تاریخ نامه انقلاب
سال چهارم شماره 7 (پاییز و زمستان 1399)

In the course of the Holy Defense (Iran-Iraq War, also called Imposed War), Iranian forces planned and implemented many operations to penetrate into the Iraqi soil. This was carried out with the aim of crashing the enemy’s defense lines, preventing the repeat of incursion, punishing the invader and winning an important advantage for the negotiation table. Following a series of small and big operations, when it seemed to be hard or even impossible to advance into the Iraqi territory, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corp (IRGC) carried out two deception operations in 1985 in Hoor-al-Azim and Umm ar-Rasas regions before launching the major Operation Valfajr-8 to boost its success rate and surprise the enemy. Seyyed al-Shohada Brigade 10 forces participated in both deception operations. Along with other participating units, these forces could shift the enemy’s attention away from the main operation zone, thus play a key role in success of the frontline forces in conquering Faw. In this paper, we intend to study the role of Seyyed al-Shohada Brigade 10 forces in this deception operation as a backup plan for major Operation Valfajr-8. Data gathering in this work has been through a descriptive-analytical method plus archived documents, oral history and key library references.

This paper intends to explore causes of the collapse of trilateral coalition of Mashhad’s Bazaar Activists, Pahlavi Regime and Astan Quds Razavi between the years 1974 and 1979. This research work claims the existence of Mashhad’s Bazaar activists’ hostile attitude toward the Pahlavi regime and Astan Quds Razavi during the period under study. Reviewing the history of Astan Quds Razavi through library and documentary method as well as interviews with informed people, this paper intends to find an answer to the question of “How did the coalition of three important pillars of power in Mashhad turn hostile?” The hypothesis of this paper states that the trilateral relations of Bazaar, regime and Astan Quds broke apart when the two powerful elements of government and Astan Quds Razavi interfered in Bazaar affairs. The government fought overcharging, lack of business permits, and some other violations of law while Astan Quds Razavi destroyed the Grand Bazaar and abstained from paying rentals to the Bazaari landlords. As a result, Bazaar witnessed protests and general strikes during those five years (1974-1979). Findings of this paper indicate that Bazaar activists suffered serious pressures and damages during the period. Simultaneousness of the two plans augmented anger of the Bazaari people against the government and Astan Quds Razavi, convincing them to join the Islamic movement.

Realization of socioeconomic justice has been among key goals and ideals of the leaders and Constitution of Iran and Cuba. This paper studies the three areas of income, education and health to evaluate socioeconomic justice during the period 1979-2018 for Iran and 1960-1999 for Cuba. Comparative-descriptive research method has been employed and the documentary research method has made use of data with the Statistical Center of Iran, Ministry of Health, Central Bank of Iran, World Health Organization, World Bank and findings of the previous research works. According to the findings of this paper, the student-teacher ratio in Iran in 2018 has been 28/52 and 11/48 in Cuba in 1999. The regression coefficient for 24 years of same data has been -.290 and -.608 respectively. Government spending on education as a percentage of GDP was 3.96% in Iran in 2018 and 6.76% in Cuba in 1999 and the regression coefficient for 11 years has been -.012 and .062 respectively. In health sector, out-of-pocket costs in Iran in 2014 stood at 47.80% and in Cuba in 1995 at 9.77% while five-year coefficients of the fourth decade stood at -2.840 and -.200 respectively. The density of physicians (per 1000 population) in Iran in 2018 was 1/58 and in Cuba in 1999 it was 5/84 while the 34-year regression coefficient stood at .038 and .136 respectively. Hospital beds (per 1000 population) in Iran in 2014 marked 1/50 and in Cuba in 1995 it was 6, while 25-year regression coefficients were respectively .005 and .073. Based on Gini cost-based coefficient, during the first three decades after the revolution, Iran was placed among the relatively unequal countries (0/50-0/35) while Gini income-based coefficient related to the three first decades put Cuba among the relatively equal countries (0/35-0/20). With the growth in inequality in the fourth decade after the revolution, Cuba was placed among the relatively unequal countries.

Attempts have been made in this research to study the two discourses of intellectualism and clericalism in Constitutional Movement and Islamic Revolution. In the course of history, the two discourses have sometimes formed coalition and at other times stood against each other. In Iranian society, intellectualism discourse has failed to succeed without clericalism discourse since clerics have managed well to use their potential to mobilize resources. Being aware of this potential, intellectuals have resorted to potentials of clerics in some epochs of history. However, thanks to the experience the clerics gained in the course of history and learnt about the power within their control, they played a more outstanding role in the victory and stabilization of Islamic Revolution. Thus, they could gain public support and push away other discourses to fix their hegemony on the society. In this paper, we have applied the theory of discourse and resource mobilization. Discourses seek establishing hegemony on the society. To do this, they need resource mobilization.

In the early years after the culmination of the Islamic Revolution, Iraqi invasion of Iranian territory was one of the most important political challenges for the newly established government. Due to Iran’s economic and military problems and empowerment of Iraq through international support, the war came to an end when Iran had to accept UN Resolution 598. To understand the importance of accepting the UN resolution and termination of the war, one should investigate the role of decision-makers. On this basis, this work - through a descriptive-analytical method and based on library sources and interviews - intends to study the role of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Iranian Parliament) in making decision to end the war. The principal question of the study is: What role and influence did the Iranian Parliament have in decision-making for Iran’s accepting of UN Resolution 598? Findings of this study indicate that such power institutions as the Leader’s Office, Supreme National Security Council, Iranian government with special authority in foreign policy, critical conditions at the time, confidentiality of the top decisions, slow process of decision-making in the Parliament due to its structural features, and disunion between the Parliament and influential institutions related to the issue paved the ground for the Parliament to be impressed by the decisions made at the other political institutions.

This paper studies in a descriptive way Imam Khomeini’s ten-year views on economic policies as compared with related policies in the tenure of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and Imam Ali (pbuh). This study intends to find an answer to the question of “What similarities are there between Imam Khomeini’s ten-year leadership and the tenure of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and Imam Ali (pbuh) in terms of economic policies?”, claiming that the three governments resorted to settlement method. Findings of this paper indicate that Imam Khomeini, as the Founder and Leader of the Islamic Revolution, has set the model of Islamic Republic based on early Islamic government. In introducing the model of Islamic Revolution, Imam Khomeini points to the successful early Islamic government and underscores his entire objective behind establishment of the government as social justice. Therefore, based upon the studies, both governments have sought establishing social justice in the society, although the two governments are different in terms of time and pace, social fabric, structure and type of the government, ways for financing the government and their economic methods. However, the two governments have contextually followed one similar path. Resorting to its findings, the paper proves its hypothesis.

This paper intends to study the role of Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad Province’s nomads in the victory of Islamic Revolution. Sparse and scattered works on this role of the province’s nomads, many of them disorganized and contradictory, have raised the need for conducting this research. The principal question of this paper is: “Did the nomads in Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad Province play a role independent of the clerics, pursuing special material gains in 60s and then in the fight against the regime of Shah, or did they play this role in tandem with the Islamic Movement under the clerics with religious motives?” The main hypothesis of the paper points to a combination of material and religious motives in meeting their demands under the leadership of the clerics. The paper has applied a documentary method as well as interviews with local informed individuals. Findings of the paper indicate that unlike the two dominant approaches that try to evaluate these fights completely independent or completely aligned, the nomads continued their fight in 60s and 70s with two material and religious motives so that serious changes happened in their manners of fight against the regime of Shah