نشریه قضاوت
پیاپی 98 (تابستان 1398)

The Airline who sells the ticket is responsible for the carriage of passenger and his luggage and if that airline cancels the flight without any acceptable reason it will be liable for the damage. In that case, we should answer the question about the basis of liability for material and immaterial damage and the ruling law of the case in the court. In addition, we must know the conditions and the effects of the civil liability of the airline. The branch no. 229 of Tehran civil court dealt with these subjects and the judgement issued, sounds somehow positive and in some aspects objectionable. Regarding the basis of the liability, the court has properly referred to the fault and contractual breach of the airline, but the Islamic rule called "La Zarar" cannot be regarded as a basis of liability. The court believes that Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (1929) and The Hague Protocol (1955), beside the internal laws can be regarded as the documentary of the verdict and the resource of the liability, but we should be aware that the Convention does not include the cancellation of the flight and the court could not refer to the convention and internal laws at the same time. Regarding the effects of the liability, the verdict is admirable because the court accepted pecuniary compensation for immaterial damage, but referring to the Convention for the recovery of pure immaterial damage and the ambiguity of the method of calculating the compensation sound inappropriate.

Judgment No. 9609970227200111 Branch 12 of the civil Court has been selected as the top judgment of justice in the province of Tehran in the group of civil courts. The judgment addresses a number of important issues in civil procedure and substantive law, especially representation and   company law. Some issues like change object of the demand, concept of same cause in cases where the obligation to perform the contract is first required and then the request for a verdict to declare the invalidity of that contract has been changed and then distinction between defense and action and its results and protest against the opinion of expert in civil procedure and representation, legal sanction of failure to determine authority of managing director or exceeding authority by managing director and legal sanction of non-compliance of select managers according to legal regulations in the field of substantive law is clear from this judgment. It seems that the mentioned judgment is one of the desirable judgments in our judicial system, but it is not without criticism.

The International Court of Justice in its jurisdictional judgment in "Certain Iranian Assets" (Iran v. USA), which was issued on February 13, 2019, is considered USA's preliminary objections to the jurisdiction and the admissibility of claim. Objection on exceptions to the non enforcement of the Amity Treaty (Article 20 (1)), objection on non-protection of the Amity Treaty to the immunity of the State, and the objection to non-inclusion of the treaty-based protection of the Central Bank (because of its failure to be regarded as a "Company") as objections to jurisdiction of the Court and the abuse of process, and the unclean hands of applicant (Iran) as the inadmissibility of claim were raised. The Court carefully considered the arguments of the parties to the dispute. The Court upheld the objection on non-protection of the Amity Treaty to the immunity of the State, but dismissed the objection to "national and essential interests" and the objection to the inadmissibility of the claim and thereby confirmed its jurisdiction to hear the application. the objection to non-inclusion of the treaty-based protection of the Central Bank joined to the merit. Because, in the Court's view, this objection is not exclusively preliminary. In this article, we attempt to examine and analyze the arguments of the parties to the dispute and the Court's conclusions about them and analyze the Court's findings.

The principle of non-interference of the court in the condition and action of arbitration is one of the important principles and rules governing arbitration. This principle, which is also "in accordance with the principle of the rule of will, strengthens the independence of arbitration and allows the intervention of the court in the specified minimum." However, the extent of the court's interference in arbitration is justified by the ultimate goal of the realization of people's rights and the sense of justice in permitted cases, and will lead to a reduction in the distance between the claim and the right in the world of proof. One of the important legal issues is the analysis of the scope of supervision and the rights and limits of the court in accepting or annulling arbitration awards. In addition to this discussion, we note that: Regarding the validity of the arbitration clause, the principal agreement between the parties may be permissible, but the parties may consider it independent and it should not be objected that the condition is not required during the permissible contract.b With this introduction, we emphasize that even if the arbitration clause is concluded in the award contract, we consider it necessary and valid.

Article 161 of the Constitution defines the "ensuring uniformity of judicial precedent" as one of the tasks of the Supreme Court and, as such, is one of the aims of the judicial system. To achieve this goal, of course, requires a thorough and comprehensive understanding of it. Accordingly, this paper seeks to address these three key questions: What is the uniformity of judicial precedent? Why look for it? And how can it be created? What about, what kind of litigation should be done in order to talk about the uniformity of judicial precedent? In response to why, the reasons for and against the ensuring uniformity of judicial precedent are explained and evaluated. On how, we examine how various legislative, judicial, and administrative tools are used to uniformity of judicial precedent and their advantages and disadvantages. These questions will be answered with descriptive-analytic method and based on comparative and theoretical studies, and will ultimately lead us to the point that, first, any attempt to uniformity of judicial precedent requires a clear answer to fundamental questions. Secondly, it is difficult to get a clear answer on some issues.

Resolution of disputes by popular institutions is as old as history and as long as human life. In the background this started in subject law in 1306 and was completed after the reforms with the establishment of fair houses in 1344 and the arbitration councils in 1345. After the revolution, the aforementioned institutions were dissolved and its laws abandoned. There were brief references to post-revolutionary legislation that the legislator eventually adopted in the wake of Article 189 of the Third Economic, Social, and Cultural Development Planning Code, the Conflict Resolution Council, and subsequently passed the Conflict Resolution Council Act in 1994. The main goals of forming such councils can be as much as preventing the entry of cases into the judiciary and consolidating the work of the courts, peace and reconciliation, entrusting people's affairs to the people themselves, and contributing to the recognition that the religion of Islam also emphasizes reforming the essence of Islam and resolving it. There is a difference between Muslims.

After the establishment of the constitutional system, justice has always had many shortcomings and defects in three dimensions of structure, laws and manpower, and this legacy has been transferred to the Pahlavi period. Ali Akbar Davar, in the early days of Reza Shah's reign, dissolved and reorganized the judiciary based on the authority he received from parliament, and one of the dimensions of his actions was the purge and extensive change of judges. About 25 years later, Mohammad Mossadegh reformed and innovated on the basis of the extensive authorities he received, in the face of corruption and inefficiency in the judiciary, and part of the scale of his actions was to purge and change the judges of the judiciary. The findings of this study represent that the main reasons for the formation of a large and rapid process of dismissal and change of judges were related to the obvious corruption and inefficiency in the judiciary, and the main goals of the judge and Mossadegh were to eliminate incompetent judges and replace competent persons.