نشریه هستی و شناخت (نامه مفید)
سال هفتم شماره 1 (پیاپی 13، بهار و تابستان 1399)

One of the most influential arguments against the scientific realist’s position is the Underdetermination Argument (UD) which holds that every theory has indefinitely many empirically equivalent, but logically incompatible, rivals, and hence there is no rational epistemic basis for believing any theory to be true. In this paper, after explaining some general points about and presumptions of UD, the most important arguments for and against UD will be discussed. Then, it is argued that a modified version of scientific realism, called “entity realism” (ER) can be immune from UD, since it is only committed to the existence of some unobservables, but is agnostic about their theoretical descriptions (whatnesses). ER, however, would be an incoherent thesis if the existence/whatness distinction, and the Existentialist’s idea, according to which existence is fundamentally real, is rejected. The conclusion of this paper is that ER, supplemented with Existentialism, although is not an ideal stance, is the best secured position for scientific realists that worth fighting for.

As God is free from substantive essence, God's definition through this approach is impossible. The question we respond in this article is that is it likely to define God not in essence but in other aspect? Ibn Sina's respond to this question is that since God and simple creatures' definition is not possible in essence, there is another definition which is as equal as the definition on the basis of essence in terms of epistemic value and authenticity. He calls this definition as the one by the help of the objects and its incarnation is God's definition through His objects. In the first step, Ibn Sina defined God as " essential entity essence", then expanded and deepened this definition by analyzing indispensableness of the essence and by discovering the direct and indirect objects. In this article, after stating the quiddity of the object and the way of defining based on them, we clarified how to use them for God according to Ibn Sina's viewpoint.

Carnap, the most prominent logical positivist, has a famous sentence that metaphysics is nonsense. At the first glance, it seems that any religious belief, especially the belief in God, is illegitimate according to Carnap’s philosophical principles. Since Carnap holds the same view regarding the meaningfulness of ethical beliefs and at the same time regards ethical behaviour valuable, it looks in similar way that at its best, in Carnapian framework, it might be reasonable to value following religions and to reject religious belief simultaneously. However, contrary to such superficial judgment, though the belief in philosophers’ God has no place in Carnap’s philosophical framework, the belief in religions’ God is totally consistent with his philosophical principles. For Carnap, experience is the only source of knowledge and all empirical judgements are merely probable. However, it is reasonable to believe and be certain about the truth of empirical sentences. Here, we show that one can establish one’s belief in religious factual claims, including claims about God, in the same way that Carnap establishes his belief in the claims of natural sciences.

Based on Constitution view, Baker claims that human persons neither have an immaterial soul which can exist independently of body (immaterialism), and nor are animals (animalism). Human persons are a part of natural world, albeit a distinguished one. What makes something a person is the first-person perspective. Initially, human infants have consciousness and develop self-consciousness during their growth, and can perceive themselves from the first-person perspective. At the outset, they possess no concept and learning to use a language gradually, acquire concepts, including self-concept, and survive while they have first-person perspective. Persons are not identical to their bodies; a person and his body have different persistence conditions, so personal identity is independent from physical identity. It may change a person's body gradually while first-person perspective and person are remained. Present paper first explains Baker’s constitution view of human persons and then answers criticisms of its account of personal identity. Among the criticisms of this view is that the first-person perspective does not persist over time and is divisible and duplicable; thus, it cannot be a criterion for personal identity. Additionally, some thought experiments indicate that the first-person perspective cannot be a proper criterion for personal identity.

Metaphysics or first philosophy, as the general knowledge or as the foundation of all knowledge, discusses the quiddity and existence and their issues. The main job of all knowledge is question and answer of special quiddities and special existences. The issues of any systematic philosophy reach to existence and quiddity. Hence Islamic philosophy in its recent period has raised the question of which of these two is original (asil) and which is credible (eatebari). Two theories of the originality of quiddity and the originality of existence were raised to this question. Each of these two theories that is accepted in a philosophy has a different face to a philosophy that accepted rival theory. No difference has been as effective as this difference in the separation of philosophies. The fame of theory of originality of existence in the recent period and denying the originality of quiddity while establishing it has made it not an independent interpretation of originality of quiddity in famous and popular books. In this article, we try to interpret the theory of originality of quiddity and the compatibility between the two theories and the same time preferring over the theory of originality of existence from the language of Fayyaz Lahiji.

In the works of the scholars and Mutakallemun, a doubt has been attributed to Ibn Kamunah in which he “did not consider the reason for rejecting the two gods to be sufficient,” and in a number of works of scholars and theologians, this doubt has been mentioned. The doubt of Ibn Kamunah refers to the well-known argument from composition. He has assumed the existence of two necessary beings in such a way that they do not require their combination, in which case the argument of combination becomes ineffective. Hence, a number of scholars and Mutakallemun have tried to answer this doubt and solve this dilemma by mentioning the doubt. In their response, some of them have stated that the root of this doubt is in the works of Sheikh Ishraq. This article intends to answer this doubt by examining the historical way of attributing it to Suhrawardi and pay attention to the fact that the phrase in Suhrawardi's book, Al-Mashre'a va Al-Mutarahat is different from Ibn Kamuna's phrase and it cannot be said that the root of this doubt is in Suhrawardi's works.

Presenting definitions for (1) theoretical and practical as well as (2) instrumental and non-instrumental rationality, this paper provides a mechanism for defending the practical rationality of commitment to religious teachings or religiosity. First, relaying on the Abraham Maslow's theory of hierarchy of needs and the theory of Thaddeus Metz and Susan Wolf on the meaning of life, the rationality of “meaningfulness of life” as a fundamental goal in human life has been advocated. Thus, based on the descriptive viewpoint of Ninian Smart, the contemporary phenomenologist of religion, about the various dimensions of religion, the paper provides a mechanism for defending the practical instrumental rationality of religiosity. It is shown that if religions, regarding their various dimensions, be able to provide a certain level of human needs in Maslow's theory, and give meaning to life of believers according to Metz and Wolf, then defending the instrumental rationality of religiosity would be able. The need to the theoretical rationality of religious teachings to defend the instrumental rationality of religiousness; the comprehensiveness of the concept of "meaning of life" as the goal of religiosity in explaining the practical rationality of religiousness, compared to other purposes of religiousness; the ability of religions to give meaning to human life, or at least to the lives of believers, as one of the criteria .

Strog reading of the religious theory of natural law is a view that makes it possible to explain and discover the moral advice of religion without referring to the scriptures. This reading is based on the following two principles: (1) the application of natural law as an explanatory framework for the moral advice of religion; And (2) emphasis on the ability of natural reason to fully understand natural law. One of the most controversial aspects of this theory is its epistemological background and the role of natural reason in understanding natural law. The claim that all of God's moral advice can be understood in the light of natural reason faces challenges that we will examine in this article. The four essential components of this reading to solve epistemological challenges are: (1) the theological validity of natural law; (2) religious significance independent of the sacred text; (3) comprehensiveness and inclusion in the field of normative ethics and practical ethics; And (4) the precedence of its rank and position over the sacred text. In this article, we discuss the epistemological challenges that the strong reading of natural law faces and along with the explanation of the four mentioned components, try to show a framework within which natural wisdom can know all the moral advice of God.

From Mulla Sadra's point of view, the existence of a disabled person is the same as that of a relative and has no independence and is one of the levels of existence of a cause. The effect of radiation from existential expansion is the real cause. In Sadra's intellectual paradigm, all causes are related to the real cause. The extension of existence is limited to the essence of the burden, and other causes come from the channels and mediators of grace. It is not only the existence of the active agent that is documented in him, but all his affairs are also documented in the real agent, and each of them extends the existence and all the existential affairs to the agent, because the agent's agent is the same as belonging to him. By analyzing Mulla Sadra's views and relying on the rule of substantial motion, some of the consequences of this type of attitude are: ultimate happiness and moral perfection, a sense of closer closeness and face-to-face knowledge of God, responsibility and moral duties as much as existential dignity, expansion of dignity. Inherent in all creatures, attaining existential freedom. This descriptive-analytical article seeks to examine the moral consequences of the objective view of the existence of a disability based on the views of Mulla Sadra.

English Which man and woman are superior to humans? This question has different answers on feminist ideas and each feminist has responded in some way. Some feminists seek the criterion of male or female superiority in their sexual and natural differentiation and others see this criterion in their gender, social and behavioral differentiation. This research uses a descriptive-analytical method to answer this question by the principles of Transcendent Philosophy and researches about it. Based on these principles, both feminist tendencies are unacceptable. The superior human is a human being who is far greater in being and this greatness is created by the realization of the stages of practical and theoretical reason. A more perfect human being is a human being who has more intellect. Sexual differentiation between men and women does not in itself create or hinder this stages and gender differentiation can only lead to human excellence if it is endorsed by theoretical and practical reason. In his various books, Mulla Sadra also has many words about the female character but this study does not believe any of them contradict this result and none of these words definitively defines a woman as being a second sex and in her opinion, a woman is not the second sex.

Following the issue of Monotheism of Actions, there is an important question that is whether Divine foreknowledge and human free will are compatible or not? Ash’arites who believed in the incompatibility of foreknowledge and human free will, could not find a meaning for man’s agency in order not to understand the compulsion. They believed that Divine foreknowledge is absolutely the reason and cause of everything including the man’s actions. Among this the works of Fakhr Razi are more visible, that in this writing, one of his reasons has been studied. Next seven results have been narrated and studied. Some results in western and Islamic traditions are common. Finally considering the other two consequences, a solution was suggested and clarified.

According to the deflationary theory of truth, to assert that a proposition is true does not add any properties to that proposition. However, most of the theories of content and meaning take the concept of truth as a fundamental semantic concept and define other semantic concepts, such as meaning, according to it. In this article, we tried to show how it is possible to substitute the verification conditions instead of the concept of truth and justify the objective and social aspect of propositions through the users of a language. Also, we tried to show how semantic properties of the logical operators could be explained according to the deflationary conception of truth. Logical operators act as connectives for complex contents and without a deflationary explanation of their rule in sentences or arguments, our survey would be incomplete. Here we explained this rule according to the syntax of formal logic and accepted the equivalence schema as a universal proposition.