نشریه کلام اسلامی
پیاپی 113 (بهار 1399)

One of the rational ways of knowing God that is understandable to the general public is thinking about the phenomena of the natural world, which in various aspects (coming into being or huduth, movement, etc.) can be a way for man to know the creator of the world. One of the most prominent and apparent of them is the order and precision that governs the world. From the argument from design, various accounts have been presented, one of which is based on the law of probability. The martyred professor Morteza Motahari has given this account of the argument from design in his works, just as he has also explained it according to the law of congruity of cause and effect. Certainty arising from the argument from design according to the law of probability is epistemological and logical certainty, not psychological certainty which has no logical or epistemological value. Of course, this certainty is not certainty in the specific sense that exists in Awwalliyyat (primary propositions) and Fitriyyat (natural propositions), rather it is a certainty at the level of Mutawatirat (widely reported propositions), Tajribiyyat (empirical propositions), and Hadsiyyat (inspired propositions). But the certainty resulting from the argument from design according to the law of congruity of cause and effect is certainty in the special sense and is equivalent to the certainty of logical Awwalliyyat (primary propositions) and Fitriyat (natural propositions). In this article, the two accounts of the argument are explained and examined, and the objections to the account of the argument from design according to the law of probability are answered.

Mohammad Arkoun is one of the pioneers of contemporary Islamic modernism in the Islamic world who does not accept traditional methods in Islamic and Quranic research and calls for a fundamental change in this field. According to his epistemological views, first of all, thought and knowledge which is the product of language are tangible as social action; secondly, the dualities raised in Islamic reason, such as faith and disbelief, are not sacred; third, we must move towards the unconsidered aspects of the Islamic intellect, such as the role of imagination and myth in the text. On the other hand, according to his views on Quranic studies, first of all, the language of the Qur'an is mythical; secondly, part of the text of the current Qur'an is ambiguous, ideological and interpretive. The present article has criticized these principles and exposed their inaccuracies.

Although Muslims disagree on the scope of the infallibility of the prophets(pbut), they agree on their infallibility in a general sense based on rational and textual proofs. Among the textual evidences of this claim are the verses of the sincere (Ayat Al-Mukhlasin), such as verses 82 and 83 of Surah Sad and verse 24 of Surah Yusuf. There are different views about the implication of these verses on the infallibility of the prophets (pbut) which are: infallibility from sin, infallibility from polytheism, absolute infallibility in all levels, and non-implication of infallibility. The correct view is that the verses of the sincere (Ayat Al-Mukhlasin) indicate the infallibility of the divine prophets in all fields except infallibility in receiving revelation and the infallibility of Munaffarat e Bastigan (what makes people hate them and their relatives), and other views are either wrong or incomplete. By proving the preferred view and answering the objections, the invalidity of other views is proved.

Tanakh is the sacred book of Judaism and part of the Christian holy book, which is claimed to have the ability to meet the basic needs of mankind, that is, to know the true laws governing human thoughts and behavior throughout history. One way to evaluate this claim is to examine the text of the book, including a content and structural review. One of the methods of structural analysis is to examine the style of expression of propositions, which shows whether the text has the necessary dynamics to respond to its audience or not. Propositions in a text cannot be excluded from two situations: they are either declarative statements or non-declarative statements. In examining this book, it is necessary to examine both types, in order to determine whether this book, in terms of language, has the ability to present its concepts to its audience in a suitable format throughout history or not? Examining the style of expression of declarative and non-declarative statements using the traditional linguistic method, it was found that some of the propositions in these books, such as doctrinal propositions, have the ability to respond to the audience of these books at different times, and some of its other propositions, especially jurisprudential issues, do not have enough ability to express the concepts needed by the audience.

Zoroaster, according to Zoroastrian tradition, went to the court of Kay Goshtasb in western Iran around the sixth or seventh centuries BC and made a claim of prophecy and bringing a new religion; this claim was examined among Islamic scholars and divided the researchers in this field into two groups. Some, with a definite belief, in the prophethood of Zoroaster and reference to the verses and narrations that have spoken about Majus, applying them to Zoroaster, introduced him as one of the prophets with a divine book. Others, relying on Islamic sources and separating Majus and Zoroaster, in a general way raised doubts about the prophethood of Zoroaster. However, what was overlooked when examining the arguments of the two groups was the judgment and evaluation of the prophetic elements of Zoroaster, which was done in this article by referring to the sources of Islamic theology and some contemporary research in a descriptive-analytical manner. And it became clear that the constituent elements of the claim of prophecy of Zoroaster, that is, presenting an ontology contrary to the prophetic teachings, using the acquired knowledge around him, and legislating traditions contrary to the divine religions; also, the invalidity of the claim of a miracle for him and the invalidity of the identification of the book of Zoroaster with the book of the Prophet of the Majus, and the denial of the divine prophets by Zoroaster, when applying the criteria set out in Islamic theology for prophecy, all testify that Zoroaster falsely claimed to be a prophet.

The great scholar and researcher, Agha Husayn Kkwansari, (1016-1098 AH) is one of the well-known authors in rational and textual sciences in the eleventh century AH and has many writings about these two branches of knowledge, most of which were written as commentaries on other books. He learned the rational sciences from the great philosopher, Mir Findiriski, (970- 1050 AH) and the major textual sciences from Allama Muhammad Taqi al-Majlisi (1003- 1070 AH). He paid special attention to the role of philosophical intellect, especially the peripatetic school of philosophy in theological discussions. Although Aqa Husayn is later than Mulla Sadra, he was not influenced by his views and is mostly a critic of the issues of Transcendent Wisdom and Mulla Sadra. His theological arguments are based on the peripatetic philosophy. Although his theological arguments include pure intellectual, pure textual, and a mix of both; the share of purely intellectual arguments was more and he paid special attention to rational arguments in rational-textual issues. Of course, he also benefited a lot from textual sciences