مجله تاملات فلسفی
پیاپی 14 (بهار و تابستان 1394)

While theists consider miracles as a proof for the existence of God, atheists criticize the validity of miracles for the existence of God, as they generally doubt the historical reality of miracles. They consider miracles as impossible. The purpose of this paper is to assess and respond to some of the main questions on this controversial subject, namely: what is miracle? Is miracle a paradoxical concept? Are the references to the historical testimonies for the reality of miracles justifiable? What causes miracles? We will address these questions by a subjective analysis of the concepts, propositions and arguments on the issue. The paper aims to show that firstly, miracle is by no means a paradoxical concept; and that it may not be legitimate to deny its possibility by appealing to the apparent self-contradiction of the concept. Secondly, under certain circumstances it is acceptable that some miracles could have happened. Thirdly, we can consider some quasi-miraculous events as signs of the existence of God, though the indication of some others is a matter of speculation.

Virtue Epistemology is an umbrella term for a new kind of epistemological theory which is formed on a virtue-based theory in the realm of Ethics. Linda Zagzebski, a prominent theoretician of virtue epistemology, believes that establishing an epistemological theory on the virtue-based theory can solve Gettier problem and Value problem –which are the two fundamental problems every epistemological theory faces. Corresponding to the definition of right act, ðˆ†irtue based-theory, Zagzebski proposes an analysis of knowledge based on the Intellectual virtue and argues that her definition of knowledge not only does not have a problem with Gettier problem, but also would not fall in the Value Problem trap. In this paper, following an introduction to the Virtue Epistemology theories, Linda Zagzebski’s theory is presented. Then the applications of her virtue-based theory in the realm of epistemology are explained. Next, a detailed account of her solution to the value problem and Gettier problem are given. Finally, her theory of virtue epistemology is criticized and evaluated.

The aim of this paper is the investigation and critique of moral laws system in Personalist moral theory. Achieving this purpose, "descriptive-critical" and "ampliative criticism" methods have been used. Substances are presented through four parts: first, the nature of moral law is conveyed; second, the quality of exploration of moral laws is presented; third, a system of moral laws is introduced that composed of "formal laws"," axiological laws" and "Personalist laws"; fourth, the challenges of moral laws system are mentioned and then modified. The findings show that moral laws have a prominent place in Personalist moral theory, in this sense that those are good guide for a person in a position of choice. Furthermore, relying on holistic approach, Personalist moral theory denies accepting the dualism of formal and axiological laws and presented them in a coordinated and coherent combination. Additionally, adding new laws to the list of formal and axiological laws and offering a new category as Personalist laws, is another innovation of this theory in ethics field. Finally, main challenges in this area, such as redundancy of moral laws in Personalist character ethics and the inadequacy of them in the leading role, are presented. From this study viewpoint, if we assign unifying role for moral laws, we can put them in the ground of character ethics and prove their moral adequacy, as well.

Traditionally speaking, ethics has been defined as the spiritual qualities that encourage “spontaneous” actions that do not need to be thought, assessed or delayed beforehand. The word "spontaneous" may give the wrong impression that ethical behavior is not based on willfulness or thoughtfulness. However, in the Islamic teachings of ethics (which apply ideas of the Islamic thinkers as well as that of the Western world), willfulness and thoughtfulness actually support ethical actions. The core issue addressed in this paper is assessing the contradiction between “spontaneous” and thoughtfulness in ethical behavior and offering a solution to this contradiction by using the four component model of morality. Using an analytical-logical method and benefiting from the four component model, the ethical behavior is divided into at least four parts: moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation, and moral character. Here, the “spontaneous” is assigned to the motivation and character, while thoughtfulness and contemplation are associated with the first and the second components. The spiritual qualities can cause spontaneous actions in some of the phases of ethical behavior, although not in all of them. It is maintained that no ethical behavior can be defined as not having been based on prior thoughtfulness or careful judgment.

Henry Corbin is among the thinkers who endeavored to actualize the essence of comparative philosophy. Husserlian phenomenology was a source of inspiration for Corbin in order to explicate comparative philosophy. Applying the method of phenomenology in comparative philosophy requires a return to the essence of philosophical thoughts. Focusing on the motto, “return to the essence of things,” in his phenomenology, Husserl was looking for this essence not in the transcendental and heavenly world, but in the immediate consciousness of it, and making it to be of a quiddity. Borrowing the motto, here Corbin was looking for the essence in the heavenly and metaphysical world according to the esoteric ontology of the Iranian Muslim philosophers. Corbin has criticized Oursel’s historical thinking and stood completely in opposition to him by resorting to the method of Husserlian phenomenology. According to Corbin, the access to the intuitive perception of essence is the end of philosophy. Comparative philosophy with historical perspective and with acceptance of historiography is meaningless. Corbin propounds the heavenly or sacred history alongside the temporal and mundane one which is considered the only real history by modern attitude.

Heidegger in his article, Plato's Doctrine of Truth, says Plato close the eyes to traditional concept of truth as unconcealment (aletheia) because of his theory of the forms. According to Heidegger, Platonic truth is agreement of natural things with their forms. Heidegger also pays attention to the concept of the form of Good in his interpretation. He says Plato prefers the concept of the form of Good to the concept of truth as unconcealment. This means first, Platonic concept of truth is agreement of things with forms. Second, the form of Good overrides truth as unconcealment (aletheia). This paper investigated Heidegger's claim with studying Plato's theory of the forms and the form of Good. It seems that Plato not only has no proof on agreement of things and forms as truth, but also he declines any dependency of truth on sensible world according to divided line allegory. In Plato's philosophy the truth is not agreement of things and forms. It is in the essence of forms, and things can be comparing with them. As Heidegger says Plato created collateral relation between paideia concept, the form of Good and truth as aletheia in the allegory of cave. So the concept of the form of Good not only does not castrate aletheia, but also confirms it by aligning.