Omission of physician that led to the death can be discussed in two ways: as a disciplinary offense or punishable as intended murder or quasi- intentional. This paper concentrates on the second one. It seems that omission is considered as a criminal offense, even if the omission is not regarded as “actus reus” of the homicide generally because of having arbitrary responsibility. By virtue of general or special obligation of the physician and other considerations, he or she is eligible for punishment as a retaliation (Ghesaas) or blood money (Dieh).Leading to ignorance, omission after act and dependency the life of patient to physician will put the doctors in different situation and impose heavier criminal liability on them.

Deceiving the Uninformed Person (Taqrir Jahil) is forbidden, either with the concealment of the truth or expressing something against it - if specific conditions exist and this is one of the famous jurisprudential principles that has been mentioned and cited in various cases and even in the novel issues of jurisprudence. However, But all its aspects have not been elaborated in a centralized independent work. This paper, for the first time, through descriptive-analytical research methodologies and library documents, examines and clarifies the contents, argument of the jurisprudence (Qur'anic verses, narrations, reason, jurisprudential rules and the application of some arguments) and the scope of this principle so that the jurists' attention can be taken seriously in jurisprudential inference. Some jurisprudential principles, such as principle of Tasbib (wasting) as forbidden, the necessity of uninformed person in giving, the necessity of guidance of the uninformed person, the denial of Gharar (uncertainty), the concealment of the truth and the relying on sin, can be evidence or proof for the validity of this jurisprudential principle. This is a propositional rule that includes the general jurisprudential ruling and covers all or most of the jurisprudential topics and is applicable to minor cases. Therefore, in some cases, not taking exception will not disrupt its accuracy or even its generality since all the principles including jurisprudential and non- jurisprudential take exceptions in some cases.

Third testimony in Azan and Iqamah due to its doctrinal and social aspects is of huge importance. This paper presents the historical background of the jurists' viewpoint on the third testimony in Azan and Iqamah and its evolution. Thereafter, by stating the reasons for the jurists' disagreement, the sloganistic aspect of the third testimony is emphasized. The third testimony is not a religious slogan rather it is conventional. The ruling of the conventional slogans varies depending on the religious titles they are subordinated to, contrary to the religious slogans that always lay under the binding principle of the veneration of the sacraments or under the prohibition of humiliating them. In addition to the recommendatory title of "confession to the guardianship", the prohibitory titles of legislation (Tashrī) and "leading into Ignorance", and the compulsory title of "Guiding the Ignorant" can also be considered regarding the third testimony. The achievement of this research is that confession to the guardianship is recommendable in every situation, especially following the testimony of the apostolate. The third testimony should be expressed in such a way that it does not imply that the third testimony is part of Azan or Iqamah.

Ignorance is one of the less frequent but very important concepts in Iranian criminal law. The legislator did not provide a precise definition of ignorance, and in Article 155 of the Islamic Penal Code, the meaning of ignorance is used in an indefinite manner, as it considered ignorance of the ruling as a legitimate excuse. In Article 217, one of the conditions for the implementation of the limit is the awareness of the criminal about the sanctity of his behavior. Therefore, the meaning of ignorance should be obtained in jurisprudence, because the fundamental concepts of Iranian Islamic law originate from jurisprudence and the principles of Twelver Imam Shia jurisprudence. By examining the history of the debate from ignorance to judgment in the two sciences of jurisprudence and jurisprudence, this research seeks to find an answer to the definition of ignorance in the Islamic penal law of Iran, especially Article 155 of the Islamic Penal Code on the issue of ignorance to judgment from a Sharia point of view. The summary of the research is that according to Sharia, if the ignorant person is incapable or the guilty party is not complicit, his ignorance is considered as an excuse in Sharia and is punishable. Otherwise, his claim of ignorance will not be accepted.

The Effects of Ignorance on Criminal Liability in Islamic Law and the Legal Systems of Afghanistan and IranDr. Khadem Hussain Habibi Abstract:This research titled "The Effects of Ignorance on Criminal Liability in Islamic Law and the Legal Systems of Afghanistan and Iran" aims to answer the fundamental question of what effects ignorance has on criminal liability and irresponsibility in Islamic law and the legal systems of Afghanistan and Iran through a descriptive-analytical-comparative approach and documentary research method. The first step in examining this issue is to study the role and position of ignorance in Islamic law as the foundation of the Islamic legal system and to identify the different types of ignorance. The findings of the research indicate that the Iranian legal system, particularly its Penal Code, acknowledges the effects of ignorance on criminal liability in many cases due to its strong influence from Islamic jurisprudence. However, in the Afghan legal system and its Penal Code, the effects of ignorance on criminal liability have not been recognized.Keywords: Ignorance, criminal liability, Islamic criminal law, Afghan legal system, Iranian legal system.

One of the main factors affecting criminal culpability is mens rea and one important element of mens rea is knowledge of law. But this important factor is not exhaustively analyzed in the literature. Three kinds of ignorance of law have been analyzed in this article; one of them is direct mistake of law and two others are indirect mistake of law (or mistake of different law). Indirect mistake of law can be divided into two kinds: First, ignorance of different non-criminal law. In this kind of ignorance, perpetrator is not aware of a civil, tax, custom, marital or other kinds of non-criminal law. This kind of ignorance is an excusing factor. Second, ignorance of different criminal law. This kind of ignorance is not an excuse but can act as a mitigating factor. There is a third type of ignorance, which is exclusive to Iranian criminal law, which is about a canon law. None of these three kinds of ignorance have clear regulations in Islamic Penal Code and Legislature needs to enact related laws.

Ignorance of the law is the cause of many dangers and crimes today, as at present more than 50% of prisoners are illiterate and have no knowledge of the law. According to studies, the occurrence of crimes in society is directly related to the level of literacy of individuals, so that people who are ignorant of the law are more likely than others to commit crimes and increase social risks. For example, in the context of the release of goods, ignorance of customs clearance laws can lead to a change in the legal status to the status of smuggling. In the case of transactions, the lack of any of the necessary conditions for the validity and accuracy of the transaction affects the status of the contract. So that if in the conditions of any of the interlocutors or exchanges or the contract of sale is disturbed, the order of the desired religious effect will face problems. There is an important rule about the effects of ignorance, which is: Ignorance of the law does not absolve of responsibility. The results indicate that ignorance is a relative concept and does not have the authority to be expressed under a general rule, but determining whether defense is considered ignorance is a precise judicial task that is the responsibility of those in charge of the judiciary.

A well known rule in criminal law is ‘ignorance of law is not a defence’. It means that the ignorance of law has no effect, on criminality and responsibility, although the ignorance of fact removes criminal responsibility. The rule ‘ignorance of law is not a defence’ has been doubted in some criminal systems, among them is Islamic criminal system. In this regard, different ideas have been expressed in Imamieh jurisprudence. Some of the ideas consider the rule as to prevent criminality and responsibility, some other consider it as to be uninfluenced and the others consider it as to remove criminal responsibility in limited conditions. Although, it should be stated that none of these ideas has been specified limitation of such an effect. Nowadays ignorance of law is one of the critical issues in individual, social, national and international relationships. The rule seems to be an uncertain and undetermined presumption. Although, this matter is encountered with more doubt in Imamieh jurisprudence, since there is no special principle to restrict its realm. In this essay, at first the rule and its grounds are to be reviewed. Then with regard to religious and rational principles the realm of rule in different crimes is to be defined and non-admissibility of the ignorance of law is to be balanced by valid religious and rational grounds.

This article examines some general views on the social and moral functions of ignorance, according to a study approach called Agnotology. Based on these views, an attempt is made to analyze some concrete examples of social benefits or moral virtues based on ignorance, i.e. categories, such as social freedom, habit, skill, forgetfulness, confidentiality, privacy, professionalism, and moral censorship. Various types of ignorance or various divisions of the unknowns are also the basis for the continuation of the present article. What is the relationship between ethics and each of these categories of ignorance is discussed in the final part of the article, which tries to better explain it using a long-standing, but neglected distinction between the two concepts of virtue and moral advantage.