مجله تاملات فلسفی
پیاپی 26 (بهار و تابستان 1400)

The present study seeks to answer the main question: "What kind of relationship does Fakhr Razi introduce between the essence and the divine attributes?" It was formed and in the study of the two theories of trait negation and the objectivity of traits, it explored to find the answer. The research findings are as follows: Fakhr Razi tries to minimize verbal conflicts by reducing the frequency of most of the issues related to adjectives to verbal issues, but he does not rely on this theory and the ontological issues of the relationship between traits and Examining Essence, Fakhr's existentialist studies concluded that he proved the existence of attributes by distorting the reasons for denying attributes, although Fakhr speaks erroneously in quoting the negation of attributes. He says that he himself is somehow in the House of Lords denying the attributes - but with a different justification. He goes on to point out the relationship between divine attributes and essence, and sometimes clarifies the objectivity of attributes with essence, although he cannot be considered a defender of the theory of objectivity, but in order to analyze the change of his theological positions and his fairness in accepting cases. Whoever considers the arguments sufficient, will be thoughtful and useful

The present study focuses on examining Heidegger's position on the effect of , death-awareness on genuine life and the relationship between death, life and authenticity. To achieve this goal, descriptive-analytical method was used. Heidegger's concern is the question of existence with a fundamental analysis of Dasein as pure life in the realm of being towards death. The thought of understanding death is deeply linked to Dasein's non-existence as well as other fundamental concepts such as anxiety, conscience, and authenticity. Getting rid of the vulgarity of everyday life is based on the turning point in choosing the genuine Dasein, death. Death is an element of understanding Dasein and conscience is also an element of understanding authenticity in life. In the meantime, anxiety is a precondition for authenticity and the discoverer of the veil of death. In Heidegger's thought, the search for Dasein's genuine face by relying on death and emphasizing the choice of a person away from the unscrupulous conscience of others is evident. Therefore, in his thick intelligence, death-awareness is one of the most important things in building a genuine life. But his approach to death as the beginning or end of life, the phenomenon of authenticity in this world or the hereafter, as well as the genuine life here or there, paves the way for a different view of the metaphysical tradition of the past.

Aristotle defines happiness as virtuous activity in both Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics. By his discussing on psychology and considering the virtues of the parts of the soul, he attempts to attain the final definition of “happiness” and “the virtuous activity”. His research in Nicomachean Ethics leads to the conclusion that ultimate happiness is contemplation. But in Eudemian Ethics happiness is defined as “the activity of a complete life in accordance with complete virtue”. In other words, in Eudemian Ethics happiness contains all the virtues, including contemplation and the moral virtues. These two apparently different definitions of the “happiness” show that moral virtue does not have the same status in those two ethical treatises. In this paper, we first express Aristotle's ethical thought in both treatises, and then we show that Aristotle considers moral virtue, at the end of the Nicomachian Ethics, as a necessary condition for happiness and contemplation, but in the Eudemian Ethics, he considers the moral virtue together with contemplation as the constituents of happiness. This difference on the stutus of moral virtue in the happiness issues from Aristotle's different viewpoints on the life of happy man in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics. In the first treatise, Aristotle concerns with human beings in “the domain of God-like activity”, but in the second treatise, he concerns with human being in “the domain of human activity”.

The doctrine of pure existence is one of the initiatives of Islamic philosophy, which has a significant place in the history of philosophy, especially Transcendental wisdom. Transcendental philosophers have proved the essential unity of true and real unity by applying it on the preliminary stages. Finally, they deal with the unity of being individual. On the contrary, some scholars have contrasted pure existence doctrine with unity of being individual. With superficial and hasty interpretations of expressions, this contradiction is shown in the Aqa Ali Modarres’ viewpoint. Transcendental philosophers believe that those who accept the unity of being Individual have considered God nonconditioned and as the source of division. But sages, including Aqa Ali Modarres, can never accept the unity of being Individual, because they consider God almighty to be pure existence, which is conditionally negatively-conditioned existence and one of the types of non-conditioned as the source of division. The Comparison of this claim with the statements of Aqa Ali Modarres has shown its inconsistency with his views and reveals the alignment of the stages of existence with the theory of unity of being Individual.

Lacan and Levinas were among the first contemporary thinkers of the twentieth century who have put emphasize on the concepts of otherness and subjectivity. The approach of these two thinkers to the issue has been accompanied by critique and challenge of rational subjectivism and the ethics of modern philosophy. Accordingly, the decentralization of the self-sovereignty subject, the priority of the other in the destruction of subjectivity and the redefinition of Ethics among the common principles that have been heuristic in presenting their new reading of the subject. However, Lacan and Levinas have taken different interpretations, insights, and conclusions in their attempts to explain the meaning of the other, the reason for its priority over the subject, and also to redefine the subject. On the one hand, in the contexts of structuralist and poststructuralist approaches in the heart of the field of psychoanalysis, Lacan Summoned the lacking subject, which is split and barred, to resist and negate with the structure of the big other, and in this resistance, the concept of desire plays a key role. On the other hand, Levinas with a phenomenological approach and in the heart of a religion-based approach, exposes the subject to the other with asymmetric responsibility, and in this regard, the face of the other plays a fundamental role in evoking the inescapable responsibility in the subject. Lacan and Levinas deal with two different aspects of otherness, which has also led to a different reading of subjectivity.

 In Plato’s Sophist, Heidegger interprets Book VI of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, particularly the discussion of Phronesis. In this book, he deals with five modes of Dasein’s opening, i.e. Episteme, Techne, Sophia, Nous and Phronesis. He has considered “Episteme and Sophia” to be a type of epistemic mode and “Phronesis and Techne” to be a type of calculative mode of Dasein’s soul. In fact, Heidegger introduces Aristotle’s five rational virtues as the modes of opening in Dasein. He has described Sophia as the highest type of the epistemic mode and Phronesis as the highest type of the calculative mode. It needs to be mentioned that Heidegger finally introduces Phronesis as the highest mode of Dasein’s opening. On the other hand, in Sein und Zeit, in the discussion of Dasein and particularly Dasein’s relations with other Daseins, one can understand Phronesis as a mode of Dasein’s existence. In fact, Dasein’s existential mode of being is its Phronetic existence. It is noteworthy that Heidegger in Plato’s Sophist presents the same interpretation of Phronesis that one finds in Sein und Zeit. Indeed, to express Phronesis, Heidegger refers to Dasein’s existential mode of being and finally he has fathomed the genuine mode of behavior as something in practice that lies in the call of conscience; this is what Heidegger presents as the forgotten conscience in Plato’s Sophist

This paper examines the implication of the verse ‘ عهدی الینال الظالمین] ‘which means: ‘My covenant does not include the unjust’] on the prophets’ infallibility. According to the verse, God’s covenant (i.e., prophethood or Imamat) does not include the unjust people. On religious definition, committing a sin is an instance of injustice. Hence, the meaning of the verse is thatthe one who attains prophethood has never committed a sin. This implies the infallibility of the prophets. A controversial case in here would be a man who has committed a sin and then repented of his sin. Does the term ‘unjust’ describe this man after his repentance? Most of Shiite theologians claim that the word ‘ الظظظالظمظیظن) ‘the unjust) is a general and logically universal word which involves any unjust person who has committed a sin, even if he has repented. The author, however, is against this reasoning.The word ‘ الظالمین ‘is a derivative noun. According to the discussion of derivative in Ilm-u Al-Usoul, the true meaning of the derivative nouns is when an instance of that noun has actually that attribute. Accordingly, an unjust person is a person who is unjust now, not a person who has committed a sin but has now repented of it and never committed a sin again. In sum, the paper argues, the verse ‘ ینال ال ‘does not imply the absolute infallibility of the prophets; it only implies that the prophets had not been unjust at the time when they attained prophethood.

Any theory in normative ethics offers an exclusive criteria for moral action. At the same time, the prevailing view is that applying any normative theory can solve practical ethical dilemas. Thus, it is generally believed that applied-professional ethics is nothing more than normative ethics. But many philosophers and professional ethicists oppose this deductive approach to the application problem, arguing for a drivative (or procedural) approach to applied ethics. According to this view, applied ethics is not merely based on a set of a priori principles in normative ethics but requires the use of human experience in specific situations. The natural and unnatural disasters are occasions that challenge the standards of normative ethics under normal circumstances and remind of the need for special studies titled “disaster ethics”. In this regard, and considering the Covid-19 pandemic, this article addresses the issue of whether the ethical challenge of the triage of coronary patients to receive the limitted medical resources and services can be solved solely on the basis of normative ethical theories?

Mental obsession means repeated, unwanted, uncontrollable thoughts which causes unusual anxiety and makes one do obsessive actions, in response. These actions seem to reduce anxiety and be protective; However, not only they do not cure, but also they sicken more by acting as a self-attacking force: Obsessive actions do not come from a will to rehabilitate, but from a will to retaliate. Mental obsession is usually known as a disorder or desease, and it’s regarded and interpreted from a psychiatrical or psychological perspective; But free from these perspectives, this article conducts a philosophical analysis of mental obsession based on “ressentiment” and “bad conscience” –key concepts of Nietzsche’s Geneology of Morals. As a result of this analysis, what underlie mental obsession are instinctive forces that can not discharge themselves outwardly and thus, turn inwards; they create and employ a bad conscience, in order to attack the owner of themselves –the patient.

Eckhart believed that the most important way to become divine, Dependency is, and poverty is the best way to achieve that. Eckhart defines three components of poverty that are: no want - no know and no having any. What is meant by the first component is the suffering of all creatures, even of self When man can accomplish nothing he wants, he reaches the joint with God For when he removes himself from the unrighteous, he comes to God What is meant by the second component is the liberation and freedom of the mind from all conceptions With this realization, man entered the realm of ignorance In it he only finds God and will receive him With the third component, man reaches nothingness and nothing remains of his people's identity Then it will be united with God. By accepting poverty, man attains the status of dependency, which is the becoming of God. This can be achieved after the evaluation That the two components - neither wanting nor having any - is incompatible with the teachings of Christianity and the Church system. And despite some differences, there is a common ground between the teachings of Islam and the views of Eckhart.

The Sudanese view of religion is, moreover, an emerging approach to Western thinkers, especially with a pragmatic view of religion. Although such an attitude towards religion is the result of some intellectual methods that do not value the legitimacy and validity of propositions, whether religious or otherwise, and consider the criterion of validity of propositions to depend on its usefulness, but the roots And the signs of such an attitude can be found in the minds of religious scholars in the Islamic world. The attitude of Muslim thinkers towards this issue is a matter of the past and after the legitimacy and truth of religion. From the point of view of Muslim theologians, not only the rules of jurisprudence and law, but also religious beliefs include the interests and corruption and the benefits and harms that return to human life. Religion is not just a series of pure devotional regulations issued only by God and forcing servants to obey it; Rather, it is a truth that adherence to it leads to human benefit and happiness. The usefulness of religion in life is conditional on the knowledge and faith in God and the believer. The most important benefit of religion to human beings is to give knowledge, provide guidance, motivation (good news and warning) and .... Knowledge and faith in God and religiosity are the basis for the emergence of the benefits of religion. Some are the benefits of this worldly and urgent religion and some are the last and nuts.

The purity of the “Pure Theory” demands the separation of law from morality. Therefore, Kelsen tries to offer an ideal form of legal statements, which are distinguishable from morality. In his traditional theory, with its substantial normativity, according to Paulson, he sustains this independency by proposing the category of imputation as a conditional statement, in confront to imperatives of morality. Here, norm addressees are authorities, not legal subjects. But, the normativity of his positivism leads to deontic form of obligation which is in both law and morality univocal. It means that the basis of “ought” in both fields is the rational necessitation which gives the basic norm, as a source of normativity of any legal system, a moral character. Kelsen was aware of the problem. Therefore he suggested his new theory, i.e. the theory of empowerment. In second theory “ought” has a meaning of competency to exercise power. Now, obligation is not more a first-hand concept in legal theory. Therefore, the ideal form of law is neither deontic, nor imperative and norm addresses are authorities. Therefore the form is the purest.

The subject of "self" and "other" in a one sense expresses the controversies of subjectivism-empiricism in contemporary Western philosophy. In these controversies sometimes the subject of the "other" was focused and sometimes neglected and even the tendency of dominated on it was provided, but with the emergence of existentialism, the subject of the "other" and emphasizing its role in recognizing the "self" was raised. Although existential philosophers have an ontological attitude to another subject, but the subject of the "other" and the encounter the "self" with it, have no explicit formulation in their thinking, while formulation the encounter of "self" and "other" can provide clear teachings to defend a desirable relationship between these two sides. In this article, it is assumed that Martin Buber's thought, although in the continuation of the existentialism was raised, but he’s thought by uses of another philosophical branches and by Jewish mysticism, and with establishment the “dialogical philosophy”, presents explicit formulation for the desirable encounter of "self" and "other". This article tries to offer the theoretical model based on Buber's views by investigating different approaches to the relationship between "self" and "other" in order to examine the possibility or lack of coexistence and originality of "other" in knowing "self" in a thinker's mind.

The analysis of the common traits between truth and creation has always provoked various theories from theologians and other thinkers in the field of theology. One of the most important of these theories is the Analogical theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, which has always been of interest to proponents and opponents since its inception. Aquinas, who by offering ananalogical predication provided a middle ground for equivocal and univocal for this category of divine attributes, considered it permissible to speak of God through the attributes of creatures, and considered the words of these attributes meaningful. But according to his remarks in his two major books, The Summa Theologica and The Summa Contra Gentiles the epistemological and ontological aspects of the divine attributes he envisioned in the theory of allegorical theology can be seen. In this article, we examine the ontological aspects in an analytical-descriptive way in Aquinas Analogical theology and conclude that Aquinas Analogical theology should not be considered as the only theory for solving the problem of the language of religion in the field of divine names and attributes.