فصلنامه اندیشه دینی
پیاپی 79 (تابستان 1400)

Theology (Kalam) is one of the Islamic intellectual sciences that has had proponents and opponents in Islamic sects since its inception. After compiling theological books, some agreed with this science and explained it, and some opposed it and criticized it. The Salafists, following the People of Hadiths (Ahl-alhdith), based on the extreme traditionalism and because of abandonment of rational reasoning, disagree with theology and consider it as a cause of damage and misguidance. Some of the most important arguments of the Salafists in denying and opposing theology are the avoidance of pious predecessors from the theological topics, prohibiting of Companions and Successors (Sahaba and Tabieen of the Holy Prophet) from dealing with theology, considering theology as heresy, its including superstitious, false, and even blasphemy, and the incompatibility between the results of theological discussions and Quran and tradition. The present study critiques and evaluates Salafi arguments and reveals their weaknesses through a documentary and critical analysis method. The arguments of the Salafists are typically fallacious and contradict the Qur'an and the tradition, as well as the manners of the companions, Successors, and other Islamic scholars. The Salafi view has bitter consequences such as the illegitimacy of other sciences and the rejecting of the value of intellectual and instrumental sciences, as well as a kind of exclusivism and absolutism about the understanding of the people of the first three centuries of the Islamic world.

Undoubtedly, the concern of happiness and achieving felicity, and getting rid of misery is one of the main concerns of every human being during his life. Facts such as Happiness and sadness should also be considered as the most important worries that affect human life in close connection with felicity and misery. In the history of philosophy, a philosopher like Sadr al-Mutallahin with his original and deep theoretical foundations has been very helpful in explaining this issue. By explanation the nature of happiness and sadness, the types of sadness and happiness, as well as their real examples, he has helped a lot in deepening the meaning of life in human beings. The main question of the present study is that by emphasizing the thoughts of Sadr al-Mutallahin, how to analyze the two concepts of happiness and sadness? In a descriptive-analytical approach, the author has concluded that Sadra, while dividing happiness and sadness into four categories: sensory, imaginary, illusory, and intellectual, considers the happiness of intellectual pleasure as the most complete happiness and the sadness of its loss as the saddest kind of sorrow.

For Faras al-Sawah, talking about religious morality does not make clearmeaning. This Syrian thinker, by providing a historical explanation of the identity of religion and morality, on the one hand, believesin the independence of morality from religion, and, on the other hand, by equating revelation with individual religious experience, believes in the dependence of morality on religion epistemologically and psychologically. The question is to what extent his position in explaining the relationship between religion and morality is convincing and defensible. Findings of this article - made by descriptive-analytical method - shows that he has a dual position on the relationship between religion and morality. Taking this dual position, his view on the relationship between religion and ethics will be criticized in several ways: Accepting moral and religious relativism, eliminating the ground for moral criticism in society, providing a secular interpretation of religious morality, ignoring the devotional aspects of religion, and accepting moral relativism at the normative and metaethical levels are some consequences of this view. In addition, relying on this view, he reduces the purpose of morality to the realization of social justice and leaves no room for religious concepts such as piety and nearness to God in the moral system.

In Ibn al-‘Arabī's eschatological theories, the employment of obscure but effective expressive preparations in the narration of some religious concepts and propositions following his mystical presuppositions leads to the deconstruction of some important Ideological concepts. The systematic examination of these expressive preparations in the classic mystical texts is a new critical method that clarifies the unconscious aspects of these texts, and how they are applied. Accordingly, The present study attempts to show the effect of expressive and rhetorical preparations used in Ibn al-‘Arabī's eschatological hypotheses on the credibility of his claims and the persuasion of his readers. The result of this study showed that Ibn al-‘Arabī, in explaining his eschatological views, has changed the meaning and function of words, phrases, and propositions according to his system of thought; and by the metamorphosis of words and transmutation of their concepts, he has altered their semantic identity. Ibn al-‘Arabī, by antagonizing common signs, in a deconstructive way, creates new semantic capacities in words and concepts and presents a new narrative of common religious ideologies about the Islamic Eschatological teachings. The study of these expressive preparations is effective in representing the unconscious aspects of Ibn al-‘Arabī's hypothesis and its established concepts, But this study can further reduce the validity of his hypothesis against opposite hypotheses. The purpose of this study is to investigate the function of Ibn al-‘Arabī's expressive preparations in his Eschatological hypotheses, which has been done by descriptive and analytical methods.

Allama Khafri (d. 942 AH) has proved the Divine Unity based on "the necessity of existence" and the attributes of real existence and by presenting ten arguments. In the matter of divine Science, by criticizing and rejecting the theory of Ibn Sina's Imprinted forms and by presenting the detailed and non-detailed perfect knowledge, he believes that the Divine Science is his very essence and the Divine essence itself is the source of unveiling and creation of all beings and exactly is what he has created outside. From Allameh Khafri's point of view, the theory of Imprinted forms is rejected due to its corruptive sequences, such as the necessity of the location of the Divine essence, passivity, and completion of the Divine essence by those Imprinted forms. The author believes that the evidence shows that Sadr al-Din Shirazi was influenced by the views of Allama Khafri on the issue of the Divine Science before and after the creation of things. Tracing and introducing this influence as well as criticizing Allameh Khafri's division of arguments of the Divine Unity is considered as one of the innovations of this research. The research method in this article is descriptive and analytical.

According to the view of Sadr al-Muta'allehin, the condition of being a soul is its belonging to a body, and thus, a soul without a body is not a soul. The question now is whether the human existence in its descending intrinsic transition from the divine world to the worlds of intellects, ideas, and matters, and in its ascending return to its final end, has a body or not. Is it possible to find a stage in which man does not have a body? In other words, does the soul become bodyless when it enters the world of intellects or even higher levels? This article, based on Sadra's ontological foundations, examines the nature of the body and points to two theories on the subject of the intellectual body. In the first theory, the nature of the body originates from the representative faculty, and due to the obvious or common presence of this faculty in all levels of existence, Man does have always a body, and by his or her intellectual or nominal body within the appropriate quantitative forms, is present in those levels. But according to the second theory, in the ascent to the world of intellects, forms become meanings, whereas the intellectual body, as one of the determinations of the soul, is still acceptable.