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سال دهم شماره 1 (پیاپی 76، بهار و تابستان 1396)

This paper investigates and elaborates the way Armstrong has concerned himself with Baxter’s metaphysics. For Armstrong, the truthmakers for necessary truths are partial identities. He believes that Baxter’s partial identity between universals and particulars is perfectly matched with this idea where they can jointly make some necessary propositions about the instantiation of universal in particulars, true. To me, this is flawed at least for two reasons. First, particulars and universals, as explained in Armstrong’s metaphysics, have no parts, and thus they do not constitute any partial identity. Second, partial identity in Baxterian sense can be only understood if cross-count identity has already been established. But this latter concept has no place in Armstrong’s metaphysics.

This paper is an attempt to illustrate the integration of Hegelian historicism with Darwinian naturalism in Dewey’s conception of experience. Using a historic approach, John Dewey reaches a naturalistic description of experience in which he emphasizes the interaction, the agency and the transformation of experience. He goes on to emphasize a scientific and objective approach toward experience. Following a critical examination of the role of experience in Greek philosophy and in 17th and 18th-century empiricism in a particular cultural context, Dewey emphasizes this historic concept and tries to introduce proper alternatives suitable for his own era. Therefore, by embodying Darwinian biology in some Hegelian ideas, and by focusing on the concept of experience, Dewey tries to give a naturalized explanation of Hegel. In this paper, the convergence of Dewey’s historic and naturalistic views in his conception of experience is discussed.

Giorgio Agamben is one of the leading thinkers of our time. He aspires to bring Walter Benjamin's project of future philosophy to completion through a complicated sort of archeological thinking. He believed that Kant had thought of philosophical archeology before Foucault did, and that he did not bring this thought to fruition. Taking the path of philosophical archeology, Agamben's approach is distinguished from that of Foucault due to His debt to Heidegger. This has led to his new treatment of words and the nature of language that can be introduced as an "archeology of concepts." An archeology of concepts involves the application of philosophical archeology to the examination of language and the function of words when man encounters Being as an opened-up being towards Being. The concept is fraught with a particular temporal understanding, in turn loaded with an "arche" which can merely be approached by archeology. This article shows that understanding Agamben's philosophical methodology requires an appropriate conception of an influential concept in his philosophy, namely that of "potentiality". Potentiality paves the way for attaining the arche of things. That is why archeology is fundamentally based on potentiality. This concept has made Agamben's philosophy face new and old problems of man and philosophy in a differentlight. The most significant of these problems is Heidegger's relation of Being and language.

The linguistic turn has played the central role in the rise of analytic philosophy. It was simply based on the idea that although a thought is explained through sentences, it will be more simple and reliable. But by after procedures, this view was specified and settled that thoughts cannot be explicated before being uttered in language. It means that the thought or the meaning cannot be grasped other than in terms of the syntax of expression and its relationship to the reference and the truth. Frege practically furthered the latter idea when he laid the foundations of arithmetics. He presented the theoretical principles of the idea in the first volume of his book, introducing different ways of reasoning in the second volume based on what he had in the First volume as the theoretical principles of the idea. On the contrary, Husserl’s view of logic not only did not reflect the relation between language and thought, but it considered language as merely something that can pass on the meaning to others. The view is based on the idea that meaning may be considered priority language and object. Simply, by Prolegomena and Logical investigations, Husserl first explains the relation between the pure categories ( as the pure theories of senses ) together, as he called it the theory of pure form of pluralities as pure form of manifold, and then explains the theory of the field of objects in terms of the early. Therefore, Frege’s way of explaining logic is radically different from that of Husserl. Accordingly, contrary to Dummett’s claim, each of these philosophical thoughts has a different origin, and contrary to Smith, woodruff‘s calm the “Fregean” interpretation of Husserl’s theory of sense cannot be possible.

Gottlobe Frege is considered as one of the first incisive critics of psychologism in logic and semantics. In this article, Frege's criticism of Ideational Theory of Meaning is discussed. According to Frege, this theory invalidates truth, but also problematizes meaning and the possibility of communication as well. These critiques are framed through Frege's main conceptual frameworks, namely, that of logisim and the first theorem of Grundlage der Arithmetik, by which he distinguishes between the objective/logical and the subjective/psychological. These critiques are then compared with later Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument (PLA). We argue that a detailed account of Frege's concept of idea illustrates that his assumptions about the relation between the inner world (Innenwelt) and language could be criticized. Through discussing "private definition of a sign'', ''following a rule'' and ''criteria of the identity'', Wittgenstein's definition of the Private Language and his arguments against it are analyzed so that we can critically study these assumptions.

Sheikh Shahabuddin Suhrawardi’s ideological wisdom has been influenced by ancient Greek and Iranian ideas, as well as the thoughts of the Islamic period, especially the works of Sufism and Persian philosophy. From pre-Islamic Greek sources, one can name the Pythagorean and Platonic schools and referred to Iranian archaeologists from a number of ancient scholars, some of whom were wise men and storytellers such as Keykhosro, Kiyomars, Fereydoun and Jamshid. Suhrawardi’s thought can be regarded as a revival of Iranian wisdom. He has been able to link the basic teachings of these two oriental orientations to wisdom and Islamic mysticism with access to Zoroastrian resources and contemplation in the wisdom of Iran and Greece, and through the use of symbolic roles Some of Zoroastrian and Ancient Persians have depicted the wisdom of Fahlvion and also used them in expressing their illogical wisdom. The innovative aspect of Suhrawardi's philosophy lies in the fact that he has expressed his Philosophy of Illumination in the codification function of these symbols and expressions.The present study seeks to identify and examine some of these terms and their role and place in Suhrawardi's philosophy.

Understanding Fakhr al-Razi’s logical thoughts is very important in understanding the views of seventh and eighth-century logicians. His role in the development of Avicennan logic and his new challenges to this logic are undeniable. Composite of judgment, believe in all concepts are self-evident, expansion and development of a variety of definitions and specific approach to the nominal definition, the mutual implication of concordance and obligation signification, six kinds of universal and to be clear than the particular, unpredicatablity of the partial concept, minimalistic view in the conditions of contradiction between the theorems, differentiation between categorical propositions and real propositions, modality of conditionals, extraction result of the forth syllogism and determining valid mood and valid conditions in fourth figure of Syllogism are Fakhr al-Razi’s logical innovations. This paper is an attempt to explain such innovations.

Merleau-Ponty’s place in the phenomenological movement, established by Edmund Husserl, can be determined only by considering the important role of “dialectic” in his thought. Using a dialectical method, he opens up a new path toward a “dialectical phenomenology” to release phenomenology, as understood in his time, from the antinomies into which it was entrapped. By adopting a dialectical strategy, Merleau-Ponty no longer defines the scope of phenomenology as “pure consciousness.” The encroachment of the “consciousness” and the “world” upon each other does not allow defining the scope of phenomenological investigation in terms of “substantiality of a domain.” Therefore, contrary to Husserl and Heidegger who delineated the phenomenological investigation against sciences, Merleau-Ponty, choosing a Hegelian approach, tries to overcome the ontic/ontological duality and widens the phenomenology’s scope of investigation.

According to the type identity theory of the mind, mental states are identical to brain states. The functionalist theory of the mind, on the other hand, defines mental states on the basis of their functional role in our neurological systems. The type identity theory has been criticized in the literature on various grounds, the most important of which concerns the idea of multiple realizability. According to the multiple realizability theory, different brain states, although they may have different physical structure, can realize the same mental states. This means that differentbeings, despite being radically different in terms of their brain structure, can have the same mental states. The main criticism of functionalists of the type identity theory concerns the idea of multiple realizability, namely, that the type identity theory cannot give a plausible account of multiple realizability. The main claim in this paper is that the functional account falls prey to the same pitfall. In order to substantiate the claim, I will first propose a new version of the multiple realizability theory, followed by the argument that the functional account cannot explain the new version of multiple realizability. It is concluded that in terms of explaining the idea of multiple realizability, the functionalist account does not enjoy any particular advantage over its rival, namely the type identity theory.

According to the prevailing notion, developments in scientific and physical theories have influenced philosophical views, but philosophy has taken the leading some issues. One of the areas in which philosophy precedes science is the discussion of the substantial motion and its results. Mulla Sadra (15th century) proved the substantial motion at a time when detectors had not yet been discovered, the atom and subatomic particles and types of atoms and their conversion to each other in quantum physics had not been demonstrated. Proving the substantial motion, Sadra concluded that time is not an independent entity, but its existence is in motion and each object has its own time with its substantial motion. Since the goal of his transcendental philosophy was not the expression of quantity, he has entered into quantitative debates. More than four centuries passed before the classical physics structure based on absolute time and space collapsed and time and dimensions were calculated based on the speed of movement in relativity physics. This study uses the achievements of relativity physics in the discussion of time and dimensions in the world of imagination, focusing on the principles of time expansion and contraction of dimensions (Lorentz contraction) in quick moves to explain the slowness of time in the Imagination world and the expansion of the earth's dimensions for Imagination beings. The results are consistent with Islamic narrative sources.

The concept of the 'Other' may be discussed in diverse disciplines of Islamic world, such as Gnosticism and occult sciences, wisdom and intellectual knowledge, ethics, theology, jurisprudence, tradition, traditional sciences, and even the science of history. The opinions of Muslim thinkers in this regard then can be considered separately. In the present paper, the problem of 'other' in the debate of other positive religions according to Muhyiddin Ibn al-Arabi is discussed. Therefore the question of legitimacy of religions is presented to Ibn al-Arabi's works, and his principles regarding other literal religions will be under debate. However the question has not been posed to Ibn al-Arabi himself, its consideration will show Ibn al-Arabi's approach in encountering with other positive religions as a Muslim mystic. It may be also one of the branches of the general category of 'other'.

In contemporary philosophical literature, acting against one's better (all things considered) judgment is referred to as akrasia as well as "weakness of will". But the possibility of such an action and the way one can explain this possibility, is debatable. However, the debate has gone further and the very definition of the term "weakness of will" appears to be questionable. Richard Holton, claimed that when we look at discussions on "weakness of will", we see something other than what is supposed to be. He continues that common sense takes "weakness of will" to be something other than acting against one's better judgment. According to Holton, people attribute "weakness of will" to over-readily revising a resolution and failure to act on one's intention. He argues that philosophical debate is on akrasia (acting against one's better judgment) rather than weakness of will and there is a misconception here. Since he declares something about common sense, his claim would be experimentally falsifiable. Alfred Mele tried to examine the Holton's claim using the methods of experimental philosophy. Finally, Mele found that neither Holton nor the philosophical literature is correct. He proposed a disjunctive model for the attribution of 'weakness of will'. Then Holton and May criticized Mele's model and proposed a new model based on various experiments. Since then there is an ongoing debate on this issue. In this article I try to make a critical review of this current debate and to examine why Holton made such a claim, what are the implications of claiming that? Finally I propose a Hybrid model which covers the findings of experiments and reserves the importance of classical problem of "weakness of will" (i.e. the explanation of such an action) as discussed by philosophers.