فصلنامه حکمت و فلسفه
سال شانزدهم شماره 3 (پیاپی 63، پاییز 1399)

Analyzing the phenomena of the social world based on the idea is the purpose of this article. The paper attempts to show that ideas as the explanatory factor can be used in the study of social and political issues. To explain the analytic role of the idea, we take a constructivist-interpretive overview of the question "How is it possible?". Accordingly, the thinking human is at the center of attention. According to the constructivist-interpretive approach, it is the qualities in the thinking human that enable him to construct an idea of meaning and then give effect to it. These features include: 1) the human mental structure, (2) the ideographic perception of human, (3) the representational role of concepts and language in human, (4) causality in human, (5) rationality in human action. This article explains how human beings can influence the phenomena of the social world by explaining these characteristics in humans. By Understanding how the idea is influenced we show that the idea has the potential to be used as an explanatory factor for the analysis of social phenomena, including politics.

The K axiom in the logic of knowledge expresses this epistemological approach that knowledge is closed under known implications. For Dretske, for two reasons, the closure of knowledge cannot be tautology: first, the knowledge operator does not penetrate into some of the logical implications of our believed propositions; secondly, the conclusive reasons of belief in a proposition cannot be regarded as a conclusive for believing in the heavyweight implications of the proposition. Therefore, if we continue to insist on full adherence to the closure of knowledge, we will inevitably accept skepticism, and it is no way to exclude this epistemological principle and reject the axiom of K. But the abandonment of the closure of knowledge and, consequently, the rejection of the axiom of K would mean that all the modal logics that comprise this axiom cannot be suitable formal systems for the study of epistemological arguments. In this paper, we show that the logic of justification, as a modal logic, while satisfying Dretske’s views, can be a proper formal modal system for studying epistemological arguments.

The French Revolution is recognized as the first concrete presence of the modern individual in history, where he stands for the realization of right and liberty against the absolute power of the king and wants absolute freedom. But Hegel, despite much praise for the revolution, deals with Pathology and critiques the meaning of will, freedom, and individuality in them. At the end of the Spirit chapter of Phenomenology, Hegel deals with the French Revolution, especially the era of terror and, in his dialectical space, rises to the battle by imagining the revolution from the absolute self-consciousness, absolute freedom, partial will, and general will, and proves Robespierre’ and the French nation’s abstract and hollow understanding of these terms. Hegel, after this criticism, also implicitly deals with Rousseau's critique as the foregrounding of the French conception of the meaning of these terms. After examining the outcome of absolute freedom and all its determinations to the end, Hegel redefines the fundamental terms in the Terror section and illustrates how public freedom and will are realized in his political thought system whereby penetrating into the absolute power and will, not only does the particular return to the individual again, but also realizes the whole inside him through outer mediators, and in this way, coming up with a very precise definition of the whole exclusive in individual and returning the external reality to the individual in a complex way.

Whenever it is said there is no truth in place, this question comes up as to whether the truth itself does exist or not? Two answers are offered for this question. First, there is no truth other than the truth that there is no truth (modern nihilism). Secondly, there is no truth even the truth that there is no truth (postmodern nihilism). This paper aims at exploring the second answer by presenting examples of the claim in postmodernism. While pluralism states that there is no absolute truth, nihilism asserts that there is absolutely no truth and that the same truth is not true as well. Hence, postmodern nihilism is self-contradictory based on its realistic interpretations and self-reflective based on its nihilistic interpretations. Post-structuralism is nihilist from the epistemological perspectives because it claims that no cognizance can be generalized and adjusted to the world but it is probably not nihilist in terms of semiotics because it does not deny the principle of implication. Deconstruction is nihilistic and devastative for the authorship-oriented person exercising centralism. Post-colonial nihilism is also indicative of the destruction and disapproval of the identity of the colonialized lands as well as reflective of the denial of the identity of the minority races like the black. Gender nihilism engages in denial of gender and queer nihilism denies any sort of sexual, gender, and identity normality.

Human life is inevitably linked with the environment and nature. Water, air, food, etc all are guarantors of the survival of human life and activities on earth. Humans reside on the earth, and so their dependence on the earth and other beings is supposed to be all other proportions of them. But mostly the relation gradually ends up neglecting one side, the environment, and using it as a resource in favor of human on the other side. This relation is based on the dominant thinking of the subject-object and neglect of other environmental values. The continuation of this situation will seriously damage the life of the earth and all beings. Martin Heidegger, a contemporary German philosopher who considers the history of Western thought as a history of neglect of being, believed that the deep roots of the current human relationship with nature and environmental crisis are in the particular perception of beings according to which beings are considered as mere human’s objects for domination of them. Heidegger considers such a relation to beings and the whole of nature as a subjective relation and attempts to solve the problem by means of the question of being and dwelling in the earth on the basis of friendship and the negation of dualism.

In Derrida's thought, "deconstruction" is not a "method" but an "approach" that questions the whole of metaphysical ideas and the tradition of Western philosophy from Plato to Husserl. The scope of his view also includes religious concepts because of their metaphysical nature. This paper shows the role of the term "deconstruction" and its application and explanation in the field of theology. To this end, while pointing to alternative interpretations that link Derrida’s deconstruction with nihilism and critique of this claim and relying on the deconstructive evidence of his thinking, such as the concept of the gift, the paradox of faith, the promise of faith, and justice, it has been tried to speak of the similarity between deconstruction and the possibility of religious thought. With this statement, the metaphorical reading of some of his commentators becomes irrelevant, and the positive and negative aspects that exist in differentiation and impossibility as deconstructive devices can pave the way for the possibility and understanding of a kind of negative theology in Derrida's philosophical thought and questioning of the sacred in the contemporary era.

This paper argues against a singular and definitive notion of modernity and calls for a new formulation of this elusive concept that moves beyond the framework established by its strongest proponent: Jurgen Habermas. In addition to serious consideration and analysis of non-Western critiques of Habermas’ unfinished project of modernity, the approach advocated here seeks to examine four central components of what I shall refer to as “multiple modernities”—components which are themselves the product of cultural diversity. 1) By reference to the multiplicity of cultures and histories, the notion of multiple modernities challenges the concept of universal history. 2) This concept takes into account the multifaceted roles of the various agents involved—in the development of multiple modernities. And because this is so 3) the underlying values of these cultures allow modernity to take on various forms. 4) The concept of “Multiple Modernities” definitively acknowledges the link between modernity and civilization—a link which I argue is a defining feature of the project of any modernity.