Among all the approaches that have been the focus of scholars in literary criticism, the share of rhetorical criticism is very small. Rhetorical critique, also known as Neo-Aristotelian critique, was founded in 1925 by Herbert Witches with a paper entitled "Literary Criticism of Oratory". In this article, he discusses the main frameworks of this critique and shows its differences with literary criticism. He made a distinction between literary criticism and rhetorical criticism there. After him, rhetorical critique, using the teachings of oratory teachers, such as Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, etc., intends to discover and examine the persuasive strategies of the text. This critique uses factors such as eloquence, audience, methods of reasoning, ethos, pathos and logos, as well as other rhetorical tools for text analysis. In this method, the critic seeks to achieve the methods that the speaker intended to persuade the audience by using the elements of the speech In this article, we will use only one part of rhetorical criticism, namely invention. The speaking element is the part of the speech in which the speaker must find a way to present his speech This subject has changed in modern literature and rhetoric from that used in traditional rhetoric.The purpose of this article is to show what topics the historians of the Safavid period took in order to make their narrative more believable. In other words, behind every topic there is an argument that the historian wants to present to the audience in order to convince the audience.

The personal credibility and authority of the historian are one of the major subjects in Historiography. It's important since the greater the personal credit of historians, the greater would be the degree of persuasion of the audience. In this article, we analyze the degree of historian influence on audience persuasion and rhetorical methods and verbal devices used for historiography credit which makes the text more believable to the audience. In this article, applying the Neo- Aristotelian criticism method, we want to demonstrate the historian Ethos and strategies used by him to increase his credit. For this purpose, we choose Futuḥāt-i shāhī Cornicle by Amīnī Haravī, since it was one of the first and impressive histories of Safavi's government formation and its ideology because the role and personal credibility of historian and his persuasive of methods are very important.

The Peripatetic formula of definition is based on the following principles: a) the possibility of knowing something by means of its essentials, b) the acceptance of Aristotelian ten categories and c) the acceptance of Aristotle's ideas of matter and form. The Peripatetic approach to definition has been criticized by such philosophers as al-FÁrÁbi and Suhrawardi. Suhrawardi claims that it is impossible for us to know things by means by its essentials and he invokes philosopher's words to prove his claim. He says that the criterion for a thing to be self-evident is intuition; external or internal. He is also critical of the theories of ‘ten categories’ and ‘matter and form’. Having rejected Aristotelian view of definition, Suhrawardi presents his own theory of 'nominal definition', regarding it as very useful in sciences. Contrary to real definition that is based on the essentials of things, nominal definition is based on the essentials of the concept in question. Other issues touched by this article are the assessment of Peripatetics and Suhrawardi's theories of definition and their limitations and flaws.

The revival of virtue ethics in the last century was an origin of new philosophical debates over friendship. Neo-Aristotelian schools disregard Aristotle’s definition of happiness; therefore, they have revived and modified certain Aristotelian notions as well as ancient post-Aristotelian schools, introducing “friendship” and “care” for the other as inseparable components of human happiness. Moreover, since ancient Aristotelian schools considered the most important demand of virtue ethics to consist in rational formation of one’s feelings, emotions, and internal passions in order to enjoy an internally good life, they were always accused of self-centrism, among other things. In this paper, we deal with “care for the other” as a new component of modern virtue ethics and consider the importance and role of “care for the other” as well as friendship in human happiness from an Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian perspectives. Then, we consider the reasons why Annas—a neo-Aristotelian philosopher—does not take ancient theories of happiness to be imbued with self-centrism and why she gives more weight to “friendship” and “care for the other” as compared to ancient theories. She seeks to find an answer to questions such as whether humans can, in addition to thinking of their own happiness, develop a care for the other in a non-instrumental way.

Arab literary critique is called classic critique before Arabic renaissance because it is still based on traditional critique including Zoufi critique, moralcritique and psychological critique.  The critique of the pre-Islamic era lasted in such an atmosphere until the end of the third century, but it is changed to philosophical critique in the fourth century by introducing Greece philosophy. This critique becomes philosophical under Aristotle’s two works which are “The speech” and “the book of poetry”. It is after this stage that the Arab world is confronted with two poetry techniques that are Aristotle poetry technique and Arabic poetry technique. According to these two poetry techniques, literary critique becomes philosophical because of Aristotle philosophy, but it is based on traditional criticism. Based on the hypothesis that Arabic critique is influenced by Aristotle poetry technique, this article poses the question of whether this influence has been influential in the fundamentals of critics’ criticism or has given rise to a proven approach. The result of this study is that this influence has shaped Arab critics’ general approach for centuries until the advent of the Arab Renaissance. The result of this study is that this influence has shaped Arab critics’ general approach for centuries until the advent of the Arab Renaissance.

Alasdair MacIntyre is among critics of Liberalism and the Enlightenment movement. He has criticized the moral thought of Kant and Liberalism from an Aristotelian perspective. Kant has emphasized pure practical reasoning for determining moral duties; whereas, in MacIntyre’s view, this kind of reasoning cannot adequately guide the moral agent. MacIntyre, instead, puts emphasis on a character constituted in tradition based on relationships directed towards the human good. This Aristotelian perspective, MacIntyre holds, yields practical knowledge regarding the application of moral rules. In my view, both methods have benefits and limitations, and it is possible to hold a middle position which restricts the moral effect of the community to secondary and exceptional moral rules.

This paper intends to provide an analysis of Whitehead’s view of substance in its traditional or Aristotelian sense based on his process cosmological principles. According to this analysis, he sees the roots of modern scientific materialism in Aristotelian substance and, following this, replaces the concept of substance with the concept of actual being within the framework of his own philosophy. The important point is that this does not mean his total rejection of substance. In fact, we can say that, on the one hand, Whitehead has a negative view of substance in the sense that he sees it inconsistent with his own cosmological principles from an ontological point of view and rejects it. On the other hand, he has a positive view of substance and considers it useful for common purposes of life in linguistic and practical respects. Therefore, it is concluded that, although Whitehead has seriously criticized Aristotelian substance and even substituted it with another concept, he has not totally rejected it.

The ambiguity of the concept of human is of the main obstacles in understanding human rights. Traditional philosophers take the Aristotelian essentialist approach to define human and claim that such produced definition provides us with a needed basis for the discovery of human rights. In this article, I elaborate on the Platonist and Aristotelian approach to the understanding of human and show how Aristotelian definition of human is neither philosophically sufficient nor practically applicable. Furthermore, such an approach is the root of many misunderstandings of human rights. Next, through criticizing the basis of essentialism, I present an alternative approach for defining human in analytic tradition based on which the “definition of human” is equivalent to the “meaning of the term human.” This approach is both immune to the philosophical flaws of essentialist approach and properly applicable to identify the instances of human.