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سال سیزدهم شماره 2 (پیاپی 83، پاییز و زمستان 1399)

With the advent of the theory of special relativity, in which the concepts of absolute time and absolute space are discarded, and general relativity, which is accompanied by an empirical interpretation of geometry and attention to non-Euclidean geometry, some basic elements in Kant's firs t critique, including the concepts of time and absolute space and the certainty of Euclidean geometry was shaken, and this provoked different reactions. For Cassirer, Eins tein's theory of relativity appears to be fruitful in three aspects. A) Eins tein's theory of relativity as a confirmation for his general epis temology; b) protecting Kant's epis temological principles agains t conflicts; c) applying the principle of relativity to the critique of knowledge and preparing the project of the philosophy of symbolic forms. In Kant's philosophy, Cassirer considers the "rule of unders tanding" to have a fundamental role in the creation of temporal-spatial relations. Therefore, he does not consider Euclidean geometry to be a necessary correlation of the a priori form of spatial perception in Kant's philosophy. Due to the necessary exis tence of invariant conceptual forms (such as time, place, number and function) in theories, Cassirer also considers comparisons between theories to be possible and that it can be concluded that with the advancement of science they become more comprehensive (in terms of explanatory scope) and more refined (in terms of the abandonment of subs tantive views). As a result, the transition from earlier to later scientific theories is not random and optional and is a function of objective necessity; however, physical theory is not the highes t form of cognition and, along with other symbolic forms, is part of human symbolism.

Framed in Laclau &Muffee’s critical discourse analysis, the main purpose of this study is to show how a BBC Persian TV Programme entitled "Pargar" presumes a consensus-based pluralism that leads to phobia of Difference. The main issue here is  to address “why has Laclau & Muffee’s antagonist pluralism been kept unaddressed in Pargar Programme. A consensus-based pluralism has been focusing on “ cultural differences”. Rather, antagonist pluralism has been focusing on “ differences”. Findings of the study showed that in Pargar programme, Abrahamic religions are assumed to be inferior compared to the oriental religions. The monotheism against to polytheism turns into anti-values and Islam has become in conflict with global citizenship. Therefore, according to Laclau and Mouffe, the real pluralism must not be construed as a meta-narrative. Islamophobia as replacement of communistphobia is the direct outcome of Pargar reading on pluralism. Laclau and Muffee believe that consensus-based pluralism cannot address the complexities in the contemporary world. Instead of formal assimilation, differences should be valued. Majority of Pargar experts have a biased reading on the concept of pluralism. Indeed, they are observing their own presuppositions, namely, respecting multivoices, various contextual religions and cultures. In all of these T.V programmes, western liberal hegemony has been sophisticatedly valued. The researcher goes beyond the dichotomy of liberalism-communism, providing a new solution which can be read as antagonist pluralism.

Plato examines language mainly as a subordinate matter related to the more important problem of knowledge. For him true knowledge is the knowledge of ideas but this is attained only through the particulars. The relation between ideas and particulars, as well as finding a mediating term between them is one of the most complex problems of his philosophy. It seems that sometimes he thinks of language as a mediate between ideas and particulars, since the words resemble both the ideas and particulars and so, beginning from the particulars, one can reach knowledge of the ideas through the words. Thus the names’ bipolar relation to both ideas and particulars makes it possible to acquire true knowledge. The difference between ideas and particulars, however, is so great that some problems emerge gradually in explaining their relation, so far as Plato suspects applying names either to the ideas or to the particulars. On the one hand, he considers names as appropriate to ideas and, regarding the permanent motion and substantial deficiency of the particulars, the names are applied to them solely as homonymous. On the other hand, according to Plato, ideas stand beyond language and their ultimate knowledge requires leaving language, then language from many aspects resembles particulars and therefore its applying to the ideas is not appropriate.

n this paper, the place of mystical experiences in Stanislav Grof's transpersonal psychology is examined and analyzed from the perspective of philosophy of mind. Contrary to popular belief in academic psychology, Graf sees mystical experiences as the basis for access to deeper levels of psyche and consciousness. He uses the holographic model in Bohemian physics to explain the emergence of consciousness at all levels of the universe, and argues that modern physics, in contrast to Newtonian-Cartesian worldviews, can defend the realism of mystical experience and access to the latent order of the universe. Grof presents a holographic pattern of consciousness given the shortcomings of physicalist thinking. According to Grof, organic unity with the world is one of the characteristics of mystical experience. Grof also considers conditions such as illness and insomnia as the basis of mystical experience, which is in the form of an explanatory reduction that is not necessarily accepted by those with mystical experience. Grof explains mystics' descriptions of mystical experience simply by referring to their categories and cultural context. The need for such a view is to distinguish between pure experience and its interpretation, which can be critiqued by the intellectual test of transparency in the philosophy of mind.

On the basis of the normativity of belief thesis in epistemology, belief is a normaAbstract: Are our auditory perceptual experiences, in the language we are familiar with, in themselves related to meaning? Some philosophers answer affirmatively and argue that auditory perceptions include meaning or semantic structures. Two of most important criticisms of this view concern what this view can say about: First, homophones-words with the same sound but different meanings; Second, understanding the linguistic phrases that their meanings depend on the context they are expressed in. In this paper, we provide some answers to these two worries. To the first, we show that our phenomenological experiences differentiate homophones. To the second worry, our reply depends on the publicity of meaning and defending the top-down processing of linguistic understanding.

The "Imaginal world” as the interface between the "Intellectual world" and the "Sensible world" is outstanding in the philosophy of llumination. Suhrawardi was the first Muslim philosopher who discussed this concept. It has many functions in his philosophy and rationalizes many wonders of the world, including the resurrection and miracles of prophets and saints. This study is a descriptive analysis in which we first elaborate on the division of "worlds of light" based on the Philosophy of Illumination, and then study the status of the Imaginal World in it. Suhrawardi speaks of the Imaginal World as the fourth world in addition to the three worlds of Intellect, Soul and Body. This world is between the intellectual and sensible worlds and is a kind of universe in which events pertinent to the soul occur. Reaching this world is not possible with the physical body, but with the spiritual body. Therefore, seeing and understanding it is possible by the spiritual senses.

On the basis of the normativity of belief thesis in epistemology, belief is a normative mental state. There are various versions of the thesis in the literature, two of the most well-known versions of which will be considered in this paper. The first version concerns the so-called “truth norm” which holds that “one ought to believe that p if p is true” (Shah 2003, 2009). On the basis of the other one, known as “knowledge norm”, “one ought to believe that p if one knows that p” (Williamson 2000, Brown 2010). A complete consideration of the theses is typically extraneous to the purpose of this short paper. Our focus in this paper concerns Shackel’s criticisms, according to which, there are self-referential sentences which make the norms contradictory. In this paper we will consider and defuse the criticisms.

Mulla Sadra has referred to the Arts as "delicate industries” and he refers to the type of poetry composed by the wise artist as "wise poetry" and mentions the wise artist. These two are the basis for the generalization of wise poetry to wise art in this study. Explaining the levels of wisdom, introducing the obstacles to achieving it and explaining the salient features of wise art are some of the topics that this paper addresses. Due to the intertwining of the soul, the seeker of wise art puts all aspects of the sensory powers, imagination, emotion, theoretical and practical intellect to the service of attaining wisdom. With the cultivation of aesthetic taste, the acquisition of artistic skill, the knowledge of artistic rules and purification of the soul the seeker becomes the translator of wisdom into great and timeless work. This article describes the relationship between wise arts and freedom, love, the sources of inspiration.

Criticizing theoretical attitudes, early Heidegger insists on the living experience as the fundamental object of philosophy. The analysis of Christian facticity provides an exemplar for the characterization of the facticity which affects Heidegger's project in Being and Time. Emphasizing on entering into the enactment of life as the basis of faith, the Christian life is in contrast to Greek theoretical metaphysics. Entering into such enactment requires the acceptance of the word of God which consists of trusting to what God has said and waiting for Jesus's second coming. Here, there is a different knowledge and experience of temporality which has been lost under the overcoming of metaphysical conceptuality. Heidegger pursues his analysis of Christian facticity through analyzing the letters of St. Paul and the confessions of St. Augustin.

Ernst Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms is one of the theories that offers a new possibility to rethink how human knowledge has evolved, especially in primitive human minds and mythical thought. The stages of knowledge, according to this philosophy, start from mythical thinking, and pass through religion and mysticism into art and science and reach Kant's transcendental perspective. But despite his emphasis on the importance of art in his works, Cassirer had no specific explanation of artistic knowledge. For this reason, the present article seeks to examine the characteristics of mythical thought, including its categories and perceptual forms and by focusing on Cassirer's disputed views on art, defines art as one of the symbolic forms. This paper is written in a descriptive-analytical method and with a library-attribute checklist in the theoretical framework of philosophy of symbolic forms. By trying to explain or compare the data, it examines the possibility of the continuity of mythical categories and forms of perception in artistic thought or the possibility of reconstructing them. Finally, based on the results, the work of art is introduced as a concrete emergence of mythical thought which, with the need to make such a transformation, extends the categories and perceptual forms of mythical thought in artistic thought with necessary modifications.

Jürgen Habermas, as the best-known defender of Enlightenment’s ideals in contemporary times, thinks that any adequate defense of those ideals, particularly the ideal of emancipation from oppression and domination, depends on formulating a theory unbound by local contexts and capable of justifying a discourse ethics on universal foundations. In order to map out such a theory, he mainly appeals to metaphysically loaded notions such as “truth” and “universality”. On the other hand, he considers himself as a post-metaphysical thinker and counts his theory of communicative rationality as a consequence of the linguistic turn. In this essay, I would argue that the way in which he appeals to notions of “truth” and “universality” is not consistent with his post-metaphysical commitments and requirements of linguistic turn.