فصلنامه مطالعات راهبردی
سال بیست و سوم شماره 4 (پیاپی 90، زمستان 1399)

Although the discourse of the Islamic Revolution had an epistemologicaldisconnection with the discourse of Pahlavism as "other discourse" and had acoherence within itself, but over time and in confronting with different epistemologicaldiscourses, it was affected by changes and many sub-discourses were formed, each ofwhich had a special impact on the governance of national security in Iran. In thisarticle, focusing on the differences between the sub-discourses formed within thediscourse of the Islamic Revolution, the question has been raised that what are theeffects of these sub-discourses on the national security governance? In response to thisquestion, using library resources and analysis of existing relevant secondarydocuments, while examining developments in the discourse of the Islamic Revolution,the principles and foundations as well as the effects and consequences of each subdiscourseon the national security governance in Iran are analyzed. The hypothesisexamined in this article is that the evolution of the discourse of national securitygovernance in the Islamic Republic of Iran, despite the development of a specificgovernance model of the Islamic Republic, weakens consensus and forms polarizationand conflict in society and also national security structures and institutions.

This article studies the legal foundations of national security in the Islamic Republicof Iran by using analytical method and peruses the linkage between national securityand legal system, the place of national security in the legal system and the pathtowards the legal system of national security, concludes that the main foundation ofnational security in Iran is based on the Constitution, public obligations andindividual rights and liberties. The connection between them protects nationalsecurity in a way that not only special authorities or institutions but also everyone isconsidered as the guardians of national security. When propounding expediency as astrong principle in introducing national security in Iran, this field moves away fromthe main principle that is based on public presence and finds a fragile position. Apartfrom this, Iran's national security, with its internal and external security approach,continues to be practically within the legal system rather than along it. The proposalof this article is to legalize national security according to the Constitution, as well asto focus on moral and religious principles and to adopt an exceptional approach tothe basis of expediency. Thus, national security will gain a well-established place inthe legal system.

National security, in modern definitions, in addition to the classical components ofsecurity such as the absence of external threats, is closely interacting with the stabilityand survival of the political system and governance and includes components thatfocus on citizens, such as civil rights, public trust, political legitimacy and Economicefficiency. On the other hand, in looking at this concept, the ratio of each of the pillarsof sovereignty should be measured and adjusted with it, and the judiciary is one of thepillars of sovereignty. Given the main function of the judiciary in establishing justice,it can be considered the most important element of governance in achieving politicallegitimacy, protection of citizens' rights and the efficiency of executive institutions, allof which lead to the establishment and strengthening of national security. The presentarticle, by emphasizing this position of the judiciary, examines its performance inproviding national security. Accordingly, the judiciary, on the one hand, will helpstrengthen national security by providing judicial security, which requires the rule oflaw, judicial independence and respect for civil rights, and all of which are modernrequirements of national security. On the other hand, the role of this power ingoverning national security has been studied during a phenomenon called policyjudicialization. The connection of the concept of judicial oversight with the executiveand political processes in the world has led to the formation of the phenomenon ofjudicial legalization. In the present article, the relationship between the judicializationof politics and the expansion of the oversight powers of the judiciary to achieve greaterand stronger national security has been examined.

In national security governance, security policy-making is the duty of thegovernment. One of the tools of security management is governmental institutions.According to the law, the country’s National Security Council is one of theinstitutions in charge of national security policy management, which is responsiblefor the internal security of the country through the security provision councils andthe relevant commissions in the provinces and cities. The purpose of this article is toanalyze, pathologize and evaluate the role of the National Security Council in thegovernance structure of national security; for this purpose, the structural, functionaland legal areas of the Council and its relationship with other councils andinstitutions responsible in the field of internal security have been measured. Theresults of this article indicate that factors such as shortcomings in the lawdetermining the duties and organization of the country's security council,composition of members and the type of their role in the council, reducing theconcept of internal security to military and law enforcement security and dutyoverlapping with that of other institutions has caused this council not to be able toplay an effective role in the structure of the country's security governance as itshould; therefore, it has become more of a coordinating institution.

Strategic surprise occurs when the national security system is unable to fully preventa crisis or of a priori management of the situation to reduce the damages caused bythe crisis. National security governance also means the activism of certaininstitutions of the country's political structure that have a specific mission in thefield of national security by law. Accordingly, the main question is what effect doesstrategic surprise have on the governance of national security in the IslamicRepublic of Iran? The results of this article show that the occurrence of strategicsurprise postpones the national security decision-making process and increases thecosts of security. While increasing cognitive bias, ambiguity in the role ofthreatening actors, keeping national security officials busy, reducing the stability andinfluence of national sovereignty, doubts about security priorities, increasinginsignificant signals and increasing public distrust of the national security system aresome examples of the impact of strategic surprise on the national securitygovernance. This article suggests ways to reduce these surprises.

Foreign policy is one of the most controversial areas of governance. The complexity,fluidity, and sensitivity of issues and multiple actors involved make it hard to createand maintain a stable consensus on foreign policy. Different models of consensusbuildinghave been applied in the different political systems. Concluding a multilateralor bilateral agreement with other countries can be a starting point for widening the gapbetween different political factions. JCPOA as a multilateral agreement between Iranand the P5 + 1 caused many debates among Iranian political elites, even some yearsafter its conclusion in 2015. The main question of the article is that whether and towhat extent Iran has been successful in consensus-building in foreign policy. Focusingon JCPOA's experience and using operational coding analysis, this article analyzes theperceptual structures of political elites about JCPOA in the pre-and post-USwithdrawal. The operational code analysis of Iran's political elites about JCPOAshowed that there is no appropriate and efficient perceptual structure for creating astable consensus on Iran’s foreign policy between the three spectrums ofinternationalist, anti-hegemonic, and swing elites.

The purpose of this article is to explain the existential threat of Zionist regime's sportin international arena for Iran. From the perspective of purpose, the findings of thisarticle are practical and from the perspective of data collection, they are desk review.They show that the sport of the Islamic Republic of Iran, after more than four decadesof not confronting the representatives of the Zionist regime in various fields, is nowfacing an important challenge. According to the increasing investment of this regimein different sport fields to gain more international prestige and performance, in comingyears, Iranian sport will face many challenges due to the presence of Israeli athletesespecially in Iran's medal-winning arenas such as wrestling, weight-lifting, judo andetc. So, taking appropriate measures at the present time to deal with this problem canprevent future crises for Iranian sports. Aligning Muslim countries with its approachand goals, justifying international sports institutions using the experiences of othercountries, and distinguishing between "playing" and "recognition" are somesuggestions made by the author of this article.

Before and after the election, Joe Biden has stated that one of his foreign policypriorities is to formulate and pursue a new US policy towards Iran. At the heart ofBiden's "Iranian politics" is his return to JCPOA. However, there are ambiguities aboutnature and quality of this policy and also USA return to JCPOA. Therefore, this articletries to answer this question: What are the nature, components and coordinates ofBiden's foreign policy towards Iran and what will it be like? By documentary studymethod and analyzing the speeches, letters, and statements made by Biden and hisforeign policy team, it is argued that Biden's foreign policy discourse is "liberalinternationalism." His nuclear policy is also based on a thematic and step-by-step linkto return to the JCPOA in the first step, strengthen and expand its provisions andextend its time in the second step, and finally extend it to the missile program andIran's regional influence in the third step.