The Relationship between Theory and Practice in Mulla Sadra's Philosophy

Unlike FΪrΪbi and Ibn SìnΪ, who thought that knowledge of things is sufficient for their actualization, or Suhrawardì, who thought that knowledge of actions is sufficient for their actualization, MullΪ ĢadrΪ had a comprehensive or holistic view of Being and the human state in both the theoretical and practical aspects of his philosophy. He did not agree with the Asha‘rites who thought that volition and practice are primary and essential, and reason and theory are secondary and peripheral. Nor did he agree with the Mu‘tazilites who thought that reason and theory are primary and essential, and volition and practice are secondary and peripheral. Rather, MullΪ ĢadrΪ considered the soul as a unified being with dual aspects of theoretical and practical reason. It is on the basis of such a view that he discusses the relation between theory and practice and propounds various theories different from those of previous philosophers on ‘practical reason’, ethical philosophy, political philosophy and the qualities of ruler.This paper aims at exposing MullΪ ĢadrΪ’s view on the relation between theory and practice and its philosophical implications in the area of practical reason. In this connection, ĢadrΪ’s thought is presented as one in which rationality, spirituality and the religious value system find a unified and holistic interpretation. This paper also tries to analyze various aspects of MullΪ ĢadrΪ’s view in relation to those of previous philosophers, and the way it encounters and treats new practical questions and problems. It is contentious to maintain that ĢadrΪ did not pay enough attention to this part of philosophy, did not deal with it thoroughly, was more inclined to talk about individual ethics with a mystical or esoteric tone, or that he did not take the practical aspect of philosophy as seriously as he took its theoretical aspect. A final goal of this paper is to show that, if we allow ourselves to revise the Aristotelian division of philosophy into theoretical and practical, and offer a different view from those of FΪrΪbi, Ibn SìnΪ, or even MullΪ ĢadrΪ on the relation between theory and practice—as ‘AllΪmah ĤabΪĥaba’ì did—we would be able to elevate the status of practical philosophy in contemporary discussions.