فصلنامه پژوهش تطبیقی حقوق اسلام و غرب
سال ششم شماره 4 (پیاپی 22، زمستان 1398)

One of the historical demands of Constitutionalism Movement was equality of the people before the law. Violation of equality principle was the cause of the corruption and legal decay of the independent monarchy. In response to this historical national demand, supplementary of the constitutionalism's Constitution reflected this historical demand in the form of a single article. Statement of this principle was faced with the protest of some groups of the society. These groups, on one hand, considered the equality before law to against their social class and union privileges and on the other hand, they understood it to be in conflict with Sharia. It appears that the recent group was seeing a content beyond its meaning in this principle and in addition, merged this problems with some fallacies. The new point that exists in the comparative study on the first issues revolving around this topic in Federal Germany Constitution and Iran’s supplementary Constitution is the similarity which was the motif of the protests and defenses in these two countries. In this article, after discussing the issue in the two countries, analogies of the reasons of both groups are outlined and particularly the arguments of the prominent lawyers presented in Germany's constituent assembly are compared with those of Naini and Mahalati through an analytic and comparative method. Such studies can serve to reveal new dimensions of the importance of the Constitutionalist jurisprudents' endeavors

The exclusive application of the bilateral method to the Iran private international law entails some issues. In the stage of creating the right, this method determines the foreign law in areas where the jurisdiction of the substantive law of the court is well-established. In addition, this method does not justify the renvoi. The reasoning of the logical analogy of the method and the impossibility to adapt the rule to specific issues is problematic. In the stage of performing the right, the decision of the foreign court according to an unqualified law is not recognized under the rule of conflict resolution in Iran. These issues can be solved through using comparative law and by means of an analytic-descriptive method. In the stage of creating the right, conflict resolution rule must have a role by unilateral method so that applying overriding laws and the renvoi can be justifiable. In the stage of performing the right, the combination of unilateral methods and "recognition" brings the fact that merely a foreign court ruling in conflict with the overriding law of is not recognized in order to taking into account of other legal systems' solutions. In this case, the effect of the public order will be increased so that the national interests not to be sacrified in the altar of coordinating solutions.

Nowadays, artificial intelligence is blown to the brim of human-made robots, and the role of robots with various military, therapeutic and other applications in human life is increasing. This has caused problems and issues in the criminal law of countries. The most important topic of criminal law regarding artificial intelligence, especially automobiles, is the discussion of their criminal liability in the event of accidents in auto driving. To clarify the basics of criminal liability of artificial intelligence in Islamic law and the countries of Iran, the US and Germany, one must first understand what the concept of criminal responsibility is in their legal system. Who is also responsible for artificial intelligence when committing crimes? And can the principles of traditional criminal responsibility addressing human beings be attributed to artificial intelligence? The findings of this study, which have been done through a analytic-descriptive method and data gathering by means of documentary tools, demonstrate that despite the similarities and differences between the principles governing criminal responsibility in Islam and the countries under study, traditional criminal responsibility principles cannot be extended it to artificial intelligence. Because artificial intelligence is incapable of understanding its actions and its consequences, it cannot be morally and legally punished. Furthermore, artificial intelligence is also incomprehensible to the concept of punishment, therefore in the case of crimes committed by them, according to the circumstances of the crime, the creator, planner or owner must be held responsible and punished.

Along with the increasing development of cyberspace, the scope of influence of religion is extended universally and the process of its globalization is improved. This fact, through paving the way for integration among different faiths and religions, potentially can decrease the religious conflicts and consequently promote international peace and security. Globalization of faith requires the acceptance of freedom of faith and religion as a fundamental principle of International Human Rights Law and the universal nature of cyberspace plays a direct role in this regard. Although the right to choose and have faith is fully recognized under human rights rules, the right to express belief in cyberspace is not an absolute one and is faced with some restrictions. Criteria such as respecting rights and dignity of others and public morals, prohibition of calling to religious hatred and prohibition of ideologies based on religious superiority are among restrictions imposed on faith freedom in cyberspace. The present paper, through a descriptive-analytic method and by means of a human rights approach and with a view to Islamic teachings, attempts to illustrate the position of religious freedom in cyberspace and its impacts on international peace and security. The authors maintain that promoting the noble teachings of Islam as to peace and tolerance toward other faiths in cyberspace can play a notable role in religious integration in the world and provides the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security.

The Civil Code which is considered to be the most significant source of rights of individuals in Iranian legal system has paid a special attention to right in its particular meaning (property rights) and its classifications. Most of the authors have dealt with the imported classification of rights (corporeal right, incorporeal right and spiritual right) and mistakenly have attempted to interpret the Civil Code and comparing it with the aforementioned classification. This fact necessitates studying the classification of right in the view of the Civil Code. The question which could be asked here is that on what grounds and how the Iranian Civil Code has classified financial rights? In achieving the answer of the said question, this article, through using a descriptive-analytic method, firstly analyzes and critiques the common classification of rights as an imported classification and with a view to law of the west as the source of the classification. Thereafter, the basis and howness of this classification in accordance with the Civil Code is explained. Consequently, it becomes clear that the common classification of rights is not compatible with that of Civil Code and the Iranian Civil Code has classified rights based on their subjects: the rights which their subject is property in its narrow sense (corporeal right) and the rights which their subject is human act or property in its broad sense (contractual right).

Pre-emption right enables the beneficiaries so that they can own the property subject to the right which is sold or is going to be sold. Studying this right in the laws of other countries can be heuristic in domestic law. This research is conducted through a descriptive-analytic method. Briefly speaking, pre-emption right in the common law legal system is divided into two types of rights namely "right of first refusal" and "right of first offer" which have legal or contractual origin. These rights are considered at the pre-contractual stage and despite the similar function with the concept of the right of ‘’shuf'ah’’ in domestic law, are fundamentally different it. The legal entity of "droits de preemption" in French law is similar to the "pre-emption right" in common law. The entity of "Vorerwerbsrecht" in German law is more close to the entity of right of "shuf'ah". In both entities, the right is created after the sale of the property to the customer, and with a little tolerance, they can be considered the same. The contract of right of shuf'ah and the contract of pre-emption right as in the context of the Common Law and Civil Law are valid in law of Iran.

Numerous provisions are connected to the notion of "the fundamental breach of the contract" in the International Convention on the International Sale of Goods (ICISG) among which are the right to cancel of the seller and buyer, right of the buyer to request the substitute goods, transferring the transactional guarantee and the predictable breach. The aforementioned concept is one of the most important and challenging concepts in the said Convention. Other international documents have used "fundamental non-performance of the contract" instead of that concept. The present article aims to answer this question that whether "fundamental breach of the contract" and "fundamental non-performance of the contract" are a single concept or are two distinct concepts, and if they are two different concepts, what are their similarities and distinctions? In order to answer this question, these two concepts are studied and analyzed in terms of definition, elements and effects. In the end, we will examine whether these concepts or similar cases are mentioned in Iranian civil law, and if not, to what extent are Iranian legal entities closely associated with these concepts? The Through this study it is determined that despite the difference in the definition, elements and effects of these two concepts, there is no substantive and basic difference between them. Furthermore, however the concept of a fundamental breach is not seen in the Iranian civil law, the mechanism embedded in the law of Iran (options) is close to the mechanism of the ICISG. In addition, the external instances of termination under Iranian civil law are far less than the external instances of termination under International Sale Convention.