نشریه پژوهش های فلسفی
پیاپی 29 (زمستان 1398)

Russell's philosophy can be divided into two distinct periods. In the first period, under the influence of his predecessors, he endeavored to preserve foundationalism and in the second period, he tries to minimize foundationalism. In his early works, he accepts induction because of its inherent intuition and widespread use in life and considers inductive inferences as probable, not certain. But in the second period, by analyzing empirical phenomena, he likes what a pure empiricist would do, infer the postulates that are the bases of empirical sciences. These postulates have a supra-logical nature, and interestingly, induction is not among these postulates. In fact, according to Russell, the science and the ordinary understanding that are resulted by non-demonstrative inference require these postulates. In this paper, we try to understand Russell's notions on induction, therefore, we investigate it in detail in the mentioned two distinct periods. For the first period, Russell's notions and one of the examples of probabilistic proofs presented for it will be presented. And for the second period, his reasons for changing his approach and his new perspective, as well as the supra-logical postulates governing the non-demonstrative, along with some of their properties, are presented. And finally, though briefly, some of the criticisms are discussed.

Which properties of the objects do we receive by our senses when we perceptually experience them? According to a common philosophical belief, sensible properties include simple ones. As for vision, these properties include color, shape, illumination, special relations, and motion. So the what-ness of things or their causal relations - for example- cannot be received via sensation. We have them- of course- in our experiences but, only after some operations of cognitive faculty on what is already received. Recently, people argue against this conception of perceptual experience. Our concern here would be exclusively on natural kind properties, for their special philosophical significance; visually experiencing natural kinds, would exclude some important general accounts of perception as out of the case. In this paper, after some introductory remarks, we try to introduce the method of phenomenal contrast as a general algorithm that should be followed if we are intended to infer anything about the content of experience on the basis of its phenomenal character. We do this by examining Ned Block's seemingly alternative method for determining the content of experience and showing that, that is just another case of applying the same method. Then rejecting some of its main criticism we defend Siegel’s own application of her method to infer that we visually experience natural kind properties.

Art thinking produs in second period of Heidegger thinking, where in event thinking (Ereigins) dominate to fundamental ontology. Therefore, seems reduced special role of Dasein in art thinking. But in fact, it can be said that there is Dasein and Being (Sein) are both sides of one coin. Anywhere think of Being is possible, essentially Dasein is presence and importance of art is that bring out the truth of Being. In this paper attempts to clarify different role of dasein in Art thinking. Role of Dasein as passage of art let bart event happens and Being itself speaks. Then investigate place of artist Dasein and poet (creator), audience (recreator) and preserver. After asking question about how to be Dasein in art thinking, determine different role of Dasein in Dasein role as artist, audience and preserver. Dasein in art thinking is Being listener and he is passive, but he is responsible and care. He is trustee of meing and the destiny of nation is formed through it. Then it is destroyed himself after gathering a nation. In this aspect after create and compose infact Dasein not destroyed in fact but in place of audience, he addressed by Being. At the end this question is answerd, what make change in Heidegger,s thinking and why he attracted to Art thinking.

In the first part of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel criticized major claims of sense-certainty that have strategic importance across the book’s process. The sense-certainty claims that it has partial and singular cognition of its immediate object; and supports his claims in three steps and through the three havens as the absolute object, the absolute subject and the absolute Intuition. Considering the text of Phenomenology of Spirit, we attempted explanation and interpretation of how Hegel could pervade into the claims of sense-certainty using these key terms of his philosophy, i.e. mediation, subject and object contact, Conception of universality in a partial circumstance, as well as the power of negation (which are first suggested in the sense-certainty part and play essential role throughout the book) and throw them into an internal Contradiction and indicate that through its steps, the sense-certainty actually comes close to corroborate the universal circumstance by all its efforts though it looks for corroboration of the singular circumstance.

This paper examines the reducibility of politics to classical ethics by examining the presumed assumptions of the relationship between ethics and politics. After criticizing classical epistemology, it criticizes its presuppositions. Then concludes that, although modern thought has made epistemology different, it has failed to eliminate puritanistic presuppositions of morality which is the inheritance of the metaphysical era. This is because modern epistemology is far removed from puritanism and absolute principles by a historical understanding of concepts such as morality and politics. While classical ethics is in search of pure and is looking for a list of presupposed good and bad. In the meantime, Machiavelli is one of the first to recognize the necessity of revising the system of values ​​and adapting morality with modern epistemology. He claims that the new Ethics is not only irreducible to some principles but as a historical structure, it reproduces itself in different situations. Acquiring these new ethics is possible in the face of accepting evil and adapting it to the nature of the era. In this way, politics also has the opportunity to focus on its main goal of minimizing violence. The present research introduces the idea of ​​"ethics in politics" as the modern ethics of modern politics.

According to Chomsky's view, the main part of our linguistic knowledge is genetically determined. Therefore, language is inherent and this unknowing or tacit knowledge lies at the foundation of our ability to speak. The purpose of this article is to analyze the nature of tacit language in Chomsky's philosophy. This research is based on a qualitative research approach and conceptual analysis method to study the concept of tacit language and its relation with other main components of Chomsky's attitude toward language including linguistic competence, generative linguistics, universal grammar and argument of stimulus poverty. According to the three main critiques of tacit linguistic knowledge, tacit linguistic ability, and tacit linguistic rule, the tacit access to the reservoir of linguistic rules in the philosophy of Chomsky is not well explained and it is not empirically verifiable. Therefore, when this knowledge is valid, it is based on a kind of explicit language knowledge of grammar and rules which are expressed in the form of a statement and can be recognized and verified by the user of the language.

Thinking which is a distinctive aspect of mankind from other human beings is a reason to call human culturally. Thinking is not merely a closed step, but is a coherent »way», and yet is a deep-seated process. When the need to »being-in-the-way», not to be institutionalized and spontaneous in the presence of the scholar, cannot be exploited by its brightness and its deep consequences. Originally phenomenology is a way to think and goes beyond that summariz merely as a philosophical school or »method».  Phenomenology is a decisive attempt to enrich the world of human experience, a world in which the various aspects of being considered less, or has been put in the shadow, and gradually had been lost its shape. The mission of the »way» is to retrieve and disclose some of the other things that exist in the world and we have neglected to do so. In present article, the author, with an ontological concern and familiarity with the damages in the field of research, addresses the phenomenology as steps of the »way» of thinking (not as a method) to have a multifaceted and comprehensive perspective to the phenomenon in order to abide to them and through this, enters into clarify the differences between »way» and »method» based on the intellectual foundations of phenomenology.

Although the concept of "mode" is not unknown for audiences and scholars of Islamic philosophy, it seems this concept is not well considered. In this article after considering the origin of mode, a comprehensive description on its position and solutions in the field of Islamic logic and philosophy is supplied, especially in transcendent wisdom. The relationship between prestige and credit is also examined as much as possible. Numerous examples have been provided to avoid ambiguity in this regard. Then the capabilities of this discussion and at the same time, the necessary conditions to utilize it have been showed. It is also summarized at the end of this article that observing the issue of mode can pave the way between dogmatism and relativism.

One of the main arguments that have posed a serious challenge to utilitarianism is an objection by Bernard Williams, according to which this theory alienates individuals from their interests and projects in favor of the greater good. Consequentialism, he argues, is concerned with what state of affairs the world contains; and utilitarianism is grounded on negative responsibility, which is inherent in consequentialism; so, it alienates an individual from the projects and attitudes with which she is closely identified, thereby causing her to lose her integrity, which is of special moral importance. This essay, reviewing and analyzing Williams’ criticism of negative responsibility, shows that this responsibility is the implication not only of consequentialism but even of pursuing personal projects; and raises doubts about its relation to the attack on integrity in several respects. It also calls into question the basis upon which Williams claims that utilitarianism alienates us from our moral feelings. Then, mentioning some objections to Williams’ view and responding to them, it discusses the importance of integrity and its moral status. Finally, it examines whether it is necessary for a moral viewpoint to be consistent with our deep personal projects if integrity is to be protected.

One of the problems in Christian theology that ignites long-lasting debates is the explication of the relation between two realms of existence (mundane world) and essence (divine world). Because of its capacity to give us a way out of the crisis of meaninglessness and nihilism, finding a solution to this problem is of importance to us. The lost meaning of the world should be restored the interaction between God and existence, therefore the dialectical relationship between these two seemingly separate realms can perform simultaneously two functions: giving meaning to and saving the world. According to Barth’s suggestion, the chiasm that separated the mundane and divine realms is unbridgeable relying solely on human reason and potencies, hence God himself with his omnipotence should intervene and save the world. Conversely, Tillich believes that the very system that initiates the creation, opens up the possibilities of redemption and these two procedures cannot be unrelated. Saving the world doesn’t require the negation of creation and bestowing meaning to it from beyond. Accepting that our world is not devoid of meaning, one can affirm it considering its positive side, while the necessity for negating the ambiguities and oppositions of the fallen world remains undisputed. In this essay, besides the investigation of Barth’s theory of dialectics and Tillich’s critiques thereof, it will be shown how Tillich apply the Nietzsche’s idea of affirmation to develop a positive dialectics.

The main issue in this paper is to find the relationship between the concepts of Foucauldian dispersed power and Kundera’s kitsch in The Unbearable Lightness of Being a novel authored by Milan Kundera. In other words, the main question here is how the concept of kitsch accompanies and interweaves dispersed power concept. One main objective in this comparative literary study, focusing a Foucauldian reading on The Unbearable Lightness of Being, is to argue that Kitsch phenomenon in  Kundera’s literary work cannot be explained without going beyond power relations in traditional reading. This argument leads us to Foucauldian different reading on the concept of power relations. Foucault and Kundera bring about power without agency/subject: A Empire of the Gaze. In their readings, power/ Kitsch alludes to concepts going beyond communism/liberalism dichotomy. This study discusses decontextualized power versus centralized power, the aesthetics of the accident versus public aesthetics, a unique issue versus ontological similarity, author centeredness versus the death of the author. These dichotomies are the fruits of a paradigmatic shift on power concept in modern era. Therefore, this study can show the consequences of modern power in four aspects, namely politics, aesthetics, ontology and literature. This study, on one hand, has some ramifications on highlighting philosophical criticism in novel criticism, on the other hand, the linkage between post-modern school of thought and Kundera’s novels.

"Our Dasein", "our today's Dasein", "our historical Dasein" and the like are idioms that Heidegger uses very often in his works especially during the first years after the publication of his Being and Time. The high frequency of occurrence such idioms suggest that they cannot philosophically be neutral and pointless. A similar search in Heidegger's works reveals besides his uses of Dasein the pronoun "we" has also a philosophical significance, so that we could observe the unfolding of this theme in his lectures and writings. Apart from presentation of the development of this theme in Heidegger's important works, the present paper also treats: 1. That the "we-problem" is in Heidegger's works thematized philosophically. 2. What Heidegger means with "we" and why he questions "us"? 3. How is the We-problem related to Daein? In so far as pronoun "we", i. e. the "we", defines the Dasein concretely, we could say we are entitled to speak of the "we-definition" of Dasein. Finally, what are the consequences of this problematic for interpreting and understanding Heidegger's philosophy?

As a problem statement, it must be indicated that the subject of soul has been the centerpiece of many philosophers’ attention which has led to the creation of diverse concepts about it. In this article, Farabi and Ibn Sina are referred to as the representatives of Masha Philosophy and Suhrawardi as the representative of the Philosophy of Illumination.  This research, in the first part, describes Farabi's and Ibn Sina's views on definitions, and then describes Suhrawardi's critique of the Masha Philosophy in this regard, and at the end he explains the point of view of Suhrawardi; since soul -cognition and its manifestations are the foundations of creatures’ cognition. As a necessity, it can be asked how our soul gains cognition? Mashayeans claim that they are capable of object cognition through its limitations, an idea which is criticized by Suhrawardi, believing such definitions to be incorrect while providing his own point of view regarding world cognition based on the light. In his opinion, soul is a manifestation on its own for its nature of light, and the brighter the light is, the more soul -cognition it will possess. He believes that Reasoning methods are not sufficient enough for gaining cognition and Intuitive knowledge is required instead. He furthermore supports his theory by holding soul and light equal to one another.

This article attempt to say that the fundamental question about justice, according to Plato’s philosophy, is always the question: which government is better and which order is fairer and who has the authority of government over people? In Plato's view, justice must be realized within the individual and in the community. Justice in the city is found in the natural hierarchy and division of labor. In other words, Plato’s view of division of labor is divided into three types of peoples’ task in life which are workers as farmers, military type and guardians. Plato conceived of the state as an art in which the ruler should consider the interests of those who are under the rule and by keeping in mind the moderation and harmony of extremes, if one insists on following the selfish tendencies it gives rise to turmoil and chaos. Therefore, Plato conceives of the state as a human body with three parts, in which there are rulers and guards who are in good shape instead of the head and chest and abdomen. As a healthy and balanced person balances and appropriateness, the sign of a state of virtue is that anyone knows his place. This article seeks to explain the principles of the theory of justice based on the thesis of the Republic and its objections and also it seeks to provide an appropriate answer to the question: is justice, as Plato says, identical with the concept of virtue?

According to Heidegger, Aletheia is a category by which one can understand the relationship between phronesis and Agathon; because Heidegger has used Aletheia in its Greek sense, i.e. disclosure and openness and not true in the sense of correspondence with the reality. Having accepted Aletheia as disclosure and openness, the relationship between phronesis and Agathon becomes possible in two ways. Firstly, phronesis, as conceived by Heidegger, refers to a mode of disclosure and openness or to put it more precisely, a mode of the existence of Dasein which is related to praxis and action and leads Dasein towards the best action, i.e. existential being. Agathon is also the source of Aletheia. To put it otherwise, it is the source of disclosure and openness as well as the source of being and Dasein. Secondly, Heidegger does not attribute the transcendence in Agathon to any supra-temporal and spatial existence, i.e. God, rather to Dasein himself. Said differently, Agathon includes the being and existing capabilities in Dasein and the latter’s transcendence lies in passing through the existing condition and reaching existential being which is possible through overcoming the habits and reaching disclosure and openness. Thus, Agathon is the touchstone of the behaviors of Dasein. This is what Heidegger refers to as the call of conscience in his discussion of phronesis and considers it a basis for phronetic action; this is a call that comes from Dasein and invites him to reach a mode of existential being that would allow it to know himself as a Dasein and act according to it.

Like his other French contemporaries’, Emmanuel Levinas’s phenomenological and ethical thought accommodates many metaphors originated from and related toward family and gender roles to expose all the previous philosophical traditions to serious criticisms. Among these roles, he lays stress upon, and gives brilliant importance to motherhood and its related role(s) as it has a fundamental ethical significance in all cultural-educational traditions to make a concrete-passive ground for his theory of ethical responsibility: this kind of responsibility, as Levinas elucidates it, comes into reality prior phenomenologically to the third, and therefore, prior to society and politics. As the surmounting axiological paradigm case in Levinas’s thought, motherhood and maternity are interwoven with ethical responsibility since the two sides have a common axiological modality. In this paper, the author’s main objective is to illustrate the axiological equivalence between motherhood and ethical responsibility while portraying the fact that they both have robust gender comportment.

In both arguments about the faculties of soul and the premises of different kinds of deductions, Ibn Sina discusses briefly practical philosophy. While in the former he regards ethics as the result of practical reason, he recognizes it in the latter based on a specific kind of accepted premises (praiseworthy opinions, well-accepted opinions) that have been originated from habits, conventions, traditions from the past time and the like. Besides these two viewpoints combined together, by confirming that i) practical reason is called reason merely homonymously, ii) praiseworthy opinions have no other basis but reputation and iii) human reason considered by itself cannot judge about them, Ibn Sina makes his readers ready for his inferences: that a) moral descriptions like good and bad are not descriptions of realities and b) moral judgments are not propositions. Nonetheless, by his ambiguous statement that praiseworthy opinions can be either true or false and it is possible to provide a demonstration for them, he, on the other hand, makes his position, at least in appearance, dark, ambiguous and variously interpretable. This article has two sections. The first section is dedicated to practical reason and its function in moral judgments while the second one focuses on Ibn Sina’s theory about the premises and materials of moral judgment and their origin. These two considerations are going to illustrate that Ibn Sina’s theory about the function of practical reason and the origin of moral judgment leaves no place for truthfulness or falsity of those accepted premises that are considered praiseworthy opinions and their demonstration is not possible. However, even if some of them can be either true or false, they must be emplaced somewhere outside the boundaries of moral judgment.

In 1951 and 1952, Paul Oskar Kristeller demonstrated that what we know as Fine Arts did not exist until the eighteenth century. Shortly afterward, this notion was widely accepted and agreed upon by most of the theorists. Later, some of the writers such as Larry Shiner developed it. However, recently some other writers do not agree with him and for example, argue against his theory by indicating that the concept of “Imitative Arts” in ancient Greece is equivalent to the “modern system of Fine Arts”. Among these critics, James O. Young, the English translator of Charles Batteux, can be noted. This article briefly explains these two narratives at first and then, defends Kristeller's by considering some considerations. This defense is two-dimensional: On the one hand, this article emphasizes the nature of Art in the modern epoch and, on the other hand, alludes to the concept of "Fine Arts" in Iran and our participation in the new western concept of Fine Arts.

Nietzsche holds that in all its levels every culture and form of life has been founded on some version of the illusion, be it Socratic, Apollonian or tragic. In the Modern area, we still need illusions as the driving forces of our culture. Hence, the paradox of honest, transparent or conscious illusions. The paradox here lies in that, thanks to the self-consciousness of this era, all the past illusions have collapsed and we came to realize that every kind of value or faith is no more than one version of illusion. Then, how is it possible to live with illusions we know them to be illusions? In this regard, Nietzsche appeals to art and probe into the way it provides us with conscious illusions. Here is the realm where we can learn how to live with transparent illusions in a fictionalist way. Art is the place we enjoy to live with illusions and we, as the free spirit of the future and commanders of new values, should imitate art in this regard, although this time in the realm of real life. In the current paper, I will try to elaborate on this line of thought and interpretation as it is articulated by Hussain, showing how Nietzsche's answer can be constred as a version of fictionalism, or be more exact, value fictionalism.

This paper is aimed to address this question: what is the role of the philosopher in transitions experienced by consciousness in Phenomenology? In order to answer that question, in addition to Hegel's Introduction to Phenomenology as the main source, Wittgenstein's attitude concerning the role of philosophy in knowledge will be examined. Since for Hegel, Phenomenology is the ladder to reach a systematic philosophy, I show that Phenomenology is prone to both negative and positive readings. If it is read as a negative one, the role of the philosopher is simply to observe; and if positive, the philosopher has a more active role. Here, Wittgenstein's view about the nature of philosophy is compared with Hegel's to show that the negative aspect of Hegel's dialectical view is similar to Wittgenstein's negative and anti-philosophical one, whereas it is only the positive aspects of Hegel's position which contrasts sharply with Wittgenstein's.

The concept of experience which had been formed in Kant’s epistemological system, despite its importance as one of the fundamental keystones of the critical system, ironically remained neglected in the decades following his death. The rediscovery and re-establishment of Kant’s concept of experience is due to the efforts of thinkers who are generally associated with “the Neo-Kantian school”. Focusing on the work of one of the prominent figures of Neo-Kantian school, Hermann Cohen, this paper sets out to show how the Kantian experience can transcend the standard conception which is based on subject/object duality, and can reach the origin of knowledge. Following that, we will see how this originary experience motivates “the coming philosophy” which has been outlined by Walter Benjamin in his early writings in the 1910s. However, this would never mean that Benjamin simply follows the path of Neo-Kantians: As we shall see, in order to reach the origin of knowledge, Benjamin uses a historio-theological “battle plan” which is markedly different from the one used by the Neo-Kantians – and Kant himself.