The Ontological Dimensions of Human Rights

Despite the immense literature on various aspects of “Human Rights,” students of law, politics and international relations are less acquainted with the ontological basis of this vitally important issue. There seems to be a false impression that this topic is an invention of Western power which is now being used as an instrument of political pressure against traditional and less developed authoritarian societies. In fact, the ontological dimensions of human rights have been largely ignored. We are now witnessing a developing criticism on the legitimacy of human rights which is under serious threat. This essay attempts to look at the issue from an ontological perspective. The main focus here is not “human rights” per se and the conventional norms governing its realm, rather, the aim is to investigate the preliminary requisites to it; that is the ontological basis that embraces man’s inalienable rights by virtue of his very nature as a “human being” and not necessarily as a member of society or the citizen of a political entity called state. The question here is whether man-disregard of his race, faith, gender, creed and political or territorial affiliation- ultimately exists totally for or as a member of society or exists in some significant sense for himself independent of the socio-political environment? Another important question is whether the entitlement of such rights entails a correlative duty or it is merely a privilege as basic moral guarantees that people shall enjoy in all countries and cultures simply because they are human beings. It will be argued that the problem of human rights is essentially lack of effective enforcement in a disparate chaotic international system.