نشریه تاملات اخلاقی
پیاپی 2 (تابستان 1399)

We use the term “good” in two contexts: as the most general term of evaluation, and to refer to the final ends of life and action. I start from the question what evaluative and final goodness have to do with each other. Do we use the same term because when we talk about final goods, we are evaluating ends and lives? If so, how do we go about doing that? Most things are evaluated with respect to their fitness to perform their function, but ends and lives do not have functions. I contrast three theories of the final good: the intrinsic value theory, the hedonist theory, and Aristotle’s account, which identifies a being’s final good with its well-functioning, a form of evaluative goodness. Aristotle’s theory suggests an illuminating relationship between evaluative and final goodness: a conscious being has a final good when she functions by having conscious states that track, and so enable her to pursue, her functional or evaluative goodness. It is therefore the nature of an animal to have a final good, and there are such things as final goods because there are animals. This theory explains the existence of final goods without any metaphysical appeal to intrinsic values.

An examination of some of the main ideas of John Rawls first two books, A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism and of the relations between these ideas. Particular attention is given to the sense in which Rawls’ theory is a liberal theory, and to the relation between the rationale for Rawls’ two principles of justice and his later ideas of overlapping consensus and public reason. In this paper I will offer an interpretation of some central features of Rawls’ theory of justice, features that are familiar but also subject to controversy. The question of how they should be understood bears on the relevance of Rawls’ theory under current conditions not only in Iran but also in the United States, where views opposed to liberalism have gained support.

Relativism generally, and moral relativism in particular, continue to be topics of philosophical controversy. The controversy arises over general questions about the semantics, epistemology, and logic of the relativist’s position. With regard to moral relativism, there are also disagreements about whether moral relativism does not undermine the force of moral claims. Some of these disputes are due to the fact that the disputants differ in the ways they define or understand relativism. Since much of the current controversy about moral relativism has roots in earlier discussions that took place in the twentieth century which have been presented in the works of Leo Strauss, a critical analysis of some of Strauss’s views is presented. Relativism was an issue of paramount importance for Strauss, who nevertheless refused to define the object of his concern. Strauss argues that relativism is self-defeating in a manner designated here as the enfeeblement peritrope. Finally, a sketch of how equivocation on the issue of relativism can be avoided by distinguishing the value relativity from parameter parity. It is the latter that is responsible for the enfeeblement that is Strauss’s target.

Originally introduced by Plato and Aristotle, Moderation Theory in Ethics is the most prevalent theory of ethics among Islamic scholars. Moderation Theory suggests that every virtue or excellence of character lies in the mean between two vices: excess or defect. Every ethical virtue comes from moderation in actions or emotions and every ethical vice comes from excess or defect. This paper suggests that while Islamic scholars have been influenced by this doctrine, they have also developed and re-conceptualized it in innovative ways. Kindī, Miskawayh, Avicenna, Rāghib Isfahānī, Nasīr al-Dīn Ṭusī, and others are among the Islamic contributors to the subject. Some of their innovations in this theory are as follows: bringing together Aristotle's doctrine of the mean with Plato's psychology (by Kindī), dividing virtues into four higher genuses, dividing vices into eight higher genuses, setting various kinds of vices and virtues under these higher genuses (by Miskawayh), adding the vice qualitative criteria to Aristotle's vice quantitative criteria (excess and defect) (by Ṭusī), dividing various conceptualizations of justice (by Avicenna), adding religious and mystical virtues into the existing list of virtues (by Rāghib Isfahānī), and proposing a comprehensive model for curing diseases of the soul. This paper seeks to establish the main contributions of these Muslim scholars to Moderation Theory and elaborate on this theory’s evolution within the Islamic world.

When studying Henri Bergson's works, one can understand that as he proceeds from theoretical philosophy to applied philosophy, he criticizes deterministic view in favor of freedom and establishes foundations of this attitude. He is of the view that by obtaining true knowledge, we would achieve practical purposes including dynamic religion, open society and, more importantly, freedom. Bergson establishes his epistemological and metaphysical foundations in a way that he provides an appropriate base for the realization of freedom in open society. This study attempts to interpret Bergson's idea about freedom in light of his dualistic system, and by referring to the place of freedom within the dualistic system, it also attempts to explain Bergson's conception of freedom and show how and why freedom would be realized. Furthermore, this paper seeks to show that freedom would be realized by disregarding the wrong parts of Bergson's dualism in relation to dynamic religion, with the help of intuitive knowledge which takes duration into account and in an open society, while closed society, static religion and the epistemological attitude which rely on intelligence and have a spatial approach to time would hinder the occurrence of freedom. Thus the cognitive basis of conceiving free will is considered in the light of a dualistic approach in which the positive side (life) realizes the freedom, while the negative side (matter) causes determinism.

According to Sadrian philosophers, human beings’ voluntary actions are movements born of the effect of recognizing their perceptive faculties concerning outside matters and this effect forms through the intention or will that rises in a person’s soul. The starting point of human action is the point of the formation of the immaterial aspect (the soul) in a human being. According to this perspective, the origins of human actions are cognizance, desire, and will. In a human being’s voluntary and involuntary actions, it is the soul that is in motion. This substantial motion of the soul is part of the great substantial motion design that is progressing in the whole of the natural world and that which belongs to it. The motion of the essence of the soul is also necessary and perpetual and its goal and ultimate beloved is God; however, a human being’s voluntary action is another substantial motion which forms within this necessary motion of the soul and can intensify the perpetual motion and revolution of the soul towards its real object of love so that it may attain the perfection worthy of it through this intensification or can throw a person into a whirlpool of decline. The ultimate goal of human beings’ voluntary actions is to arrive at the closest level of closeness to God that has two aspects: 1) possessing the most intense knowledge concerning all existents and the levels of the world and 2) abstraction of essence and action from matter. All motions in creation happen through God’s grace and, therefore, a human being’s voluntary actions are all performed through the help of God’s eternal grace without affecting man’s free will.