فصلنامه پژوهش های اصولی
پیاپی 21 (تابستان 1393)

There are several viewpoints about the essence of Usul: one of them claims that the knowledge of Usul is Conventional (Etebari) and based on the other view it is actual. AnywayUsul is based on actual institutions and criteria. Author argues that problems of Usul involve three parts: significations and explorations, probatives (Ehejajat) and consolidations (Tanjizat) (by its attachments, equipollents and preferences) and practical positions; in none of them are conventional subject, predicate and relation.

One of the important issues in the Usul that has very application in the different problems of Fiqh is the rule of Enseraf. This essay discusses addition to explanation of the rule of Enseraf, to study origins and parts of Enseraf, their probativitis and their applications in the new problems of Fiqh. This paper involves two sections: The first section as a Usuli discussion, organizes viewpoints of scholars of Usul about Enseraf and after analyzing those views concludes a new view. The second section as a Fiqhi discussion, shows several examples of applications of the rule of probativity of Enseraf in the solution of Fiqhi problems.

Along with the division of reason to the cognitive and active parts, the fact of religion is the composition of beings and goodness parts. While the reason recognize the principles of religion devoted itself to believe it heartily. Theorems of Principles of religion are in to two class. Reason is sufficient for synoptic recognizing the principles of religion and the teaching of God's Book and tradition (sunna') consolidate the mentioned recognition. For the detail recognition reason needs training, contemplation and acquiring and the Book and tradition (sunna'), two infinite sources are available. Benefiting from those to sources needs settled scientific power which called ijtihad. Because of the fallibility of reason in acquiring the knowledge ijtihad in religious sacred textsgive us the answers of the second class of theorems of principles of religion. But in most cases we cannot reach to the certainty in its restricted sense. In this article I attempt to show how we can believe to ijtidadic outcomes in acquiring theorems of principles of religion.

This article discusses about the nature of prohibitory; is whether it demands abandonment or proscribing (Zajr); i.e. the meaning of prohibition is "ought not to do" or "not ought to do". In addition I talk about the existence of corruption in abandonment of obligatory rulings and the existence of interest in abandonment of prohibitive rulings, studying different aspect and also different viewpoints about whether command to something is equal with prohibition of its general opposite. Based on some viewpoints injunctive rulings are not five but three.