فصلنامه حکمت معاصر
پیاپی 30 (بهار و تابستان 1399)

This paper in the field of Islamic theology scrutinizes the implication of the verse Aṭīʿū on the infallibility. The verse (اطیعوا الله و اطیعوا الرسول و اولی الامر منکم) “Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those of you who are in authority” (Q. Nisa /59) is one of the most important Quranic reasons that Islamic theologians have prepared for proving the infallibility of prophets, especially Islam prophet. Muslim theologians have made a reason like this: 1) God has absolutely commended Muslim believers to obey the Messenger and those who have authority on others among them. 2) If they were not infallible, God’s absolute command to obey them would be wrong. 3) But God never is wrong. 4) Therefore, they were infallible. The author thinks that this reasoning is wrong. According to some evidences, God’s command to obey the Messenger and who are in authority is not absolute. On the other hand, there is no correlation between God’s absolute command to obey someone and his infallibility.

Contingency in line with general concepts such as “existence and non-existence” , “unity and plurality” , and “ causality and being caused” is one of the fundamental and remarkable philosophical issues. The proper explanation of the different meanings of contingency and of the relationship of these meanings to each other make it possible to correctly understand and prove many other principal philosophical problems. Essential contingency and dispositional contingency are among the important meanings of contingency , so that the way we explain them will change basically the destiny of problems such as “coming into being and eternity” , “ potentiality and actuality” , and “causality and being caused” . Sheikh Ishraq for the first time has raised the issue of dispositional contingency , while contradicting Ibn Sina's argument for the rule that “ every event is preceded by potentiality and by matter that possesses that potentiality” . MullaSadra has dealt with the differences between essential contingency and dispositional contingency , and MullaHadiSabzevari has categorized these differences into six groups.At least in sixteen pieces of his works, MullaSadra has expressed his views on the relationship between essential contingency and dispositional contingency, therefore compatibility between these ideas seems very difficult . Indeed, It can be said that these views are contradictory. In this article , using professor Motahhari 's philosophical researches , we have tried to explain the new relationship , obtained in the light of genuineness of existence , between these two meanings of contingency , while judging MullaSadra's different positions concerning essential contingency and dispositional contingency.

One of the important issues of the field of religious studies in contemporary times is the ability to understanding the language of religion. those who belive that this language is understandable, they are against each other that this is the common sense(all being intelligible) or the mysterious and symbolic.Mulla Sadra has paid attention to the exegesis of the Qur'an, therefore he has paid attention to some kind of language of religion. He considers ontology the only existence as genuine, in the sense that he sees only the existence of reality.In addition, he believes in Gradation of being, that is, existence is a unic fact and with intensity and weakness.He emphasizes the dignity of knowledge in the language of religion.Because he considers the Qur'an to be far-reaching, he supposes the external language of the Qur'an as a symbol of their inner meanings, and because of the mysterious nature of the Quranic verses and the words of the elders of religion, they give them appearance ,inwardness, exegesis and interpretation.And believes that anything in addition to appearance has an esoteric, so that the appearance and the inner one are twice as many as an object.In his view, there are no fundamental contradictions between the inner meanings of the apparent meaning and therefore the interpretation which appears to contradict it, interprets the vote (without foundation).He also believes that the purpose of the "Truth"is a unit that can be obtained through three ways of revelation (Quran)and rational analyzes (proofs) and refinement of the soul (mysticism).

The relationship between God and His creatures have been noticed in the Islamic and western mysticism. Indeed, mystics for explanting the possibility of relationship between God and His creatures, and also for preserving God's transcendence beyond creatures, paid more attention to this issue. Saenoddin Ibn Torke, one of the prominent mystics in the eighth and ninth AH, have been noticed to this issue by using the term Surrounding Distinction. We can see in the Spinoza's writings, issues like the Ibn Torke's Surrounding Distinction in his mystical writings. Both thinkers have been paid attention to the issue of God's nature, His attributes and His relationship to creatures. And also both thinkers by using the kinds of distinctions, tried to show that the distinction between God and His creatures, in not a contrasting one but a Surrounding one. In another word, both try to demonstrate the transcendence and incarnate (albeit not materiality) for God. In this article we will try to compare between Ibn Torke and Spinoza's thought on the Surrounding Distinction between God and His creatures.

The "mystical morality" is a kind of morality that requires the truth based on direct communication with the ultimate/ unseen reality, the adornment to the specific traits that are similar to those of the trait. The components of mystical morality are the basis of revelation, attention to the source and resurrection, comprehensiveness, the shari'ah, the apparent change caused by esoteric transformation and the use of gradual education. The purpose of the mystical morality is to adhere to the divine ethos, ie, to give the names of Allah and to reconcile the divine attributes. Divine admiration for divine attributes, due to their division into Beauty (Jamal) and Majesty (Jalal), is possible due to the likeness and likeness of God. Therefore, when we consider God as incommensurable with other creatures, we can understand him in relation to the attributes that signify differentiation, transcendence, and difference. In this regard, human beings find God as a great existence, dear, great, supreme, sultan, zealous, and environment. Now, if the similarity between God and His creatures is emphasized, God is considered as a creature and is considered to be in the form of attributes such as kindness, mercy, beauty, love, forgiveness, forgiveness, grace and favor.

Ayatollah Javadi Amoli's position in Iran after the revolution is very similar to that of the Jewish Philo in Alexandria in the first century AD; In a way that can and should be the root of many of the great ideas of both philosophers in their social conditions; Because a person's way of thinking cannot be unrelated to his or her social status. But in the meantime, Alexandria, due to its time precedence and diverse cultural arrangement, has been the origin of the first historical sparks in questioning the relationship between religion and philosophy; And again, in the meantime, the position of Philo of Alexandria has been very significant. Philo's interest in Greek culture and philosophy, on the one hand, and his attribution to the Hebrew tradition and Judaism, on the other, led him to present a plan for the establishment of religious philosophy; The components of Philo's design are still considered by religious philosophers; In a way, a character like Javadi Ameli, who is 2,000 years away from Philo, has also used them in his collective plan; The summary of both plans is this: All the sciences in the breadest sense of the word _which particullarly includes philosophical teaching_ directly derive from revelation and teachings of the prophets (AS) or is referred to it. Finally it must be said that philosophers such Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, are payroll of great prophets such as Abraham and Moses.

There are many commonalities between Mulla Sadra's thinking and Nishidakitaro's philosophy. Both have a holistic view of existence, and their epistemology and anthropology are ontological. The foundation of human's knowledge and cognition is the foundation of the world, and reality is the kind of consciousness. Both believe in the unity between subject and object. Reality emerges and is revealed in the realm of the human soul. In the process of knowledge of the world, these two philosophers are involved in a transcendent element of the soul. Man is not in a state of passivity in the perception of the world, but the soul has an active presence in this process. Truth and falsity belong to the descriptive and conceptual / linguistic states. Man builds himself by actions. Common aspects are also seen in the ontological foundations of knowledge in both of them, such as the indeterminacy of the ultimate foundation of existence and the way in which this foundation appeared and manifested in definite, plural, and actualized beings. In this study, we have only dealt with the commonalities of these two thinkers, and investigating the differences between these topics can be the subject of another study.

In Mulla Sadra’s work, we encounter two different meanings of the terms substance and accident. One is the well-known meaning according to which contingent beings divide into substances and accidents: like first philosophers Mulla Sadra defines substance as a being not in the subject, and accident as a being in the subject. More precisely, substance is a quiddity which is not in the subject, not a property of something else, and accident is a quiddity in the subject, not needed by the subject, a property of something else. Thus, from this point of view both substance and accident are quiddities. God falls into neither of the two above defined categories, because in the division it is the quiddity which is divided; hence Mulla Sadra considers “non-substance” as a negative divine attribute, providing some arguments for his claim.  He proposes another meaning for the duality of substance and accident founded upon components of his own philosophy such as the primacy of existence (asālat al-wūjūd), hypostatic unity of being (waḥdat shakhsī wūjūd), and ontological indigence (faqr wūjūdi). Based on the primacy of existence, he redefines quiddity as a shade (ẓīl) of existence. Therefore, quiddity is not divided into substance and accident, but the latter two are both existential. Next, invoking the principle of hypostatic unity of being, he states that it is only the true unified Being who deserves the title substance, describing as accidents other beings which are his manifestations. Through explaining ontological indigence he also proves that the realization of indigent existence depends on rich existence and compared to him everything in the universe is pure dependence (rabṭ) and mere indigence, and considered a mode and manifestation of him. The substance is he who is independent and essentially rich, and the rest which are the manifestation of dependence count as accidents.       Mulla Sadra matches the two meanings together. Everything in the universe is a manifestation of a particular name of God. Thus, just as parts of the universe are divided into genus, species, individuals, and substances, so the division is found in the names of God; and just as the truth of substances is veiled by accidents, so the divine essence is veiled by its names and attributes; and just as attributes such as species - some of which are more general and some more particular as with close and distant species and their correlatives – together with which the substance is a particular genus or type, so some of divine attributes are more general and more permeating and some more particular and less permeating. Each of the innumerable beings in the universe which are its parts is a manifestation of a particular name among divine names; and just as parts of the universe divide into genus, species, individuals, substances, and accidents (including quantity, quality, relation, habitus, time, location, situation (or position), action, and passion ("being acted on)), so the names of God divide into genus, species, substantial, accidental, etc. names.  Everything in the visible universe is a shade testifying to what is in the invisible the world of names, as the manifestation of the substantiality of the Creator, called Allah by Mulla Sadra, is “the perfect man” In the light of foundations specific to his philosophy, Mulla Sadra’s novel explanation demonstrates that the duality of substance and accident both make sense and have examples in the external world (although in his wisdom in accordance with the well-known meaning of the terms an immediate cognition of substance is not possible, and it is only accidents which are knowable). But also his analysis paves the way for the demonstration of dependent existence (i.e. the existence of beings which are not God). If considered in comparison to the Necessary, everything is dependent, or, accidental, as Mulla Sadra calls it. The impact of the concept of dependence (or accidentality) upon philosophical discussions is that it dispenses with the need for quiddities and linking quiddity-bound concepts to the concepts not bound by quiddity. Thanks to the analysis, the fact of God being together with names and attributes (called accidents by Mulla Sadra) takes on a novel interpretation: it is not like the coincidence of the accidental and essential; nor like the coincidence of substance and accident in the well-known sense of the terms; nor like the coincidence of quiddity and existence, because God is not a general quiddity at all. Instead, his truth is a pure, simple, sacred Being that has no names, shapes or limits, and for which no proof is invoked. Rather, he is the proof for everything, a witness to every manifestation.      The main concern of this article is to compare, examine and match the two views, since despite the fact that there are numerous books and articles addressing the issue of substance and accident, there is not a discrete study of the two perspectives; hence the necessity of explaining Mulla Sadra’s view. Because this aim is fulfilled through studying and researching into his books, the present article’s research method is conceptual analysis written in an analytic-descriptive form.

This Paper, By referring to the different approaches to Islamic philosophy and wisdom in the contemporary world, examines Abdul Javad Falaturi's different approach to Islamic philosophy. Contrary to the predominantly Orientalist readings of Islamic philosophy, which understand this tradition under the Neo-Platonic tradition, Falatouri seeks to explain the role of the Qur'an in Islamic philosophy through contemporary comparative and linguistic studies. According to his analysis, Islamic philosophy and wisdom resulted from the fusion of two different worldviews, namely, the worldview of Greek science  and philosophy and the Qur'anic worldview. So this philosophy was neither purely Greek nor purely Qur'anic nor a mixture of the two, but rather a separate and distinctive process arising from their synthesis and consequence.

There is a will which is attributed to Razi which have been a controversial topic from ancient times until now. Preferring Qur’anic method to theology and philosophy, some scholars, such as Ibn Emad Hanbali and Fathalla Kholeif, think of that as a kind of repentance from rational discussion. There is a statement which is apparently narrate by Ibn Salah, quote Razi’s word that he regretted studying theology and philosophy; that he said: “I regretted studying theology (Kalam)” and then he wept. This quote support former interpreting. We proved, in this paper, that that interpretation is not authentic and the meaning and purpose of it is different; thus it is not a kind of repent, but rather it is a moderate rationalism (opposite to both classical rationalism and fideism), which he held in his life and could be found in his works. And, it is showed that what is quoted from Ibn Salah is not reliable; because could not be found in Ibn Salah’s works, perhaps it is a transited saying from him. Those writers, who quoted from Ibn Salah, a few centuries after him; thus it is not acceptable. Therefore, this narration is not authentic. This story is important, because it targeted reasoning in Fakhr system of thoughts; if it is true, then it shows that Kalam is not in harmony with real, orthodox Islam, as those who mentioned it maintain. But if not true, it shows that Razi did not believe that theology (Kalam) is not a real part of Islamic sciences. As a matter of historic facts, there is not an authentic source for the story. Therefore, it seems that someone made it up to justify their fanatic, extremist, fundamental interpretation of Islam, in which they have not tolerated any kind of reasoning, including Islamic theology (Kalam), the field of study that Razi well represent. For Ash’ari scholars like Fakhr Razi, reasoning is a useful, discursive tool to assess and study claims and beliefs, and particularly to defend religious doctrines. However, their attitude toward reasoning and intellect (Aql) itself is far from their Mu’tazali opponents. While Mutazalis see reasoning as a source for inferring truth, their Ash’ari opponents see it as a tool to assess claims, interpreting holy texts, including Qur’anic verses. On the other hand, for Fakhr’s part, in the will we could find him in a mediocre rationality position. He stated that what he discussed in his life was not of stubbornness, carelessness or recklessness, but just for the sake of reason. In other works he can be seen committed to Quranic verses and holy texts, beyond reasoning as a source superior to the text; so to speak, he only used reasoning for understanding; and that he put the “Quranic method” on the top of the list, do not imply that he denied reasoning and respective fields of study totally. But a few figures, like Ibn Emad al-Hanbali or Kholief, saw it as a kind of repentance of discursive methods, which is impossible to justify such a position. As to Razi we could see that he had held such a position in his whole career, as he had scrutinized philosophical doctrines, assessing every claim, and always put the Quran on the top of everything else. Therefore, to say Razi repented Kalam is not a valid, authentic conclusion.

One of the contemporary controversies about Islamic philosophy is the controversy over its originality that makes it possible. This identification issue has a great impact on the history of Islamic philosophy and the future of Islamic philosophy. In this regard, the opinions of three contemporary thinkers, Mustafa Malekian, Gholam Hossein Ebrahimi Dinani and Reza Davari Ardakani, have been investigated. By reducing Islamic philosophy to theology, Malekian denies the originality and possibility of any religious philosophy, including Islamic philosophy. On the other hand, Dinani and Davari not only emphasize the originality of Islamic philosophy and its possibility, but also speaking of the necessary interaction between philosophy and Islam. This research has been done in four axes and in the form of these axes, their views have been studied. In analyzing these views, their agreement to oppose religious philosophy and their differences in considering Islamic philosophy as a religious philosophy is mentioned and it has been stated that it is possible to defend the possibility of Islamic philosophy by considering the demonstrative method and the argumentative process of Islamic philosophy. The impossibility of Islamic philosophy is considered incompatible with the historical reality of Islamic philosophy and its possibility has not been denied, but the continuation and the realization of the possibility of its advancement is only possible if current and future philosophical issues are taken into account.

Khunaji’s logic deal with the logical novelties Afzal al-din al-Khunaji in his Kashf al-asrar an ghawamiz al-afkar. Among all the novelties of Kashf on concepts, defintion, propositons, and categorical and hypothetical syllogisms, Khunaji’s logic just deals with the following titles: real and external (haqiqi and khariji) propositions (five chapters), tautologies (five chapters), modalities (three chapters), and convesion (three chapters). In Khunaji’s logic, his points of views have been compared with those of his predessesors such as Avicenna and Fakhr al-din al-Razi. All these have been acomplished using methods of the modern mathematical logic.

Afḍal al-Dīn Muḥammad in Nāmāvar Khūnajī (d. 1248/646 AH) was a 13th-century logician who wrote eminent logical works such as Kashf al-Asrār ‘an Ghawāmiḍ al-Afkār [Uncovering the Secrets from Abstruse Thoughts], al-Mūjaz fi-l-Manṭiq [The Succinct in Logic], and al-Jumal fi-l-Manṭiq [The Outlines in Logic]. This paper is concerned with textual criticism and verification of the latter essay. Although Kashf al-Asrār is Khūnajī’s most important work, it does not obviate our need to other works by him. It is, therefore, necessary to provide a refined text of these works, including his al-Jumal. This succinct essay counts as an abstract of Kashf al-Asrār, and was taught as a textbook for a long time. As evidence for the significance of the essay, it should suffice that several commentaries and expositions were written for it. The essay involves Khūnajī’s own views in Kashf al-Asrār as well. In my textual criticism of the work, I have relied on four manuscripts and one printed edition deploying the intermediary method (between copy-text editing and eclecticism) in order to provide scholars of logic with a refined text of the work. The significance of al-Jumal is attested by the fact that it was taught as part of the curriculum in northwestern Africa, and many expositions were written for it in this region. Although Khūnajī’s innovative ideas appears in his elaborate book, Kashf al-Asrār, a comparison between the two works reveals that the former is indeed an extended abstract of the latter. In fact, al-Jumal contains everything that appears in Kashf al-Asrār except for certain elaborations and objections raised by Khūnajī to others. Al-Jumal involves Khūnajī’s own views as well. Therefore, al-Jumal is a very succinct essay on important logical issues, serving as an introduction to logic and the rules of accurate thinking. It only includes the issues of definition and syllogism as part of arguments. In this essay, the author embarks on the core logical rules without going into preliminaries and without engaging in controversial problems. The method of textual criticism and an introduction of the manuscripts and copies: in the textual criticism of this book, I have deployed the “intermediary” method, relying on the following manuscripts:Two original manuscripts of al-Jumal both of which are close to the author’s time, and two other manuscripts of expositions of al-Jumal. “M”: the manuscript in Malek National Library, associated with Astan Quds Razavi, in microfilm no. 640, written between 1258 (657 AH) and 1268 (667 AH), and as it seems, it was proof-read by Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. “Q”: a manuscript of Jumal al-Qawā‘id [Outlines of the Rules] in Central Library of Astan Quds Razavi, no. 981. It was written in 1341 (742 AH) in Mecca. The manuscript is stamped as “precious.” “Sh”: a manuscript of Sharḥ al-Jumal [Exposition of the Outlines]. This manuscript also belongs to Malek National Library and was written in 1320 (720 AH). “A”: This is a very elaborate exposition of al-Jumal by Sayyid Sharīf Tilimsānī under Sharḥ Jumal al-Khūnajī fi-l-Manṭiq [Exposition of Khūnajī’s Outlines in Logic]. This manuscript belongs to Fazili Library in Khansar, available in Markaz Ihya’ al-Turath al-Islami (Center for the Revival of Islamic Heritage) in Qom. I did not regard this as an important alternative copy.