فصلنامه تاریخ فلسفه
سال دهم شماره 1 (پیاپی 37، تابستان 1398)

Henry Corbin is a western commentator of Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist philosophy. His thoughts in relation to interpreting this philosophy are based on t’awīl (hermeneutics), phenomenology, metahistory, and comparative philosophy. The present paper is the first attempt at addressing this subject, and it is intended to critically investigate Corbin’s thoughts regarding the comparison of Suhrawardī’s philosophy with those of Plato, Aristotle, and neo-Platonists. Here, the authors have explored Suhrawardī’s innovative ideas so that the differences between them and the thoughts of the above-mentioned philosophers are disclosed. They have also presented a general critique of Corbin’s methodology and its defects in the conclusion. Comparative philosophy, which is sometimes called intercultural philosophy, requires philosophers to deal with various cultural, linguistic, and philosophical trends with an emphasis on the fundamental principles underlying the philosophers’ thoughts and to study the differences and similarities among their views. In Corbin’s view, comparative philosophy has functioned as the gateway of the correct perception of philosophical thoughts in the history of philosophy, and that is why he has compared Illuminationist philosophy with the philosophical views of Plato and Aristotle. He believes that Suhrawardī’s philosophy has been derived from Plato’s views, which seems to have its roots in his idea that the origin of philosophy is Greece. Corbin considers him as the Plato of the world of Islam; however, he ignores Suhrawardī’s innovations, the differences between his philosophy and that of Plato, and his criticism of Aristotle.

The statement, “Reason was the first thing that God created”, which has been mentioned in several Islamic texts and has been quoted and emphasized by some great philosophers such as Suhrawardī and Mullā Ṣadrā (in Sharḥ-i uṣūl al-kāfī), is a well-known narration in Islamic ḥadīths. A similar statement with a clearer meaning is: “The Glorious God created the intellect, which was the first heavenly created”. Such statements gain more significance when we compare them with similar statements regarding the place of the intellect, which is equal to being, in Greek philosophy. As the master of all Iluminationist philosophers, Suhrawardī, as he has emphasized in his treatise of Fī ḥaqīqat al-‘ishq (On the Truth of Love) (p. 268), was well-aware of this famous narration. Given Suhrawardī’s explicit reference to this statement and his clear indication in Ḥikmat al-ishrāq, in which he calls himself the reviver of ancient Iranian philosophy (or at least introduces the wisdom of ancient Iranian philosophers (fahlavīūn) as one of the main sources of his own philosophy), this study aims to provide an answer to the question of how we can trace the effects of ancient Iranian wisdom in Suhrawardī’s philosophy. One of the most important factors linking his philosophy to ancient Iranian philosophy is his reference to the place of such Amesha Spenta as Bahman or Urdībihišt in Avestan and Pahlavi texts and considering them as the pillars of the nūrī (illuminative) and ontological system in his philosophy. Here, based on the principle of “Nothing is emanated from the one but one”, he calls the first-emanated from the light of lights (al-nūr al-anwār) the closest light (al-nūr al-aqrab) and, based on ancient Iranian philosophy, he calls it Bahman. However, one might inquire about the relationship between Bahman and the first-emanated, particularly if the first-emanated in Islamic philosophy is the intellect. Following a historical and analytic approach, this paper investigates the philosophy of choosing Bahman as the first-emanated in Suhrawardī’s philosophy and examines his particular choice of Bahman as the god of wisdom and knowledge as tantamount to the intellect in Islamic ḥadīths, which demonstrates Suhrawardī’s profound knowledge of ancient Iranian wisdom.

Phronesis or practical wisdom is one of the intellectual virtues which Aristotle has defined as a predisposition for continuously becoming involved in practice while thinking wisely about good and evil affairs. The outcome of this predisposition or phronetic act is the product of a kind of philosophical thinking which, in addition to viewing certain established principles, attends to madīna (polis) as a cradle for the development of acts; to finite, particular, and changing affairs as the subject of knowledge, and to Man as a free agent. The irregularity and, at the same time, legitimacy of phronesis provides individuals with a strategy not to surrender to fixed and strict scientific laws as the only legitimate tools of knowledge acquisition. Through making a methodological distinction between sophia or theoretical wisdom and phronesis, Aristotle has in fact founded the independence and irreducibility of practico-ethical knowledge about what is correct; practical deliberation cannot be reduced to logical arguments. In Aristotle’s ethical philosophy, accidental knowledge, as the knowledge of finite, particular, possible, and changing affairs, is a complement to essential knowledge, which pertains to pre-eternal and universal affairs and primal and fixed basic principles. Sophia and phronesis can lead to happiness only in case they function as the two sides of the same coin.

According to the teachings of Zoroastrianism and Ahuramazda, the position of kingship in ancient Iran enjoys two aspects of religiousness and leadership or wisdom and government, which were both granted to the king in the light of divine power (farr-e īzadī). In Illuminationist philosophy, too, the light of all lights (al-nūr al-anwār), which illuminates all worlds, is the same khurneh in Avesta, which is referred to as farr (glory) in today’s Persian. In the light of farr, which is an īzadī and divine gift, the blessed person qualifies for the position of kingship. If any knowledgeable and just king deviated from the path of justice, he was deprived of this blessing and glory. Najm al-Dīn Rāzī’s view in Mirṣād al-‘ibād regarding the position of leaders and kings and their duties are very close to ancient Iranian thoughts, Zoroastrian teachings, and Khosrawani wisdom. He calls the king as God’s vicegerent on earth and, through assimilating the king to homā (a fabulous bird of good omen), he confirms God’s attention to this rank and position. Therefore, it can be said that what is called farr-e kiyānī (divine light) in Khosrawani wisdom and Illuminationist philosophy has appeared in Mirṣād al-‘ibād as divine power and heavenly confirmation. Accordingly, Rāzī refers to some specific features for kings which match those appearing in ancient religions and Khosrawani wisdom. The present study aimed to list the features of kings in Mirṣād al-‘ibād while considering the elements of kingship in ancient schools of philosophy, particularly Khosrawani wisdom, and then explain the similarities and differences between the thoughts of Najm al-Dīn Rāzī and the basic principles of Khosrawani wisdom regarding the necessary qualities and features of a king. The findings of the study demonstrate that, given the place of his own gnostic interpretation and the Illuminationist and Zahirite meaning of Khosrawani wisdom, Rāzī considered kingship to be the same as divine guardianship and the philosophical concept of “king philosopher” or, in other words, a wayfarer who has attained God and is now at the stage of “for the created through the Truth”. This individual is a “particular king” who has been granted the position of “people’s king” or the authority to rule people in the light of such characteristics.

A necessary research activity in each period is the revival of the works of thinkers and philosophers who have played an essential role in the history of the development and advancement of Islamic culture and teachings but have remained unknown to the world. Fakhr al-Dīn Samākī, known as Muḥaqqiq Fakhrī, is one of these philosophers who lived in the 10th century (AH). He was the student of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Manṣūr Dashtakī. He wrote some important works such as Glosses on Qūshchī’s Sharḥ-i tajrīd and Glosses on Maybudī’s Sharḥ al-hidāyah al-ḥikmah. Athīr al-Dīn Abharī’s Hidāyah al-ḥikmah consists of three chapters on logic, physics, and theology. Maybudī commented on its two chapters of physics and theology, and Samākī wrote glosses only on the first and second sections of the three sections of the chapter on physics of Maybudī’s Sharḥ al-hidāyah al-ḥikmah. Unlike Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī, Samākī did not found a specific school of philosophy; however, he managed to play a significant role as a mediator in the development of philosophical thought in general and turn into a source of inspiration for Mullā Ṣadrā in developing his Transcendent Philosophy. He did so through presenting some accurate critiques, conducting thorough investigations, and expressing specific and innovative views regarding certain topics discussed by mutikallimūn, Peripatetic philosophers, Illuminationists, and gnostics within the framework of some of his dependent and independent (commentaries and glosses) works. Among such views, reference can be made to his different interpretation of sollemī (stepwise) argument and the development of three new arguments on demonstrating the finitude of things, which have been discussed in this paper.

As far as we know, no book was ever written in Persian during the early centuries of the history of Islam on philosophy or any other field, and all Muslim scientists and scholars, who were mostly Iranian, wrote their scientific works in Arabic. From fourth century (AH) onwards, Iranian philosophers gradually started writing a limited number of their works in Persian alongside the many works in Arabic. This was an invaluable endeavor since it paved the way for later scholars to write in Persian. They did so at a time when Persian, after an interval, lacked the necessary capacity for the expression of abstract philosophical concepts and meanings. Ibn Sīnā and his students, Nāṣir Khusraw, Suhrawardī, Bābā Afḍal Kāshānī, Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī, and many others played a significant role in writing philosophical works in Persian. Their attempts at finding Persian equivalents for Arabic philosophical terms have been of great value to Iranian philosophers of the modern period to create Persian philosophical works. Following a descriptive-analytic method, this paper investigates the linguistic and literary reasons behind the dominance of Arabic over philosophical writings. Moreover, through introducing the most important philosophical writings in Persian, it explains their role in the development and enrichment of this language for the transfer of philosophical knowledge. Finally, the author discusses the effects of translated western philosophical works on the enrichment of the treasure of Persian lexicon and emphasizes the necessity of writing more philosophical works in Persian in the present era, in which the number of people who speak Arabic as a foreign or second language has decreased to a large extent.

Ibn Miskawayh, Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, and Ḥakīm J‘afar Kashfī share relatively similar views on the soul and believe in Aristotle’s middle term. Moreover, all of them consider the four-fold virtues of wisdom, bravery, piety, and justice to be the most original moral virtues; however, they also have some disagreements with each other. This paper, while trying to accurately explain the similarities between them, aims to carefully investigate the differences among them regarding the mentioned virtues. Accordingly, after dividing the virtues into primary and secondary ones, the authors analyze and compare the lists and definitions of secondary virtues in the view of each of these philosophers with those of others. The findings of this study demonstrate that the greatest similarities between the views of Ibn Miskawayh, Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, and Ḥakīm J‘afar Kashfī pertain to the virtue of wisdom and its related virtues. However, there are some relatively noteworthy differences among them regarding bravery, piety, and justice. For example, regarding piety, there is some disagreement between the views of Ibn Miskawayh and Ṭūsī; nevertheless, Ḥakīm Kashfī provides a different list of secondary virtues in comparison to the other two philosophers and oftentimes discusses piety in unity with economic and sexual self-discipline. The list and definitions of secondary virtues in relation to justice are completely similar to each other in the views of Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī and Kashfī; however, Ibn Miskawayh’s list of justice-related secondary virtues contains 13 items more than those of the other two philosophers.