نشریه دانش حقوق عمومی
سال نهم شماره 2 (پیاپی 28، تابستان 1399)

One of the examples of free choice of religion and expression of opinion is the propagation of religion. Propagation of any religion other than Islam is a well-known title in Shiite jurisprudence, the issue of which has been discussed by the jurists under the Dhimma contract, but the said title has not been explicitly recognized in the Constitution. The main question of this article is whether, according to the principles of the Constitution of the I.R. of Iran, it is possible to impose restrictions on religious propagation activities other than the official religion? Due to the authority of the religion in the Constitution, there is no independent title for propagating any religion other than the official religion, and this gap could challenge the scope of the authority of the official religion. The idea of this article is that a legal rule can be drawn based on the identification of the official religion and the "observance of Islamic norms" in Article 4, and the prohibition of "disturbing the principles of Islam" in Articles 24 and 27 and hence, any religious propagation activity that does not conform to the two titles can be restricted. Accordingly, with regard to the prohibition of investigation of individuals' beliefs in the Constitution and the guarantee of the right to choose one's religion, the mentioned restriction is in the field of citizenship rights and does not contradict with the fundamental human rights. The international law also gives governments the power to restrict religious propagation.

The Article 45 of the Constitution, in the position of reviving the macro and systematic attitude towards the public wealth of the society and by emphasizing on the jurisprudential teachings of the Imami religion, has provided the public wealth and its examples to the Islamic state. The present study, using library studies and adopting an analytical-descriptive approach, in the position of recognizing the concept of these properties, has reached the conclusion that, contrary to the popular belief, "public wealth" is not merely "Anfal". The properties mentioned in this Article fall into three general categories: "Anfal", "Mobahat" and "User-centric public properties"."Anfal" are the properties belonging to the legal entity of the state and the nature of the state's relationship with them is the relationship of ownership of a legal entity with its properties within its jurisdiction. "Mobahat" are the properties belonging to no particular person and anyone (whether government or other natural or legal persons) can own and exploit them, although the state has the power to impose restrictions on their exploitation. "User-centric public properties" are also those not owned by the legal entity of the Islamic state like Anfal, nor it is possible for individuals to own them, as Mobahat. The administration of these properties, which are permanently allocated for a general or non-restricted purpose, is in the possession of the Islamic state, and their ownership belongs to the legal personality of these properties.

The General Policies of the System are among the nascent legal institutions in the legal system, which are widely discussed about in many different dimensions. Among the issues that have been and are being debated around this legal institution is the legal aspects of overseeing the proper implementation of these policies. At present, this oversight is based on the criteria set out in the “Regulations for Overseeing the Proper Implementation of the General Policies of the System”, which also include overseeing parliamentary enactments. In the current legal order, the above-mentioned oversight is carried out by “the High Supervisory Board for the Proper Implementation of the General Policies of the System” and the Guardian Council. One of the main questions of this article is whether the parliament can insist on enactments that are considered contrary to the General Policies of the System, and refer it to the Nation’s Expediency Council in implementation of the Article 112. This research tries to find the answer to the above question by an analytical method. After the legal analysis of the various aspects of this issue, the initial hypothesis of this article that “the parliament might insist on the enactments contrary to the General Policies of the System”, was confirmed.

There are different theories to express how to regulate the relationship between rulers and subjects. The theory of the nation-state and the theory of the Ummah-Imamate are among the most important of these theories in the intellectual atmosphere of the modern state and the Islamic government. It is certain that the adoption of any of these ideas will have distinct effects in the Constitution. However, the status of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran on this issue is in a state of ambiguity. Therefore, this article answers the question of how much attention is paid to each of the theories of Ummah-Imamate and nation-state in this Constitution. For this purpose, by examining the tenets of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the presuppositions of its authors regarding each of these theories can be achieved. In this article, we have acted with an analytical-critical approach to discover the logic of the Constitution. The result of this research indicates that although the Constitutional law system of the Islamic Republic of Iran is organized at the level of principles and goals based on the idea of the Ummah-Imamate theory; but for some reasons, not all the requirements and accessories that are comprehensive and appropriate to this theory have been included in the Constitution, and at the level of the structures and institutions, ideas from both theories can be seen. Although the establishment of the political and military institutions is necessary to advance the theory of the Ummah-Imamate; but it is not enough, and the full implementation of this theory in the Constitution requires the completion, reform and creation of political, judicial, cultural, social, economic and military structures and institutions.

The Development Plans, although were supposed to be in charge of policy development plans and medium-term development in Iran, but past experiences indicate that they have not been successful. Even post-parliamentary oversight on these plans, due to the factors under consideration, has not been able to play an effective role in development plans. The impact of the former political structure on development plans, the problems in the preparation and approval phase and their interaction with the supervision and objections of the legislation and the lack of attention to the characteristics of the plan laws are considered as the main challenges of parliamentary oversight in this regard. The present paper first analyzes the concept of the development plan and parliamentary oversight, and then examines the challenges of parliamentary oversight.

Due to the expansion of the international relations among countries, the Islamic States nowadays are forced to communicate and interact with the Islamic and non-Islamic states. Among the important and challenging issues is the explanation of the limits and the degree to which the Islamic State adheres to the international treaties in accordance with the jurisprudence of the international relations. Chapter 10 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, inferred from the Islamic jurisprudence and Sharia, emphasizes on the regulation of the country's foreign policy based on the Islamic standards and upon the rejection of all forms of domination, both the exertion of it and submission to it, and the maintenance of comprehensive independence and non-commitment to hegemonic powers and peaceful co-operation with non-belligerent states. In this line, the Islamic State may conclude agreements to protect the country's interests and to maintain active relations with other states, both Muslim and non-Muslim. The adherence and the principle of fidelity to the covenant are obligatory, even versus non-Muslim states, as long as they are bound by the treaty. However, by using the verse 58 of Surah Anfal, the jurists have cited the rule of Nabz during different eras, according to which as soon as they see the signs and evidences of betrayal by the infidels in a definite way and in cases where the other party commits conspiracies, the leader of the Islamic State may declare the treaty null and void. Implementing the Rule of Nabz provided with the conditions is binding based on the Book and Sunnah, Shiite and Sunni consensus, and the rational implication. In the present study, using a descriptive and analytical method, the position of the jurisprudential rule of "Nabz" in the jurisprudence of the international relations has been described and analyzed.