نشریه منطق پژوهی
سال یازدهم شماره 2 (پاییز و زمستان 1399)

Allameh Tabatabai, in the definition of predication , considers predication an existential union between the subject and the predicate. In this union, the subject is an existence by itself and the predicate is a connective existence (towards the subject). Then on the division of prediction, he divides prediction to 1. Primary and essential predication 2. Common technical predication 3. Realty and attenuate prediction. In the first predication, an essence predicates on itself, in the second predication, an accident predicates on an underlying subject. In third predication, a caused predicates on its cause. With a reflection on the topic of properties in analytical metaphysics and its relation to the philosophical foundations of Allameh Tabatabai, a serious conflict is established between the second predication and third predication. This conflict is resolved by providing a solution, but a second conflict arises. Finally, for the second conflict, the definition of predication must be changed. Therefore the “connective existence” must be changed to “relative existence”.

Conception and assertion have always been considered as two basic and systematic parts of logic. The basis of two-partite logic is the discussion of conception and assertion; so, from the time of Avicenna until today, and according to the modern logic of the West, various issues have arisen in this regard. Two-partite logic is based on dividing the knowledge into knowledge by representation (ʿIlm Ḥuṣūlī) and knowledge by presence (ʿIlm Ḥuḍūrī). Given the nature of the division and the difference between the species, the issue of the relationship between conception and assertion is the most important of all these issues. The nature of this relation has a direct effect on the "logic of division", "dependence of one of them on the other", "possibility of the mental realization of each without the other," and other related issues. Avicenna, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and Mulla Sadra (in an independent work) are among the thinkers deliberated on this issue. The present article has reflected on analytical problems in the division of the knowledge by representation into conception and affirmation in the works of the three thinkers. So it aims to obtain the relationship between conception and assertion, the role of each one in achieving the other, and finally a comprehensive view of the three philosophers on the nature of conception and assertion. In this research, by separating the status of language (word) from the status of quiddity, the knowledge by representation has been explained and analyzed: in the status of quiddity, only assertion arises, and through the status of language and the relationship between language and thought, conception is obtained. If the knowledge by representation is of merely one core, logic will in fact be one-partite.

This paper examines two rival versions (normative-axiomatic and psychologistic) about the nature of deduction and its relation with intuition in Descartes' thought. The ideal of the first version is to reduce the role of the faculty of memory and, sometimes, the role of the faculty of imagination in long chains of deduction due to their fallibility in Descartes' view. Achieving this ideal also depends on the mental training and practicing to place longer inferential chains in a single Cartesian intuition. This version accepts the independence of a logical consequence, considers deduction to be definable on the basis of definiens such as rules of inference and the basic principles of logic, and does not contradict the axiomatic tree of Cartesian knowledge. But the second version essentially sees deduction as nothing more than an intuitive grasping: a simple mental act that is nothing more than a complex intuition of several intuitive things. Therefore, this version considers deduction to have no logical regulations and considers it indefinable based on definiens such as logical principles and rules, and instead places the grasp of a truth that manifests in a kind of psychological clarity experienced by the knowing subject. These two versions try to seem compatible with cognitive objectivity and offer an innate and inadoptable reading of Cartesian logic; But since the second version contradicts both the more fundamental points of Descartes' thought and the independence of logic, this version cannot lead to the cognitive objectivity and innateness of logic in an acceptable way.

According to the maximalism about truthmaker, every true proposition has a truthmaker. One of the challenges faces maximalism is: what kind of entities are truthmakers of negative propositions? There are many solutions suggested by maximalists. One class of these solutions is based on negative entities. In the present paper we first briefly explain the problem. Then we indicate some solutions which are based on negative entities and some objections. These solutions are based on views entitled “totality states of affairs”, “polarity”, “absences” and “fundamental negative facts”. According to the solution based on totality states of affairs, in every negative case, in addition to positive facts the totality of them makes another fact, which in turn, plays the role of Truthmaker of negative proposition. According to the polarity solution, objects instantiate the properties into positive and negative manner and negative facts that result from the negative instantiation are considered as Truthmaker of negative propositions. According to the absence solution, the Truthmaker of negative proposition is considered as the absence of Truthmaker belonging to its alternative positive proposition. According to the fundamental negative facts solution, fundamentally there are negative facts the same as positive facts and these facts are Truthmaker of negative propositions.

One of the goals, or perhaps the most important goal of Bertrand Russell’s prominent attempts in his philosophical and logical works was to establish a sort of Ideal or Perfect Language in order to be used to deal with the varieties of complexities, ambiguities, and paradoxes which in one way or another appear in natural languages. Such a project is built on the central notion, or better methodology, of Logical Analysis. Russell by using his logical analysis can distinguish between (genuine proper) names and definite descriptions, which further helps him to cope with three main problems: informativeness of identity claims, negative existentials, and non-existents, that is, those expressions which have no reference whatsoever. In this paper, I will introduce and explain Russell’s view in two parts: The Conceptual Aspect of his analysis, which involves the definition of logical analysis, and the Extensional Aspect, which brings in his famous Theory of Descriptions.

Farabi is the first Muslim logician to define conversion in his works. Ibn Sina, by borrowing from him and adding the adverb "survival of falsehood", has defined the conversion as follows: " Displacement of the subject and predicate along with the survival of the quality, truth and falsehood.". The logicians after Ibn Sina, led by Tusi, have found several inaccuracy in this definition and have tried to provide an accurate and consistent definition with the logical system. In this research, while measuring and evaluating these problems and answers, the historical course of definition of conversion by Muslim logicians has been studied. For this purpose, the evolution of the definition of conversion has been studied and by mentioning the problems of the definitions of logicians such as "Farabi", "Akhavan Al-Safa", "Fakhr Razi", "Ibn Sahlan Savi", etc., we have been led to the conclusion that "Khunji" and his contemporaries definition ("Tusi", "Ermoi", etc.) is a suitable and correct definition.

One of the important issues in Islamic philosophy is the discussion of mental existence and its forms. Among the forms that have become mental, two forms have challenged the foundations of this issue. Forms of community of substance and width and community of transverse categories under each other. The main issue of this article is to show the application of the distinction between the first pregnancy and the common pregnancy in proving and solving the problems of mental existence in Mirdamad. The method of discussion will be library and historical method. The brief answer to this main question is that Mirdamad was able to give the same answer to the problem of mental existence by separating the two, which was later registered in the name of his student Mulla- Sadra. Meanwhile, Mirdamad has had a great impact on the development of the theory of predication and the distinction between the tautological and common technical predication.

In this paper, I will argue for this claim that Hegel's logic implies Trivialism. In recent decades among scholars, there is a special interest in rereading classic philosophers through the modern logic, also about Hegel this story is true. Graham Priest, a contemporary philosopher and logician, had claimed that we can find Hegel's logic in a paraconsistent way. More specifically, Priest said Hegel's logic is committed to Dialetheism. His claim has some opponents(such as Michela Bordignon) who say Hegel's being dialetheist has some requirements such as commitment to the third truth-value (Glutty value) and this is a dubious presupposition. Bordignon had claimed that in Hegel's logic, there is only one truth-value: true. In three-part of this paper, I will report and criticize accounts of Priest and his opponents, then I will establish an argument for Hegel's being Trivialist, respectively. And finally, I will try to explain what Trivialism is and I will give a reason for defense of it.

»Self« or »Ego« is amongst basis of philosophical an psychological thought. Philosopher and thinker of Humanities sciences Frequently, treated a bout its quality and entity so much. Edmund husserl, The Famous phenomenologian in contemporary world believe that, the »Ego« is center of cog native acts. One of the basic act that imputation to Ego, is vocal an expressional acts, and condition of get on this things. namly, that is »Self« or »Ego« can conceived like basis and core of cognation and conceived like busis and core of cognation and comucational instrument of environmental world. In other words, language and subjective analysis can assist it to knowing the thing of world and completed process of knowledge or not. Project of Husserlian Transcendental phenomenology, try to achive it's proper place by »Epoche «of physical and positivistic thought. For this, he analysed the relation of »Ego« and mind in transcendental Framework based on intentional character of consciousness. For this one of my relational implement is expression and speech. That He looked transcendental. In this reaserch we attempt that by analysis concept of transcendental Ego. For Husserl, investigate logical and expressional relation between subjectivity of Ego and world.

Dummett`s philosophy is influenced by two great philosophers : he follows Frege in his methodology and attempts to build metaphysics upon logic and theory of meaning, and he also follows Wittgenstein in his theory of meaning and accepts his use theory of meaning that says in most cases, the meaning of a word is its use. Nevertheless, Dummett tries to avoid the radical skepticism found in late Wittgenstein, since he believes if that is true then communication is in constant danger of simply breaking down. His solution against this radical skepticism is introducing the idea of implicit knowledge for our understanding of how language works. In this article, I tried to show how this idea causes Dummet`s theory to be different from Wittgenstein's concept of language. We cannot maintain at the same time both implicit knowledge of the language and think of the theory of meaning as a base for metaphysics.

We first look at some controversial issues in mathematical logic. These issues are often confused by non-specialists. The main topics that we will address in this regard are: Tarski's definition of truth, Tarski's theorem on undefinability of truth, Gödel's completeness theorem and Gödel's incompleteness theorems, and first and second-order logic. Next, we will introduce some non-classical logics and their place in philosophical logic as well as logic in computer science. In addition, we discuss some philosophical issues related to logic. Among the issues we discuss are the definition of logic, the difference between logic and logical system, and the challenge of monism versus pluralism in the choice of logic. By separating logic from logical systems, we will defend the view that mathematical logic, as part of mathematics, should only be committed to the standards of mathematics. In this regard, any non-classical logic system that meets these standards will have legitimacy.

From his viewpoint, logic cannot in advance shape a fixed form for determination of thought; because every determination had its own special form. The transformation ofsoul (Geist) can't be apprehend within traditional logic, so it clings to earlier forms of Geist and as a result, neither it can comprehend new manifestations and determinations of Geist, nor can it form a native metaphysic for each Folkaccording toGeist’s determination for them. Such logic will turn finally to skepticism. In the following paper, it will be explained how Hegel's epistemological- ontological logicis trying to transformthe nature of thought. In his opinion, the role of logic is not merely speculation, but also identifies and unification of thought with Being. Therefore, his logic alongside possessing content, determinate the content of thought. Hegelian logic is a complete philosophical system, capable of conceptualizing every Geist's unique determination.By his ontological-epistemological logic, Hegel finds metaphysic as a possible science, without entanglementin Kantian dogmatism.