نشریه خردنامه صدرا
پیاپی 99 (بهار 1399)

This study aims to explore Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical thoughts, portray the salient features of his philosophy, and demonstrate the influence of philosophical thought on his understanding and interpretation of religious texts. Using a descriptive-analytic method, the author describes some of the elements of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy in the fields of theology, cosmology, and anthropology and, in this way, tries to explain his hermeneutic principles in the perception of religious texts. Next, he presents some of his interpretations of such texts in order to reveal the influence of Sadrian philosophical trend and hermeneutic principles in understanding religious texts. Given his prominent role in the development of Shī‘ī philosophy and wisdom, it seems necessary to deliberate over his philosophical theories and works and examine his methods and principles of interpretation in the field of Sadrian studies. The findings of this study indicate that Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical thought, in general, and his philosophical views, in particular, as well as his hermeneutic principles, which originate in the Transcendent Philosophy, and utilizing certain concepts in explaining philosophical problems distinguish him from other thinkers in the presentation and analysis of religious categories. Finally, the author concludes that benefitting from philosophical and metaphysical categories and theories, while being harmful in certain respects, could result in having a different understanding of religious texts.

The Problem of perception has always been an important philosophical issue since ancient times. Ancient Greek philosophers, particularly Plato and Aristotle, extensively discussed the tools and conditions of perception. Aristotle, for example, explained the external and internal perception of the soul in his two treatises of On the Soul and On Sense and Sensibilia. Among the perceptive faculties of human beings and animals, sense perception holds a particular station. This is because one’s first encounter with the external world happens through this faculty. In order to clarify sense perception, he refers to and discusses the external faculties of the soul (touch, sight, taste, hearing, and smell) and the informative data they provide. He believes that sense perception must be intertwined with the intellect in order to result in knowledge. Muslim philosophers have also discussed sense perception and most of their views are similar to those of Aristotle. Through propounding the soul’s creation of forms, Mullā Ṣadrā distanced himself from Aristotle and managed to introduce a new theory in philosophical psychology. In this paper, the author examines and compares Aristotle’s and Mullā Ṣadrā’s approaches to the problem of sense perception. In doing so, he firstly defines the soul and its faculties and, then, investigates external faculties in the views of both philosophers. Finally, he deals with the important discussion of the epistemological aspect of sense perception.

One of the main proofs demonstrating the subsistence of the soul is the immateriality of the soul. However, solving the dilemma of the subsistence of all human souls depends on the analysis of the quality of the immateriality of the soul and demonstrating imaginal immateriality. Muḥaqqiq Ṭūsī has tried to prove the immateriality of the soul and has essentially propounded immateriality as an argument for demonstrating the subsistence of the soul. Although he has not referred to the demonstration of imaginal immateriality, some of the proofs he presents have the potential to be used in proving this kind of immateriality. On the other hand, he believes that the souls which have reached the level of rational immateriality also enjoy imaginal immateriality. Mullā Ṣadrā has also demonstrated the rational and imaginal types of immateriality in order to solve the problem of the subsistence of all souls and, basically, his attempts at demonstrating imaginal immateriality were at the service of demonstrating the subsistence of all souls. Some of Mullā Ṣadrā’s proofs are similar to those of Muḥaqqiq Ṭūsī. Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the application of some of these arguments to imaginal immateriality is perfect and, in addition to them, he also provides some independent reasons in order to demonstrate the rational and imaginal types of immateriality. Hence, through proving that the faculty of imagination is one of the levels of the soul and an immaterial thing by itself, he has managed to reason for the subsistence of the souls which have not moved forward from the level of imaginal immateriality. Here, the authors state that the arguments propounded by Muḥaqqiq Ṭūsī are capable of demonstrating imaginal immateriality and, accordingly, as Mullā Ṣadrā indicates, the subsistence of all human souls is possible in the light of demonstrating the imaginal immateriality of the soul. This has been clearly explained based on Sadrian principles; nevertheless, before Mullā Ṣadrā and in Muḥaqqiq Ṭūsī’s studies, imaginal immateriality can only be witnesses in those souls which have reached the level of rational immateriality. This argument cannot solve the problem of the subsistence of all human souls.

There are a variety of interpretations and esoteric commentaries written to commend and condemn Adam’s fall. However, it is necessary to discuss and investigate which interpretation is more compatible with his station of prophethood and vicegerency and is more accurate and well-founded. In this paper, the writers argue that, among the several existing interpretations, those which support and commend his fall are more defensible than those criticizing it. Moreover, they try to provide an answer to the question of whether one can consider a necessity aspect for the fall. In the view of the people of knowledge, particularly Mullā Ṣadrā, several gifts and blessings were realized due to Adam’s fall, including the emergence of multiple hidden borderlines in the natural world; land development; population increase; Man’s perfection in the light of love, gnosis, and act until attaining the unique station of divine vicegerency, and, particularly, the end of the world of being; the rise of the perfect Muhammedan man, the end of all prophets and the People of his House, in the form of human beings; etc. Therefore, Adam’s fall was not only a praiseworthy phenomenon but also a necessary act which must have been necessarily realized relying on God’s pre-eternal and creative will so that it could serve human beings as a ladder to take them from the nadir of descent to the infinity of ascent.

The problem of gender has not been explicitly discussed in Islamic philosophy, in general, and in Transcendent Philosophy, in particular. However, through examining the principles of Islamic Philosophy and the work of philosophers, one can learn about their views and different interpretations of this problem. This paper is intended to reveal the relationship between the intellect and gender based on Sadrian philosophy and explain whether men and women share the same or different levels of intellectual perception. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, the most fundamental characteristic of human beings is rationality, particularly theoretical intellect, and men and women are the same in terms of their faculty of intellection. In other words, there is essentially and naturally no difference between them regarding their intellect. Mullā Ṣadrā stipulates that reaching the level of intellection – putting the intellect into practice – is an acquisitional affair, and the difference observed between men and women and even among men or women themselves in the process of knowledge acquisition is accidental and the outcome of contextual factors. Mullā Ṣadrā has demonstrated this problem in the classification of the intellect and the stages of intellection – from intellectus materialis (material intelligence) to intellectus acquisitus (acquired reason).

The human soul possesses certain astonishing capabilities, a number of which appear in certain domains beyond the level of common activities. Dreams, revelation, and magic are among such capabilities. This study aims to examine and compare the views of Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā regarding the interactions among perceptive faculties in the realization of these three phenomena. In the eyes of these two philosophers, the outward, inward, and rational faculties interact with each other in order for dreams to be realized. When it comes to revelation, external faculties play no role and, with respect to magic, all perceptive faculties interact to contribute to its realization. Based on his own specific principles, in addition to the effect of the active intellect and heavenly souls, Mullā Ṣadrā also believes in the impact of the disjunctive world of Ideas on perceptive faculties. Moreover, Ibn Sīnā’s lack of commitment to the concomitants of the discussion of the trans-substantial motion has resulted in his presentation of a different explanation for the relationship between the soul and body. In spite of such differences, the views of both philosophers with regard to the quality of the interactions of faculties in multiple cases are, to some extent, close to each other, which could be rooted in their attention to religious texts. Finally, the authors acknowledge that, given the discussions propounded by Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā, one can derive certain strategies in order to improve the functions of perceptive faculties and the interactions among them. In this regard, reference can be made to strengthening the rational faculty, thought control, and temperamental balance.

In Mullā Ṣadrā’s works, bliss (bahjat) is introduced as one of the effects of existence and, similar to other ontological elements, no quiddative definition could be provided for it. Hence, through an assessment of bliss in a semantic network consisting of “pleasure”, “happiness”, and “love”, it has been tried to develop a more accurate knowledge of their ontological meanings and referents. Accordingly, the authors argue that the ontological level of bliss is higher than pleasure and enjoys both generality and particularity relations. On the other hand, happiness means attaining an immaterial and independent existence or the same transcendental existence. Bliss means the soul’s awareness of the realization of such a transcendent level. Thus bliss and happiness are the effects of attaining the highest levels of existence and, in terms of reference, there is an absolute generality and particularity relationship between them. Love and bliss are both the effects of the realization of the perfection of the soul as well and, when it comes to their meanings and referents, they bear an equality relationship to each other. Therefore, it can be said that in Mullā Ṣadrā’s ontological system, the elements of bliss, pleasure, love, and happiness are tightly intertwined and related to each other so that the realization of each paves the context for the soul’s access to the other effects and good deeds of existence. Among them, bliss, as the main feature of such ontological benefits, plays an undeniably significant role. After clarifying the similarities and differences among them, the authors identify the affirmative and positive elements of bliss and, hence, conclude that bliss can be considered to be the contemplation of the most supreme ontological perfections of the soul which are realized through attaining the level of immaterial, independent existence and a transcendent configuration. Reaching such a level is possible for the soul through the knowledge of God as the cause granting life and self-knowledge to human beings. This results in massive bliss for the soul. The attention to the soul’s ontological grade at this level and its unique achievement, i.e. knowledge of God and self-knowledge, reveals the place of bliss and its effects on the soul.