نشریه مطالعات سیاست خارجی تهران
پیاپی 8-9 (بهار و تابستان 1397)

It can be easily stipulated that the conflict of American interests with those of its Egyptian, Jordanian and Palestinian allies* has already discouraged America from pursuing the terms of the "Deal of the Century". This conflict has in fact made the Deal of the Century to be doomed to failure and the United States to retreat from its position. We can also figure it out from what Jason Greenblatt, America's peace process envoy, said ("according to the President, now is not the right time to initiate this deal"**) that the United States think waiting preferable at the time and is resolved to procrastinate this process at least for one year.

There is almost complete unanimity on this issue that Lebanon has entered a totallynew political phase after its Parliamentary elections. The election didn't just result in the selection of new members, but also a change in the power equations and the rules of the game. The other issue that nearly everyone is unanimous about is that now the time of the March 8 Alliance and March 14 Alliance is over and coalitions and formation of political parties will be made based on some other principals and new equations which include two important elements:Elections results The equation of the new political power, what went on before .the elections and also what happened after that

Since Malek Salman came to the throne of Saudi Arabia and became the King, Saudi Arabia has witnessed sweeping and unprecedented transformations in both internal and foreign policy. It has now become one of the analysts' concerns to investigate the reasons, implications and perspective of these transformations. Some maintain that these changes are related to the issue of succession in Saudi Arabia and are, in fact, aimed to strengthen the current status of the Crown Prince, Mohammad ibn Salman. Some also believe that Saudis are after reforming their traditional and ancestral ruling and are actually accepting the ruling necessities of the 21st century. Anyway, regardless of the analyses, since Saudi Arabia is an important actor in the West Asia region, the Islamic world and also the oil market, these changes are worthy of study and interpretation. The present paper seeks to study the prospects of the new changes in Saudi Arabia and their implications for the regional role of this country. It's still difficult to deliver an exact evaluation of the situation, but we can think of some scenarios and offer some predictions based on the current trends and realities.

The results of Turkish general and presidential parliamentary elections demonstrated that we are not witnessing special changes comparing to previous elections and Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party is still the most popular and influential party in Turkey's society. Still, the votes to the aforementioned party have decreased comparing to the last election. Also, analysis of the results of the opponent parties, especially those of the Republican People's Party, points to the fact that in the mid-term, the replacement of the dominant party and passing of the power is highly unlikely. Bahçeli's National Movement Party supported Erdoğan and Justice and Development Party during this election; their coalition put the opposition in a much more difficult situation, especially because Meral Akşener, the Good Party's leader, refused to accept and introduce Abdullah Gül as the common candidate of the opponent parties. The results related to Kurds suggest that in the Kurdish regions of South and East South, the main competition is between the two poles supporting Erdoğan and Öcalan, and other parties have very few votes in these regions. The People's Democratic Party which is a satellite party of Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) could get acceptable results despite difficult situation and many limitations. Evidence suggests that in Turkey's macro political picture and in the new presidential system, Erdoğan can have the opportunity to take actions in order to achieve the "2023 Vision" goals; however, he should also take some problems and obstacles of the way into consideration.

The collapse of the ISIS in Iraq was the end of a process and the end of an American-Zionist project aided and abetted by their Arab allies that had implications for them, in proportion to their positive and negative roles, and the integrity of Iraq. The vast costs of supporting the ISIS and Takfiri movements led to a negative effect of these political, social, and factional and security investments of the supporters of this project that lost their previous potential and status. Therefore, the end of the ISIS had different implications for many of the power factors and also the political and social status of both internal and external actors; the ISIS collapse potentially led to a new era of transformations. This report is mainly concerned with reviewing the aspects of this transformation and the new state of affairs which has revealed its first signs in the result of the elections and also the arena of power for the internal power and external political actors. The hypothesis that "the rules of the game and kind of acting have changed after the ISIS" must be proved in the ruling structure and the elections and reveal its functions. Establishing the parliament, selecting the Prime Minister, President, Parliament Speaker and the arrangement and approach of the cabinet are all different aspects of the expression of power in Iraq which will evidently be faced with the resistance of the losers of the project of supporting Takfiri terrorism in Iraq. Until this new period of power and its functions and implications aren't totally established or matured, the victory over the ISIS needs to pass the turning point and challenges and get turned into concrete achievements in different layers of power and security and political status.

A subject is presented in the United Nations when it enjoys the least convergence of the views, and then the Secretary General sets about to form an expert group to investigate all the aspects of the subject in order to make some improvements. The number of the members of this group is limited (nearly 20 countries) and should be formed by the Secretary General based ona fair geographical distribution. These groups' activities are of significance from different points and help forming of the international norms within the subject. Since 2004, five expert groups have been formed in cyber field. The first was formed in 2004 and ended its mission in 2005 by confessing to the failure in its mission. The reason of failure was reported as the complexity of the subjects. But the real reason of failure was rooted in the power relations among the main actors of this field and especially America's sabotages. The second group, formed in 2009, could reach a unanimous vote about report: the actual and potential threats in the field of cyber security are of the most serious challenges of the 21st century. The most important output of the third group, formed in 2011, was the agreement over this principal point that, the international rights, particularly United Nations Charter, can be applied for the cyber space. The fourth group was formed in 2014 and ended its mission in 2015. This report has addressed some important issues such as the necessity of government surveillance on the use of information and communication technology and etc. The fifth group of the experts was formed in 2016 and ended its mission in 2017 by confessing to its failure because of the conflict of interests of the cyber powers of the world, and therefore veiled the results of the efforts of previous groups in ambiguity. Thus, the first and the last group of governmental experts fell victim to American sabotages and couldn't generally be efficient in collection and formation of the norms and rights of the cyber security; hence, this increasingly unsecure situation of cyber space which finds new and enormous aspects day after day. Iran has never been a part of any of these expert groups.