فصلنامه حکمت اسلامی
پیاپی 20 (بهار 1398)

One of the most important issues of philosophy is to prove the existence of Allah. Naturalist philosophers, theologians and metaphysicians have since long been trying to prove the existence of Allah. The top-class philosophers such as Farabi,  Ibn Sina, al-Tusi, Mulla Sadra and his followers have considered each of the physico-theological arguments of motion, that of theologians from the temporal world and that of philosophers from contingency valid arguments; nonetheless, they hold that those arguments fail to prove the simple whetherness (whether He exists) unless through something else. Since they suffer from some limitations of method or that of provisional certainty they cannot pass through the position of contingent things or that of His existence as a description -rather than His self-subsisting existence- this type of arguments fail to prove His eternal necessity and at last His simple whetherness. However, the Proof of the Truthfuls comes free from those five limitations.    Ibn Sina has suggested the first account of the Truthfuls Proof which Mulla Sadra holds does not meet the required standard. Mulla Sadra has suggested a different account of such a proof by which we come to know the existence of Allah through Allah Himself. Allamah Tabatabaei has proposed another account of such a proof in which no classification into the rich and the poor is mentioned, and still it proves the self-subsisting existence of Allah through the modality of eternal necessity (which is far above essential necessity) .

There are different approaches in the course of the Islamization of sciences. Some scholars have adopted maximal, some minimal, and some moderate approaches. Some approaches demand the refinement of existing sciences and the confirmation of their identities. Other approaches demand the formation of new sciences. The formation approach in religious science considers revealed doctrines and metaphysical backings as primary in the process of religious knowledge production, or devote parallel attention to different methods in the acquisition of knowledge. In the course of forming new disciplines of knowledge, serious consideration of the Islamic worldview and modifying it accordingly is necessary.      Furthermore, the new knowledge is expected to enjoy a variety of methods and references. The erudite criticism of the existing sciences and their development through academic method, known as the formation approach, are demanded by the production of new religious knowledge. The esteemed professors Javadi Amoli and Misbah Yazdi have adopted the formation approach and meta-fundamentalism in the course of the interpretation of religious knowledge.

Aristotle's view on ethics has always been one of the most influential one in the philosophy of ethics. For that reason, philosophers of ethics have proposed different accounts of his view whose correct or incorrect interpretations might only be decided by the reference to Aristotle's works of ethics. Different criteria are or might be inferred from Aristotle's phrases. The examination of those criteria is the subject matter of this research.
In what follows, the authors has deduced and studied Aristotle's preferred criteria for the ethical value through the analysis of his words. The findings lead us to two separate positions of the issue: 1- of something being there, and 2- of demonstrating the same thing. Aristotle's criterion in the position of its being there is the assimilation to gods, theoretical contemplation and rational activity. His criterion in the position of demonstration is the golden mean between two extremes and the consideration of moral agent, as well.
The most serious criticisms of the above criteria are: an ambiguity in the criterion of the position of its being there, inadequate criterion of rational, that those criteria do not match with the Islamic principles of ethics, that they might go far from religious virtues, that the golden mean criterion might not be valid, and that moral agent as a criterion might not be valid, either.

In this essay, the authors have gone to show what capacities there are in Mulla Sadra's school of philosophy for the methodology of political philosophy, particularly the explanation method. In order to answer this question, the authors have first illustrated the aims and functions of political sciences through a philosophical-analytical method, and then studied the methodological capacities of Sadraian system of metaphysics in each of the functions of political sciences.     Some achievements of this research are as the following: 1- viewing a variety of its conceptual definitions, Mulla Sadra's transcendental philosophy has a good deal of capacity in the methodology of definition of abstract concepts of political philosophy. 2- Having embraced the rational interpretation i.e. suggesting abstract and intellectual meanings for political activities, one should come to propose an interpretation of the same activities as divine action, too. 3- Considering the principle of unity within multiplicity and vice versa in the plurality of causes, a researcher of political philosophy may not only explain the plural aspect of causes, but also their unity one. 4- Due to the rational approach in political philosophy, there is no room for prediction i.e. emperical futurology in that field of knowledge. 5- In the position of political activity assessment, a Muslim researcher is expected to consider the Islamic aims and genuine values in order to propose his assessment in the world of politics .

Allamah Tabatabaei's theory of mentally-posited concepts characterizes social concepts as socially-posited ideas coming into being only after the formation of a society; they may acquire their meanings merely in a society making social activities possible; they are mainly changeable though fixed in a few cases; and they might be used as tools in order to help us meet our needs and achieve our social perfection.     Such socially-posited concepts are influenced by objective realities, though they may not come into being unless through the agreements of the peopel and social contracts. They, accordingly, do not exist independently in the outside world, or rather they exist intersubjectively. The dependence of socially-posited concepts on social contract and their mere intersubjective existence lower the grade of social propositions from certainty to that of well-known admitted or axiomatic premises. This will change the methodology of social sciences and practical philosophy in general and deprive this branch of knowledge from apodictic demonstration into dialecticism. In the tradition of Muslim philosophers, however, practical philosophy and the social sciences developed thereunder have always been supported by apodictic demonstration methods.      As a result, Allamah Tabatabaei's theory of mentally-posited concepts and its impact on the decline of methodology of practical philosophy and the social sciences developed thereunder demands a serious revision. At least, we are demanded to reconstruct the above theory in the field of socially-posited concepts and to refer to the tradition of Muslim philosophers in this field.

Each school of thought rests on its particular bases and references. As a school of thought, Salafism has its own epistemological principles. From one side, sensationalism (the school that confines knowledge to the sensuous or imagined knowledge) and traditionalism developed therefrom are the most conspicuous epistemological characteristics of Salafism, as they are persisted by Ibn taimiyyah.
From another side, empirical sensationalism as a prevailing paradigm and a tough rival to rationalism in the West insists on the sensuous knowledge as the only valid source of knowledge. The two schools of Salafism and empiricism agree upon the rejection of reason and rational demonstration. In what presented here, the author has examined the views of the two above sensationalist schools at three levels of epistemology, ontology, and humanities .

Every material thing, philosophers hold, and every living thing, mystics say, are in constant motion. The Creator, the true Living One, manifests Himself through the motion of love, of epiphany, of clarifiaction, and of illumination.     Through the motion of love, He makes the world real in order to develop the perfection of being. Through the motion of clarification and illumination, His holy Essence appears for Himself and thus determinations can be thought to develop their perfection in Muhammadan Reality as the station of knowledge and then to observe them in the station of outside reality thus paves the way for the human full innate nature and the manifestation of Divine Essence. Likewise, through the motion of epiphany, the holy Essence demands to bring Himself from the hidden Ipseity and Hidden Treasure into appearance thus He manifests Himself in all beings through a particular epiphany. Every day, He comes to introduce Himself through different and fresh forms He gives to the creatures in a way that nothing nowhere might be conceived unless His epiphany.     In this way, man may feel the presence of the Truth Almighty in the world of being and comes to believe that, as the cause of persistence of being, His epiphany gives life to the hidden and actual worlds day by day.

In his theory of "the Ethics of Belief", William K. Clifford has gone to hold that anyone who believes something without enough supporting evidence has committed a moral fault. In this theory, Clifford has leveled the accusation of immorality against the religious people for their choice is not supported by enough evidence thus unknowingly. His theory came under various criticisms by many thinkers such as William James. The main objections leveled at this theory are: that it is not well-founded, that it is unduly and excessively generalized, that it has failed to consider all dimensions of human character, and the like.     In what follows, the authors have first explained and studied Clifford's theory, and then compared it to the teachings of the Qur'an. They have clarified that if the faith in a school or in a person is based on reasoning and understanding -as it is so in Islam and with many Muslims-, then Clifford theory will not be correct. Granted, as it were, Clifford's claim applied on some beliefs of some religious people considered thus immoral, the faith and doctrines of many Muslims rest on enough and strong evidence and reasoning, so they are morally right

The belief in Hyle as a substance of no actuality but pure potentia has been one of the controversial issues of philosophy since Aristotle. From among Muslim philosophers, the Peripatetics have embraced it and added to the arguments for it. Some philosophers, however, considered those arguments invalid, because essentially the very concept of a substance of no actuality at all is absurd. Stoics, Suhrawardi the Master of Illumination, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, Khwaja Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, Hakim Ilahi Qomsheii, Shahid Mutahhari, Shahid Sayyid Mustafa Khomeini, Ayatullah Misbah Yazdi, and Ayatullah Fayyazi are among those who have denied the existence of Hyle.
In his Risaltun Fi Nafye al-Hayula (A Treatise on the Rejection of Hyle), Sayyid Majid Hosseini Kashani, a philosopher of 12th century A. H., has proposed the arguments for Hyle and then went on to reject them all. He has also specified a part of his treatise to constitute a proof to totally deny the existence of Hyle.
In this essay, the authors have corrected and researched the text of the mentioned manuscript providing it with comments in the margin .