the final portrayal of his solution to the mind-body problem addressed in his book Passions of the Soul.