نشریه پژوهش های عقلی نوین
پیاپی 10 (پاییز و زمستان 1399)

Perennial philosophy has an outstanding status in traditionalism and its proper understanding is dependent upon accurate understanding of traditionalism. The latter, as a dynamic trend in the Western modern world, provides a different impression of tradition and undertakes to clarify tradition on a novel ground. In the meantime, perennial philosophy, as the most pivotal component in the consistency of traditionalism, enjoys a specific essential and epistemological value. Dealing with its epistemic dimensions as well as its relation to religion and metaphysics would not be possible except through understanding the main contents of this school. In this paper, with reliance on the opinions of contemporary traditionalists and commentators as well as reference to the historical development of this concept, we would address their new perusal of tradition and thereby provide the ground for a clearer understanding of the pivotal concept of perennial philosophy, its epistemic dimensions, and its relation to tradition, religion, and metaphysics.

One of characteristics of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is provision of a new approach in reading texts with reliance on dialectics between the interpreter and the text. Although this method is registered in Gadamer’s name, such an approach can be implied from the Qur’an and traditions as well. According to this approach, the roles of the text and the interpreter are quite equal in the process of understanding and comprehension to the extent that both are equally effective in achieving it. Thus, analysis and explanation of the thinkers’ opinions can be equally dealt with by reason and religion. Accordingly, the question can be raised as to, “Has Mulla Sadra adopted the dialectic approach between reason and religion in his special opinions?” By examining Mulla Sadra’s special opinions, particularly in three issues of “reality of science”, “reality of causality”, and “substantial motion”, we can conclude that he has possessed such an approach, thus being regarded as a synthetic and dialectic philosopher. In this article, the writer undertakes to examine and establish this issue with the “rational analysis” research method as well as “narrative” method.

Upon stating the difference between sex and gender, this research would deal with the way in which human soul has come into existence and would go on to analyze the gender of the soul in respect to the theory of spiritual createdness (rowḥāniyat al-ḥudūth) and corporeal createdness (jismāniyat al-ḥudūth) of the soul. According to the theory of spiritual createdness, the origin of gender comes up only in sex and it has no place in the soul; therefore, the soul is immaterial in essence, lacks gender features and has its specific gender features only as per its various physical conditions. However, according to the theory of corporeal createdness of the soul and with regard to some of the philosophical principles of Mullah Sadra’s philosophy one can achieve conclusion that the soul consisting of body and female physical features is different from the soul consisting of body and male physical features in terms of physical, emotional, and cognitive tendencies and thus gender is an identity issue and the difference between the gender of man and woman is traced back to the very reality of their existence. Therefore, as from the viewpoints of the physicians and psychologists men and women are physically, psychologically, and emotionally different and also as according to religious texts men and women have different rights, so also in philosophical terms the soul of men and women would have their own specific psychic and sensual tendencies proportionate to their feminine and masculine bodies.

Many of the Muslim philosophers view human free-will as among the most significant means of knowing God; that is because they believe that man is similar to God in his essence, attributes, and actions and thus knowing human free-will and its limits would clarify his role in the world of being as well as his relation to God. Mulla Sadra has stated this discourse in a coherent and innovative way based on the principle of the ontology of genuineness, gradation, and oneness of being and ultimately has ingeniously explained the theory of intermediate position (amr-i bain al-amrain) through the theory of individual oneness. Similarly, in respect to explaining human free-will, Gazzaniga, as a leading researcher in cognitive neuroscience and the study of the neural basis of mind, believes that human free-will is made up by the brain's "interpreter" and freedom of choice is attained for man through interaction in society and environment, but at the same time humans are responsible beings. In this paper, first, each of these thinkers' principles of thoughts is elucidated and then, after explaining the similarities and differences of their viewpoints, both viewpoints are analyzed and evaluated.

Ma‘rifa (doctrinal knowledge) and piety are interactively or reciprocally related. The philosophers' disagreement over the effect of ma‘rifa on piety is in fact this very efficacy, which some accept and others deny. As for the contrary, that is the effect of piety on ma‘rifa, however, they disagree, especially in terms of what kind of ma‘rifa can piety produce or provide the ground for. The question that crosses one's mind here is that regarding the effect of piety on ma‘rifa which one of the theoretical or practical ma‘rifa is effected by piety? As a contemporary Muslim scholar, Shahid Mutaharri believes that piety can be effective only on practical intellect and does not have any effect on theoretical intellect. With a descriptive-analytical method, using library sources, and relying on religious principle, this research undertakes to criticize Shahid Mutahhari's viewpoint. The findings show that such notions as mystical experience of the mystics, the mandate of conscience, the generality of religious statutes, the philosophy of creation, the arc of ascent, and the universality of manifestation denote the effect of piety on theoretical and practical ma‘rifa.

Argument through religious experience is one of the arguments presented for proving the existence of God (which in this article is briefly and less accurately called "religious experience argument"). This argument uses religious experience, which some people undergo, as an indication of the existence of God. Richard Swinburne is among those who raise such an argument in his book, “The Existence of God”. One of his basic arguments is a principle that he calls "credibility principle". Briefly stated, this argument says that if the object A is understandable, it can be concluded that the object A probably exists. The present article is a critical assessment of the possibility of using this principle in religious experience argument. Furthermore, it is concluded from all the critiques of the writer (of the article) and the critiques brought up by others concerning the use of this argument in religious experience argument that because of facing with serious challenges, this principle is not applicable.

Plurality of religion and the variation of vastly different religious attitudes always prompt us to ask questions about the criteria for their rightfulness. Followers of each religion have given different answers to this question as per their religion's historical features or their being among the Revealed or non-Revealed religions. Using rational, inductive, and historical methods and content analysis, this research has concentrated on different criteria for the assessment of the rightfulness of religions. These criteria include: 1. Belief in God, 2. Divinity, 3. Unity versus polytheism, 4. Belief in the Hereafter, 5. Epistemic coherence and more adaptation to human rationality, 6. Universality in doctrines and efficiency in providing meaning for human life, 7. Doctrine-centeredness instead of prophet-centeredness, 8. Non-distortion of Holy Scriptures, and 9. Correction of prior religions. The longitudinal and latitudinal relations of these criteria would enable us to draw the conclusion that the Revealed religions enjoy more rightfulness; and in turn, the one among them that is undistorted or less distorted, enjoys more coherent and rational beliefs, and plays a more effective role in the meaning of life and ethics of the faithful is more rightful. Meanwhile, religious rightfulness is gradational and thus most of religious traditions, especially the Revealed Religions, have it. However, they do not enjoy it equally; rather, the more noticeable presence the above criteria have in a religious tradition, the higher gradational and hierarchical rank that religion can enjoy.

In order to carry out a comparative-Qur’anic research about spirituality, we must first define spirituality. This term has not been used in the Qur’an and its definition is indeed an accurate determination and limitation of the subject of a comparative research. This article is a rational search for attaining a suitable definition of spirituality so that one can set it as a criterion in comparative-Qur’anic research studies. Such a definition would be a so-called nominal and conventional one. In a conventional definition, we are more concerned with its proportion to the objectives of the research rather than its correctness and full consistency with reality. Therefore, the question in this article is not what the right or true spirituality is and what difference it has with untrue and false spirituality; rather, we are in search of a definition that is proportionate to a comparative objective parallel to comparison of the Qur’an’s views with other views existing about spirituality. In conclusion, it would be clarified that the most appropriate definition of spirituality is to consider it as a relatively persistent search for “the sacred” in life.

Based on his viewpoint of particularism as well as functionalism (in his own sense of the word), McNaughton believes that the elucidation of moral motivation as well as stating the reasons for moral weakness must be assessed on the basis of the situation in which the action takes place. He believes that when the person gets into a situation to act, he can have two kinds of perception of his situation: i.e., the general and the limited. He attributes the general perception of a situation to pious people and believes that if the person achieves a general perception, he would never get entangled in moral weakness. McNaughton has studied moral weakness in the field of limited perception and viewed such factors as the attractiveness of immoral acts, domination of sensation over reasoning and the immoral consideration being stronger as the causes for limited perception of the situation and moral weakness. On the other hand, Allama Tababtaba'i has also taken into consideration the person's perception of a situation in the formation of moral concepts and this very issue has provided the ground for a comparison of the two thinkers' opinions on elucidation of the reasons for moral weakness. Allama points out two types of general and limited perception, too. He attributes the general perception to the strongly faithful people and considers weakness of faith, voluntary ignorance, prioritizing pleasures of faculties of lust and anger, and weakness of determination (resulting from emotions, moral dispositions, and social atmosphere) as the reasons for weakness of faith. Consequently, both thinkers have pointed out two types of general and limited perception of situation concerning elucidation of moral weakness and have attributed general perception to pious people. They have also examined moral weakness concerning limited perception.