نشریه جستارهایی در فلسفه و کلام
سال پنجاه و یکم شماره 2 (پیاپی 103، پاییز و زمستان 1398)

Creational guardianship (Wilāyat Takwīnī) is a newfound issue in the history of Shiite theology that has been formed under the influence of various factors and has undergone conceptual changes and evolutions. In order to get a clear picture of the formation and evolution of this idea throughout history, it is necessary to re-read the doctrine of creational guardianship and study the history of its formation and developments. By referring to and analyzing contemporary texts, we find that the first use of this term dates back to the 13th century, and since then we have seen the spread of this idea among contemporary Shiite thinkers. Based on the existing opinions and theories, we can find a kind of wide-ranging graded view of the idea of creational guardianship. In this view, on the one end of the spectrum there are people who have accepted the idea of ​​ creational guardianship in its "complete and comprehensive sense" (maximum approach to creational guardianship) and at the other end of the spectrum are those who "deny" creational guardianship (negative approach); but in between, there are many people who accept the creational guardianship with "certain limits and restrictions" (the moderate approach to the creational guardianship). The common factor in all definitions of creational guardianship proposed by both proponents and opponents is the creational power of (existential) intervention, apart from the scope of this power and also apart from the fact that whether the owner of the creational guardianship has an original will or he is a mediate for the Divine Will. Disagreements over this concept are also due to reasons such as the lack of an accurate semantics of the word, the vagueness of the definitions proposed for it and the uncertainty of whether the proof of its possibility can be taken as a reason for its existence or not.

In his book "Ethics", Spinoza uses the law of self-preservation to explain the intellectual life of man and his freedom of choice. According to this law, "everything has in itself a striving to preserve its existence." The importance of this law becomes clear in shaping the moral system and achieving the ultimate goal of "human happiness", which is Spinoza's main purpose of his philosophical endeavor.  Based on the theory of self-preservation, concepts such as freedom of will, free choice, happiness and virtue find new explanations. On the other side, Allamah Tabatabaei establishes his social theory by proposing the theory of Fiṭrah (human nature), and then considers the way of life derived from Fiṭrah or the Fiṭrī (natural) religion based on the special "existential structure" of human. By acting in accordance with natural religion and in the light of intellectual life, the human will reach the good life. Finally, the concept of human choice and freedom finds a new meaning based on Fiṭrah in this theory. In this article, with an analytical-comparative method, an attempt has been made to examine the views of the two philosophers and their common and different approaches in terms of the results of the two philosophical traditions.

One of the features of the scientific and mystical life of Abū Saʿīd Abū al-Khayr is the fact that he had seen various teachers. Among these tutors, however, he has been significantly influenced by Abū ʿAbd Al-Raḥmān Sulamī. Using a historical approach and comparative method, this research seeks to prove this claim by extracting and explaining a number of common teachings in the works of Sulamī and Abū Saʿīd Abū al-Khayr. These teachings include: optimal use of time, abandonment of pretentiousness, abandonment of prudence, abstinence from eating alone, abstinence from companionship of the wicked, abstinence from using of the word "I", and loving and caring about people. The article also mentions two other cases, namely, looking at people from a divine perspective and observing the power of God in the transient existence. All of the above reinforce the possibility that some teachings of Sulamī may be absent in his own writings but may be found in the works of his student who was educated and influenced by him. This means that in order to have a comprehensive and inclusive knowledge of the teacher, the teachings of the master should not be limited to the works left by him, but it is necessary to consider the opinions and thoughts of the people who were trained in his school.

Allameh Tabatabaei and Qāḍī Saʿīd Qummī are two important representatives of apophatic and cataphatic theology. With a negative approach, Qāḍī Saʿīd turns to the impossibility of recognizing the Divine Attributes, denying the existence of any attributes as well as those conceivable by human for the Almighty. In contrast, Allameh rejects the negative approach and turns to apophatic theology by emphasizing the cognitive nature of the language of religion and the existence of attributes. However, referring to the inherent imperfection of concepts and the inability of the human mind to purify concepts from defects, he considers the description of the infinite nature of God with these conceivable and comprehensible concepts to be flawed, although he ascribes the root and principle of the attributes to God due to his specific ontological principles. In this paper, by comparatively evaluating the two perspectives in a comparative and analytical manner, we have analyzed the quality and extent of their success in escaping the problems of both tashbīh (assimilating) and taʿṭīl (divesting God of all attributes), and, of course, have emphasized the necessity of avoiding the two extremes.

The present study has used the method of qualitative content analysis to analyze international texts and research related to death. All available print and electronic sources related to the research objectives and questions were used to collect information. Data analysis was performed using the deductive classification system and in the midst of the process, first the components were counted by open coding and then the results were achieved by removing the overlap and categorizing the items. The general purpose of the research was to investigate the position of death in Rūmī's thought and existential philosophy and the implications of these two views. Results were divided into these categories: death as a truth and the most certain possibility, death as transcendence, thinking, liberation, joy, test, overcoming fear, controlling desires, and death as change and evolution. Therefore, it can be said that death is not the end of life and can be a bridge and a passage from one period of life to another. Therefore, death can be considered as a stage of life.

Considering the importance of knowing God in the rationality of religious beliefs, in proving the existence of God and based on one of the explanations of burhān al-ṣiddīqīn (the proof of the veracious), Allameh Tabatabai claims that the conceptual knowledge of the existence of God is self-evident. Therefore, by explaining this issue, it is necessary to emphasize the self-evidence of God's existence besides its innateness. Based on the principle of "the absolute necessary eternal reality", I have first tried to prove that this principle applies only to the Necessary Being. Then, by explaining the conceptual and propositional principles of the self-evidence of God's existence and stating that some experts have accepted the self-evident presential knowledge about the existence of God, I have tried to prove its self-evidence in the conceptual knowledge from the view point of the late Allameh Tabatabai. If the above-mentioned self-evidence is proved, the Necessary Being is proved to be a primary self-evident and the first philosophical issue. Therefore, the purpose of the paper is to prove the self-evidence of the conceptual knowledge about God through Allameh Tabatabai's explanation of the proof of the veracious.

Every philosopher's viewpoint about the subject of philosophy is the axis of his philosophical activity. Throughout the history of thought, various subjects have been dealt with by philosophers. It is well known that Ludwig Wittgenstein has challenged the subject of philosophy and revolted against the traditional philosophy before himself. Also, in his later thought, a proposition could not have a universal and essential meaning. In this research, an attempt has been made to examine this different view in the case of interpreting the subject of philosophy, comparing it with the viewpoint of Ibn Ṣīnā as one of the greatest traditional-Islamic philosophers. It seems that "Existence qua Existence" as the subject of philosophy, based on the epistemological assumptions of Ibn Ṣīnā's intellectual framework, faces challenges with the philosophical views of both early and late Wittgenstein. Islamic philosophy needs to expose itself to modern philosophical questions more than before.

The aim of this study was to explain and evaluate the views of Sunni theologians on the knowledge of people in Barzakh (purgatory) about the incidents happening in this world. The method of the present study is qualitative content analysis which has been explained as deductive analysis. The belief in the connection between the purgatory world as one of the stages of human life and the material world is common to the Islamic society; a small number of Salafi and Takfiri Wahhabi denies the continuity of human life in its true sense-which necessitates that the people of Barzakh be aware of the people of the world-and thus, uses it as their theoretical basis for rejecting the definitive Islamic tenets such as Tawassul and Ziyarat, Tabarruk. The result of this study, in addition to explaining and analyzing the views of Sunni thinkers on the continuity of perception and knowledge in purgatory, is noteworthy for criticizing the intellectual foundations of takfiri movements. This paper suggests that explaining and elaborating the theoretical issues concerning the life after human death can contribute to solve the practical disputes and behavioral disparities in such issues.

In all of his philosophical and theological books, Lāhījī has only accepted the "argument through joining and separation" from among the eight proofs for the existence of hyle. This argument is so strong for Fayyāḍ that, on this issue, unlike his manner in his commentary on Tajrīd al-Iʻteqād, he distances himself from Khāja's views. He has challenged Khāja's criticism. Although Khāja supports hyle in his philosophical books, he opposes its existence in his book Tajrīd al-Iʻteqād. Lāhījī has explained the reason for Khāja's opposition, which is discussed in this article. This article, based on the principle of "the definition and proof are the same in terms of their limits", describes and critically analyzes Fayyāḍ's argument for proving the hyle and also its conceptual and propositional principles and will demonstrate that the opponents of hyle have used two syllogisms of resistance and opposition in rejecting the hyle. There is enough information about the syllogism of resistance, but as for the syllogism of opposition, Fayyāḍ's study in terms of its review and critique is invaluable and one of the leading researches in this field.

One of the issues raised in Islamic philosophy is the primacy of existence or the primacy of quiddity. Qāḍī Saʿīd Qummī is one of the proponents of the originality of quiddity for which he has argued. On the other hand, there are many expressions in his works that indicate the primacy of existence. Some have considered such statements contradictory because he has had various teachers with different backgrounds. But the reason must be sought somewhere else: first, the superiority of the Qāḍī's mystical power over his philosophical power which implies his inability to interpret mystical findings; second, the graded nature of his words, which necessitates that we should not consider a word of him regardless of the totality of his works. In other words, interpreting the originality of quiddity as the true unity of existence and the fact that by the originality of quiddity he meant to emphasize the unity of existence not a trivial meaning of the primacy of quiddity, and also the existence of lexical conflicts in the dispute over the primacy of existence or quiddity and that it is only a difference in wording.

Trying to show the epistemological value of religious beliefs has always been one of the preoccupations of philosophers and theologians. While a group of philosophers of religion denies the epistemic value of religious beliefs, others emphasize their epistemic validity. Although each of these two groups differ in their criteria for the epistemological evaluation of beliefs, they all consider the nature of such criteria to be a priori. In the meantime, by denying this common point, the school of pragmatism tries to evaluate the epistemic value of religious beliefs based on their practical aspects. The aim of the present study is to try to examine the validity of pragmatic views in evaluating religious beliefs based on the Quranic teachings. In this regard, based on some verses of the Holy Quran, the authors will show that pragmatism as a criterion in determining and evaluating the epistemic value of religious beliefs is not incompatible with the Quranic teachings, but several verses have pragmatic aspects. The approach of this research is critical analysis and its result is to show that pragmatism as a criterion for evaluating the epistemological value of Islamic beliefs should not be considered as a threat. In this regard, it will be demonstrated that, in evaluating beliefs both affirmatively and negatively, the Holy Qur'an judges them based on their practical results, rather than presenting logical arguments.

One of the issues that occupied the minds of many thinkers in ancient times was the issue of change, generation and corruption, and the role of principles in these processes. The positions of some early philosophers led to contradictions such as the denial of motion and any stability in existents. Aristotle, however, considers nature to be subject to motion, and although he considers matter and form as the source and main cause of any creation and change, he also considers a third element called "non-existence" necessary for change and generation and corruption in nature. In this way, he solves the old puzzle above. As it is well known, matter and form are among Aristotle's four causes; but in spite of the explicit statements about non-existence, it is not considered as a cause, while the study of its role shows that it can also be considered as a kind of cause, because it provides the basis for the creation and change of objects. In this article, by examining the role of non-existence in nature, we try to show that without it, creation and change in existents is not possible and in fact it is a kind of cause.