پژوهشنامه فلسفه دین (نامه حکمت)
سال هفدهم شماره 2 (پیاپی 34، پاییز و زمستان 1398)

The methodological naturalism, ie, the elimination of the Supernatural causes in the explanation of nature, what is the situation in the history of Western thought, and in which process was recognized as the main feature of the new science? With the historical study of Western thinking, it becomes clear that the roots of methodological naturalism reach the end of the period of myth and the beginning of philosophical thinking. In ancient Greece, with the exception of Plotinus and, to a certain extent, Plato, the dominant discourse in the recognition of nature, was a natural cause. In the early Middle Ages, due to the tendency toward Plato and Plotinus, supra-nationalism and the revelation of knowledge were the method of scientists in understanding nature. But in the late Middle Ages, for the sake of Aristotle's influence, the naturalistic approach returned to the scientific space of the West. With the critique of Aristotle in the Renaissance and the scientific revolution in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a new method of methodological naturalism was accepted as a method of science. Classic physics, with a deistic view of the universe and the theory of evolution, with the exclusion of any divine design and discipline, established new naturalism in the scientific space, and this characteristic is still recognized as the paradigm of science.

Famous emergentists such as Nancy Murphy and Paul Davies claim accepting some emergentists' views would lead to a fundamental change in the prevailing scientific paradigm. This article first provides a general analysis of the components of the scientific paradigm by examining the main themes of positions such as naturalism, reductionism, scientism, and the like. In the course of this analysis, the various components of the scientific paradigm are explained, and the relation of these components to each other is examined. Afterwards, we examine emergentists' views of both weak and strong doctrines, and after classifying these views, we evaluate their relation to the components of the scientific paradigm. Investigating and classifying emergentists' views is done based on separating the views accepting hierarchy in nature in an ontological sense, against the views accepting just hierarchy in our explanations about nature, as well as the different views on the possibility of causal effects from higher than physical levels on the world situation. The results of this study show that, contrary to the views of Murphy and Davies, emergentism does not result in a paradigm shift, and only some of the particular views underlying this philosophical position are, to a limited extent, incompatible with some of the components of the prevailing scientific paradigm.

In this article, we address the role of pragmatic considerations in knowledge and, in particular, religious knowledge, as one of the challenging topics in epistemology and religious epistemology, and suggest a different model for the relation between pragmatic considerations and religious beliefs. Based on this model, a plausible explanation for believers and atheists' different positions in similar and identical epistemic situations can be conferred. In this regard, after presenting epistemic purism as the common view in epistemology with the claim that epistemic subjects must have the same position in the same and identical epistemic situations, we will show its inadequacy in explaining some epistemic intuitions. Then we consider subject-sensitive invariantism from Fantl and McGrath's perspective and confirm its supremacy over epistemic purism for its ability in explaining those epistemic intuitions. Finally, using a version of subject- sensitive invariantism in the field of religious beliefs, we show that believers can defend their theistic positions without being accused of deficiency and epistemic vices.

Jurgen Moltmann (1926-) is one of the first generations of the post-world war theologians who existentially experienced the ominous consequences of despair in the Christian society and made his best efforts, alongside the Confessional Church, to resurrect “hope” among the Christians. Utilizing the Liberal and the Existential Theology and demythologizing of the Christian history reserve, he stated that the resurrection of “hope” is the result of human existential capacity along with his/her knowledge and decision. Applying dialectical method, Moltmann put the “eschatology”, which was an aphotic subject at the end of all Christian theology books, as a practical principle at the center of the Christian theology, besides “cross” and “resurrection” of Christ. Influenced by Ernst Bloch and away from theistic and pantheistic God, Moltmann borrowed the “panentheistic” view of Pannenberg about God and by a new interpreting of the “cross” and the “resurrection”, distinguished from Martin Luther, Karl Barth, and Rudolf Bultmann’s, he made God with His “covenant” the most watchful figure in the human being’s sufferings and challenges and the most active being in the fate of man and cosmos. In this documented, critical and analytical article, emphasizing on the first book of Moltmann; i.e. Theology of Hope, we have tried to answer the question of importance of “hope” in Moltmann’s theology in comparison with Bultmann’s liberal and existential theology, Barth’s neo-orthodox theology, and Bloch’s Marxist philosophy of hope. Moltmann could accomplish the presence of the Holy Book in the Christians’ daily life, and make a comprehensible key for solving the problems of the Christian society by resurrecting of the eschatological hope instead of remaining at the present or the past.

Along with other Islamic theologians and philosophers, al-Shaykh al-Mufid believes in the inerrancy of prophets as far as it is related to the claim of prophethood, as well as reception and presentation of revelation and contends that they cannot commit sin in these areas whether consciously or unconsciously. In areas other than those related to their prophecy, though, he believes that while they are all inerrant in almost every realm, before their being chosen, prophets other than Muhammad might have inadvertently committed minor sins which do not humiliate them. On the other hand, al-Mufid considers the prophets to be aware of divine commands and aware of the consequences of (dis)obeying them. One might object that belief in the prophets’ knowledge of divine commands is incompatible with the belief that they have committed sins. I will argue that based on the philosophical principle of gradation of knowledge and inerrancy, as well as the scriptural arguments for gradation of prophecy, the prima facie contradiction in al-Mufid's ideas on prophets’ knowledge and inerrancy can be resolved.

According to the critical Kant, the idea of God is a transcendental idea of pure reason, i.e., theoretical reason cannot, after considering its limitations, make an argument against or for it. In the pre-critical period, however, in a treatise called "The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God" he tried to prove the existence of God by means of the theoretical reason. The significance of this treatise is that, on the one hand, contrary to what the critical Kant believes about the limits of human reason, he endeavors to theoretically prove the existence of God, and on the other hand, contrary to the Wolfian-Leibnizian tradition, he proposes a natural-theological argument instead of a cosmological argument. Concentrating on the concept of possibility in formulation of an ontological argument, he criticizes the former formulations, especially Descartes’, and presents a new version of it. In this paper, we intend to first explain Kant's argumentative reasoning for proving the existence of God based on "The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God", and second, we try to show that the alleged conflict between the title of the book (only possible argument...) and its content (the acceptance of two natural-theological arguments and ontological argument), which led some of Kant scholars to believe that Kant is incoherent is false and comes from a mistake in translation of the German term ‘Beweisgrund’

In an epistemic disagreement, if the counterparts insist on their rightfulness and falsification of other’s opinions, the cognitive contradictions often end up with conflict. If one of them ignores his belief and accept other’s beliefs unconditionally, it leads to domination and sovereignty of others. Here, Ibn ‘Arabī proposes a third way. Despite sticking to his belief, he considers other’s beliefs as opportunity for further excellence and knowledge. In Ibn ‘Arabī’s system of thought, every creature is ontologically a manifestation of a name or some names of God. Also, epistemologically, their understanding of God depends on their ability to receive the divine manifestations. Ibn ‘Arabī accepted the idea of inaccessibility to the whole truth by connecting the discrepancy of ideas and beliefs to the discrepancy of talents and manifestations. This idea can be one of his most important bases in addressing epistemic disagreement.

Max Scheler’s philosophy of religion is, in fact, the essential phenomenology of religion. The core of his discussion of religion is the concept of "Religious Act," which Scheler introduced as a "givenness" in which the divine/holy is given. He believes that "Person" communicates with God in the religious act, and the experience of this communication is unique and irreducible. This action is self-evident, but its self-evidence differs from self-evidence in logic and derives from the phenomenological intuition. According to Scheler, the religious act is fundamental to human existential dimensions. He describes three intrinsic specific features of religious act, which we review in this article. At first, we look at the intuitive understanding and the role of emotion in it. Then, after explaining the concept of the religious act and its characteristics, we examine and evaluate Scheler’s formulation of these characteristics. We argue that the relationship between Scheler’s conception of the religious act and the Divine (whether understood monotheistically or not) is not clear. Besides, speaking of “transcendence” implies an a priori “trans-world.” Finally, Scheler’s method in recognizing the fundamental dimension of the human being is in contrast with the task of phenomenology.

During the 1980s, in opposition to the traditional interpretation of Tractatus, in which it is believed that Tractarian nonsense proposition can be divided into two groups of misleading and illuminating nonsense, a new interpretation (therapeutics or anti-metaphysical) has formed the proponents of which are in agreement upon two fundamental ideas about Tractatus: First, all nonsense propositions in Tractatus are mere nonsense, and there is no difference between them, and second, Tractatus aims at transmitting a practical knowledge to its reader, rather than a theoretical one. Some central figures of the therapeutic interpretation of Tractatus, such as James Conant, believe that early Wittgenstein should be treated within the Kierkegaardian lines and his Postscript. Both early Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard maintain that "ineffable truth" is an inconsistent idea that should be considered as a disease that should be treated. In this paper, I try to describe therapeutic interpretation and the Kierkegaardian reading of early Wittgenstein. Then, I focus on some of its failures and defects: Far from being compatible with what Wittgenstein has meant by "nonsense," therapeutic reading could not adhere to "resolute" meaning of "nonsense." Based on these remarks, I try to achieve to the conclusion that neither therapeutic interpretation nor its subsequent Kierkegaardian reading of early Wittgenstein is acceptable.

The cognitive science of religion is an emerging field of cognitive science that gathers insights from different disciplines to explain how humans acquire and transmit religious beliefs. According to scholars of the cognitive science of religion, the mental and cognitive mechanisms of the human being have particular orientations and biases that make him susceptible to the acceptance and transmission of religious beliefs. In this essay, while examining the characteristics of these biases and the way they work, we show that although our innate cognitive tendencies make our minds generally receptive to religion, they cannot alone explain the emergence and proliferation of religious beliefs and practices specific to a particular culture. We will also show that although advocates of cognitive explanations put the study of religion as a natural phenomenon on their agenda and seek to discover the natural causes of the formation, acceptance, reinforcement, and prevalence of religious beliefs, their efforts do not reject the validity of religious beliefs as well as the possibility of non-natural explanations of religious beliefs.

Badāʿ (the change of divine will) is one of the Islamic doctrines considerably emphasized by the Imams of Shīʿī Muslims. One of the problems concerning the doctrine of badāʾ is whether God can change his definite/fixed (maḥtūm) will. In this article, we shall examine the answers offered by some prominent contemporary Shīʿī philosophers and theologians, (ḥukamāʾ and mutakallimūn) including al-ʿAllāma al-Ṭabātabāʾī, Āyatullāh al-Khuʿī, and Mīrzā Mahdī al-Iṣfahānī. We shall show that, firstly, it is merely al-Iṣfahānī who claims that the maḥtūm can be changed by God. Secondly, although al-Ṭabātabāʾī refutes his predecessors' belief on divine essential will, his critique does not have any influence on his answer to the question; because, as he put, his disagreement is fictitious. Finally, while both theologians have similar views on the divine will, their approach to another problem makes their answers different: Does “God changes a maḥtūm” entail “God issues a denial (takḍīb) of his messengers?”

Avicenna contends that God’s essence is active and receptive of intelligible forms and believes this to be an example of the principle of the unity of activity and receptivity in simple entities in relation to their implications. In this article, we firstly elucidate the principle. Then, by applying the principle to three different interpretations of the relation between God and the intelligible forms, we show that in each interpretation, a specific meaning of divine activity and receptivity should be taken for granted. God’s reception of the intelligible forms in Suhrawardī’s interpretation implies passive receptivity, while in Mulla Sadra it means qualification and in a third interpretation, it means inseparability from God’s essence. The unity of activity and receptivity in each interpretation has its own problems and implications. The first interpretation implies accumulation of action and reception in God’s essence. The second interpretation can be justified only if one presumes the unity and objectivity of intelligible forms and God’s essence as well as the unity of intellect and intelligible. Finally, in the third interpretation there is no reason to admit that God’s essence is receptive of intelligible forms.