فصلنامه اندیشه دینی
پیاپی 71 (تابستان 1398)

Knowing human nature is one of the most important elements in Suhravardi's philosophy and therefore, his works, especially his symbolical and metaphorical narratives, are grounds for understanding human essence. According to his view, human soul is an illuminous substance, equal to transcendental spirits and even to God. The goal of the philosophy must be to save the soul and to help man release himself from the darkness of the body and the prison of this world. Symbols used in Sheikh al-Ishraq's mystic-philosophical narratives can be categorized in cosmological, theological and anthropological categories. The anthropological symbols are the main both in frequency and in goal. Although some symbols are formally peripatetic, but the meanings he derives are illuminous (Ishraqi). The implications of some other symbols don’t fit seemingly to the principles of his masterpiece Hikmat al-Ishraq. It can be due to his creative and inspired imagination which precedes his systemizing reason.

The meaning of the monotheistic reading from a scientific theory is to interpret that theory in the context of a monotheistic metaphysics. Accordingly, it is necessary to show that scientific theories have a kind of metaphysics, in the light of which metaphysics, the possibility of different interpretations of that theory is provided. In addition, we must show that the metaphysics can be metaphysics based on a monotheistic ontology. Some philosophers believe that monotheistic reading from scientific theories is impossible, because they believe that such an effort faces four fundamental challenges: an explanatory, logical, methodological, and scientific challenge. My goal in this paper is to show that none of the above-mentioned challenges can show that monotheistic reading from scientific theories is impossible. Accordingly, it is possible to base the metaphysics of science on a monotheistic ontology and interpret scientific theories in the context of such metaphysics.

Moral responsibility is one of the most philosophical subjects with practical significance. Based on this practical significance, P. F. Strawson argued that we can, and we should, ground our theory of moral responsibility on the reactive attitudes like blame and praise free-will-debate freely. In this paper, we study Strawsonian approaches that are known as reactive attitudes approach. For this, we propose “history challenges” for this approach. Then we argue that this approach can be successful against these challenges only by grounding a limited notion of moral responsibility on a limited list of reactive attitudes as Scanlon did. We argue that although Scanlon’s theory is not intuitive, it has the virtue of self-consistence. We also show that there are two levels of responsibility that Scanlon’s “two forms of responsibility” better describes it than the popular Attributability-Accountability distinction. We also show the significance of this limited, but successful, case of reactive attitudes approach.

Alvin Plantinga, on the relationship between science and religion, has two general approaches: defensive and aggressive. In the first approach, he tries to show that there is no deep-seated conflict between science and religion. But in the second approach, it seeks to show that, contrary to popular opinion, there is a profound conflict between science and naturalism. He puts forward an argument called "evolutionary argument against naturalism." The main idea of his argument is that the probability of the reliability of the cognitive capacity of man with the acceptance of the combination of naturalism and the theory of evolution is low, and this includes all beliefs produced by the cognitive capacity of man, including the very belief in naturalism. Therefore, the simultaneous acceptance of naturalism and the theory of evolution is not reasonable , While this problem does not exist in the simultaneous acceptance of theism and evolutionary theory. Plantinga's argument has come up with many reactions and criticisms. Ernest Sosa has written two criticisms. By referring to Descartes and distinguishing between non-reflective and reflectivel knowledge; By referring to Descartes and distinguishing between non-formal and informal knowledge, he considers Plantinga to be essentially concerned with reflective knowledge and considers it to be incorrect; in Sosa's view, the status of theism and naturalism is the same. Plantinga, on the other hand, sees the main problem in reflctive knowledge, and believes that theism is better than naturalism, because naturalism is confronted with a defeater.

Before Mulla Sadra, the intelligibles were divided into the primary intelligible and the secondary intelligible . He developed this argument and divided the secondary intelligible into logical secondary intelligible and philosophical secondary intelligible. This essay explains the views of Sadruddin Muhammad Dashtaki on secondary intelligible in detail for the first time, relying on the manuscript of his old commentary of Qushchi's commentary. The semantics of secondary intelligible, the devision of derivative and non-derivative intelligibles and the external union of the intelligibles with its (their) own subjects and external qualification or qualification in mind are included in this review. In addition, Mulla Sadra's report has been documented in terms of Dashtaki's statements. The division of philosophical intelligibles into derivative and non-derivative and the belief in the external of first division and the nonconcret of the second, is the most important characteristic of his view and of the specific attribute of his theory.

The meaning of the text and interpretations of meaning in Sadra's school is influenced by his thoughts and principles. Accordingly, interpretive meanings are justified in his wisdom. In the school of Sadra, the meaning of man's exposure to being is a form of self-expression that man expresses and names in identifying the revelation and uses its capabilities to introduce the facts of different realms. Slowly The foundations and thoughts of Sadrà, including the originality of existence, the formulation of existence, the rule of the Supreme Leader, Sadra's thoughts on the science of affairs, the essential movement and the fixed prophets are somehow effective in the logic of the meaning of the world of sense or the world of imagination and reason, and The ontological support for the interpretation of the text is well explained. In this article, the influence of Sadra's bases and opinions on the meaning of the text has been deduced and comes from some of the texts Sadra has extracted or adapted from certain meanings. This article highlights the ability of Sadra's philosophy to develop the meanings of the text. The data and logic of his interpretations are from the above point.

Knowledge in Sadra’ philosophy, is merely presence of something near Percipient. The most perfect sense of “presence” under this school, is intuitive knowledge of human being about “self” within which knowing and known have unity. Hence, From Sadra’s view, “knowledge” of “self” has a very high rank position in philosophy. However, what is described as " intuitive knowledge to self" in transcendental wisdom, From Kant’s view is not intuitive knowledge ; but this knowledge is also a kind of our empirical knowledge where is obtained through mediation of “subjective form” which is called “appearance” by Kant. But Kant believes that other than this “empirical ego” assigned to “transcendental ego” He believes that it cannot, as Nomenon, be placed in the center of the human experiential vision. Therefor, he neither believes knowledge of self as an acquired knowledge nor as intuitive one. In this article, we explains this problem of why Mulla Sadra considers intuitive cognition of self. This problem is embedded within a more general problem : Whether that ego which comprehends itself belongs to knowledge ? In this paper, we will show that the “knowledge” of “self”, unlike Kant's conception, cannot be explained except by the existential attitude, because intuitive perception is a kind of presence in existence and for existence.