مجله الهیات تطبیقی
پیاپی 26 (پاییز و زمستان 1400)

Zoroaster was born in an era that Iran was experiencing political and social unrest. He brought a new religion based on several thousand years of history of thought and wisdom in ancient Iran. As he mentions in the Gathas, the new religion created immense changes in the Iranian society. He says in the Gathas that his goal is to build a new utopian ruling and social system that guarantees welfare and prosperity. The political thoughts of Zoroaster are intertwined with his religious ideology and the utopia he pictures is an earthy replication of the Minavi utopia ruled by Ahura Mazda. The utopian  rules are based on wisdom and his power is legitimized by Amshasepand Shahrivar. The outcome of such a ruling is a world of order. Confucius was also born during an era of chaos and bloodshed caused by civil wars. The Chinese society of that era was struggling with war, poverty, corruption, and insecurity. By studying the golden age of mythology of ancient China, Confucius introduced a moral-political system for the Chinese society. He believes that utopia becomes possible when virtues become the foundations of ruling and society. He argues that virtues are attainable through educating moral role models, respecting the principle of Lee or social system goal and the law of titles reform or creating order in the principles of sovereignty, placing everyone in their rightful position, and choosing a wise ruler for society. The Zoroastrian and Confucian utopias are both affected by the Orient political thought. They both emphasize concepts like Asha and Ming (i.e. global order and harmony), training and educating rules, and institutionalizing virtues in society. Zoroaster and Confucius both preached about comprehensive political and social reforms and both tried to achieve a world with an order. The present study is an attempt to investigate the utopia in Zoroaster and Confucius religions following an analytical and theoretical approach through  library and descriptive methods. The main objective is to examine the concept of utopia and its elements from Zoroaster and Confucius’ viewpoints and find the common aspects and differences. The main questions to be asked are: 1) what is the source of the idea of utopia in Zoroastrianism and Confucianism?; 2)  what are the differences and similarities of these two utopias? The source of Zoroastrian utopia is in Minavi and all affairs of the utopia are explained based on the Minavi world and creatures. AS such, the specifications of the Minavi world are combined with earthy and Gitavi life. He develops an extensive moral system for his followers based on good thoughts, good words, and good deeds. On the other hand, Confucian utopia is earthy and all its affairs are explained based on human and man’s attention to humanistic behavior, charity, and performing rituals. This moral system is based on Zen and charity. Both of these utopias start with making internal changes in man and both are attainable gradually. The universe order has a special position in the moral systems of Zoroaster and Confucius. Asha in Zoroastrianism and Ming in Confucianism are the keys to achieve utopia. They both put emphasis on educating rulers and citizens. Zoroaster and Confucius believe that the ruler must be wise and knowledgeable to create peace and welfare in the society. They argue that the ruler must be just and define justice as placing everyone in their proper place to fulfill their responsibilities. Justice in Confucianism appears as title reforms while in Zoroastrianism, it appears as the preservation of social classes. The relationship between the ruler and people in Confucianism is a cycle in such a way that people affect the state, and the state affects people. In Zoroastrianism, on the other hand, there is a linear relationship between people and state and it is the state’s responsibility to affect people. Punishment and enforcement of the law are not desirable in Confucianism as Confucius believes that virtues must be institutionalized in people and the shame felt by a wrongdoer should be enough to prevent others from doing the same mistake. In Zoroastrianism, we see punishment so that people feel the responsibility to  be accountable. Zoroastrianism and Confucianism are different in terms of the roots of their utopias. Still, both define an extensive ethical system. The outcome of such a system is the same:  the society is supposed to be led towards prosperity, welfare, security, and peace.

In the Torah, blessing and curse come directly from God and are closely related to the "covenant" design. The prevalence of these concepts in the texts other than the Bible indicates that there has been a general understanding of blessing and curse among the people of ancient Israel. These people regarded them as powerful tools for influencing one another. An examination of the Old Testament reveals that Man can play a role by asking for blessing or passing it onto others. Giving back blessing from Man to God means thanking God and praising Him. The purpose of God's blessing is to restore, strengthen, and maintain Man's relationship with God and ultimately ensure his eternal happiness. The questions are how these concepts have come into being and where and when they have originated. It may not be possible to provide a clear definition of these abstract concepts, while each statement is merely a simple and superficial interpretation of them. However, these terms have an extraordinary and long history. Thus, to understand their depths and richness, one needs to carefully examine how they originated. Based on the Torah and written sources, the present study investigates the concepts of blessing and curse through analytical methods and determine their relations to the covenant with a theoretical approach.God's covenant with Abraham is the beginning of a law that other prophets have offered to their followers thousands of years later. It is also God's command to Abraham and his children to bless everyone. All those who have followed the faith of Prophet Abraham in every generation are the inheritors of God's covenant. Health and wealth are the "blessings" guaranteed in the Abrahamic covenant. In his covenant with Abraham, God has promised him 50 blessings. He has sealed those 50 promises and guaranteed them with an oath.If the Covenant is taken as the axis of the relationship between God and Man in Judaism, all aspects of human life can be interpreted according to this covenant. The understanding of these phenomena by Israel shows an evolutionary state that begins with its mythical meaning in Genesis and reaches its theological meaning in Deuteronomy. In the history of their evolution, Israel’s children gradually realized the following points: first, blessing and curse are both from the holy nature of God; secondly, God’s blessing and curse are directly and indirectly related to the observance or violation of the covenant, respectively; thirdly, the only proper human response to the divine blessing is thanksgiving and its transmission to others.In the Exodus, alongside the vertical dimension of the relationship (God-Man), the horizontal dimension of the relationship (Man-Man) becomes important. Here, along with the blessing of prophecy (Moses), blessings of the kingdom (kings of Israel) and priesthood (Aaron and his sons) have been also mentioned as the agents of blessing. The king is seen as the representative and mediator between God and people and the male offspring of Aaron as the priests of Jehovah.In Deuteronomy, the examples of blessing and curse are specifically addressed. Interpretation of blessing in the pre-exile period is related to a conditional or absolute blessing, but the contents of this period show that God is not only the source of blessing, but also the guide of blessing to people. According to the Torah, blessing includes fertility, domination, nourishment, loving, and, most importantly, intimacy with God Himself. However, blessing is not a mechanical system of punishment and reward. God in the Old Testament is a God whose love and justice are manifested in His blessing and curse, respectively. This research focused on the phenomenon of blessing and cursing in the Torah, but to increase the depth, Israel’s cultural and social aspects and their relationships with other cultures of the ancient Near East had to be explored based on other sources.

The present study was conducted to investigate the views of the Ash'arites of Iranian Kurdistan towards philosophy. To achieve this goal, a phenomenological-based qualitative research method was used. Twelve contemporary Kurdistan theologians were interviewed about philosophy. The questions were designed based on the research objectives. The results were as follows: 1) The Ash'arites of Kurdistan considered it sufficient to rely on the Qur'an and Sunnah and a rational view based on religious texts for designing and teaching the issues of old and new theology.2) Following a philosophy of Greek origin and its imitation were considered by them to be futile.3) To them, a philosophy could be invented based on Islamic texts. However, Ash'arite academics were more interested in philosophizing due to studying humanities and interacting with professors based on the contents of their academic philosophical courses.Therefore, considering the trend of spreading philosophy among the contemporary Ash'arites of the world, the Ash'arites of Kurdistan still try the same traditional practice of opposing philosophy. In the section of practical suggestions based on the research findings, the following recommendations could be put forward: 1) establishing philosophy with different orientations at the University of Kurdistan; 2) further training of old and new theology; 3) establishing the Institute of Philosophy and Wisdom in Kurdistan; 4) strengthening and equipping Kurdistan libraries with philosophical books; and 5) providing a more interaction between Shiite and Ash'arite theologies.In the field of research literature on contemporary Ash'arite theologians of the Islamic world, the results showed that people, such as Sheikh Mohammad Abdo (Rabbani Golpayegani, 1999: 18), Taha Abdolrahman (Miri and Parsania, 2009: 56), Nasr Hamed Abu Zayd (Abuzid 2003: 263), Mohammad Abed Jaberi (Jaberi, 2010: 375), Mohammad Arkoun (Arkon 2009, 2993, pp. 15-3), and Varshid Reza (Enayat, 1998: 157) had agreed with philosophy and only Seyyed Qutb (Savoshi, 1997: 157) had opposed it. However, among the contemporary Ash'arite theologians of Kurdistan, the findings indicated that some great figures such as Mullah Abu Bakr Chori (Baba Marduk, 2003: 148), Mullah Abdul Karim Modarresi and Mullah Mahmoud Modarres Negal (Baba Marduk, 2003, vol. 1: 147), and Malabaqir Balk ( Modarresi, 1985: 14) completely opposed philosophizing theological and religious issues and only the theologians of Takhti Mardukhi family like Sheikh Abdul Qader Mohajer, Sheikh Mohammad Sim Thani, and Sheikh Mohammad Jassim Sadr al-Ulama could teach philosophical issues due to their family powers (Abdoli, 2019: pp. 43-40). This had a significant relationship with the field results resulting from the interviewees’ views.Therefore, according to the teaching procedures and contents of traditional courses governing these scientific schools, the majority of Sunni seminary teachers and scholars  followed Abolhassan Ash'ari in opposition to reason. Ghazali's views were especially in complete opposition to those of the philosophers. New doctrinal doubts were sufficient to make us rely on the Qur'an and Sunnah; thus, there was no need for Greek vague and imitative philosophy as being at the same time blasphemous. Finally, if one is to rely on philosophy in the present age, he/she must create a philosophy with Islamic text-based principles. Only a small number of the university interviewees were found to follow Ash'ari profession due to having an interaction with academics and studying in those fields. The humanities, such as sociology, law, philosophy, theology, and philosophy of education, had a positive approach to philosophy.It was expected that the Ash'arites of Kurdistan had a positive approach to philosophy like the Ash'arites in the Islamic world with the development of technology and modernity. However, the Ash'ari discourse of Kurdistan was finally found to be in opposition to philosophy.

One of the challenges of philosophy is explanation of the relationship between the soul and the body. As it is difficult to understand this relationship, various allegories have been used in philosophy to express that relationship. Allegory is one of the most influential ways of conveying deep meanings and explaining sensible affairs. Since the transcendental knowledge and trans-sensory notions lie beyond the reach of the human senses, allegory can play an important role in getting such meanings across. They are expressed from different perspectives as follows: 1) God Almighty-world relationship; 2) captain-ship relationship; 3) form-matter relationship; 4) architect-building relationship; 5) rider-ridee relationship; 6) bird-cage relationship; 7) tree-fruit relationship; 8) fetus-uterus relationship; and 9) light-shadow relationship. Some philosophical allegories are not strong and appropriate to express the soul-body relationship, while some others can express this relationship properly. Each of the above-mentioned allegories has a special feature and they are not the same in terms of power of creation. Some similes express the point of resemblance more accurately. The greater the point of resemblance between the tenor and the vehicle is, the more powerful the allegory will be and the smaller that point is, the less influential the allegory will be. Differences in principles and viewpoints affect the type of allegory. The analogy of the soul and the body to the tree and fruit rests on the principles of transcendent wisdom. This analogy is at odds with other views. Allegories, such as captain and ship, architect and building, and bird and cage are more compatible with the Masha (peripatetic) perspective toward the soul-body relationship. In each of these analogies, each one of the tenors and vehicles has an independent and separate existence and there is a contingent rather than intrinsic relationship between them. This idea has no place in MullaSadra's approach, according to which the soul’s belonging to the body is intrinsic to the soul and the soul’s existence rests on its connection to the body.A variety of allegories about the soul-body relationship have been mentioned in religious teachings, such as the allegories of word and meaning, soul and wind, gem and coffer, soul and thin cloth, environment and body, knowledge and action, piled up garment, and value and action.Each of the philosophical and religious allegories has common implications including: a) acceptance of otherness and duality of the soul and the body; b) originality of the soul in relation to the body; c) trans-sensory and metaphysical nature of the soul; and d) longitudinal relationship of the soul and the body. This paper explains and analyzes these allegories and distinguishes between the strong and weak ones. Among the main features of religious allegories is attention to the invisible, metaphysical, and trans-sensory nature of the body. This feature has been considered in most religious allegories, such as meaning and word, soul and wind, knowledge and action, piled up garment, and value and action, but it has not been regarded in many philosophical allegories, such as captain and ship, form and matter, architect and building, shadow and under shadow, etc. although it is accepted in philosophy.One of the major shortcomings of philosophical allegories is that they highlight maximum duality between the soul and the body. At this maximum duality, the duality between the soul and the body becomes more pronounced. The soul and the body are transformed from a single interconnected truth into two independent and interconnected entities. There is maximum duality between the tenor and vehicle in allegories, such as captain and ship, form and matter, architect and building, and rider and ridee, while they are not suitable examples to express the relationship between the soul and the body. …..The trans-sensory aspect of the soul is often evident in religious allegories and the communicative aspect possessed by a trans-sensory being is seen in the similes. Accordingly, they do not have such maximum dualistic allegories as some philosophical allegories do. Among religious similes, all, except the second one, have this feature.

In the present study, the possibility of complementarity of the Tashkiki religious language and the cognitive account of Metaphorism in response to the God-Talk problem in the philosophy of religious language has been proposed and defended as a suggestion. At first, the article starts with addressing two primary and paradoxical responses to the problem, namely, assenting cognitivism on the one hand, and God's transcendence on the other hand. Then, it explains and formulates what might be called the Tashkiki religious language response of Sadr al-Muta'allehin to this paradoxical situation. In Sadra's response, which is based on his modulation of the Being Idea (Tashkik al-wujud), the two basics, ‘univocality’ and ‘plurality and difference’, are simultaneously preserved. Theological and anthropological predications are univocal and common in meaning, but the way these predications are applied to examples is different.In the next step, we point out an explanatory defect (in terms of philosophical linguistics) in this answer. Although Sadra's answer seems ontologically perfect, it does not offer a precise solution to transmitting propositions from a purely epistemological human context to the divine context. However, Sadra himself offered some supernatural solutions in order to immediately understand the facts. However, this solution is not purely epistemological, as not all human beings can do it and therefore do not understand the intended meanings.The specific suggestion of the study for solving the mentioned defect is that by using contemporary metaphorical studies that emphasize the cognitive character of metaphors, steps can be taken to eliminate this defect. To do this, first, cognitive metaphors have been formulated according to Paul Ricoeur. According to Ricoeur's view, metaphors are cognitive. Secondly, contrary to the first perception of metaphors, they are not limited to words; rather, they are creative issues, and new knowledge will be gained through semantic shaking and tension.In the next step, we have argued that, despite what may seem in the wind, these two views are compatible and consistent, and the commonalities of the two views have been stated as two incompatible views can never be complementary. Secondly, it suggests that we can look at complementary views in response to the God-talk problem. Then, we have suggested that in these two ideas (i.e. Ricoeur's view and Sadra's view), one can look at two complementary things in response to the God-Talk problem. Finally, we discuss some of the consequences of this proposal.

Throughout the history of Christianity, various movements, such as Gnosticism, Arianism, Monarchianism, Sabellianism, and other sects have lived together. Meanwhile and in this sectarian milieu, a converted Christian known as Montanus founded a new movement called "New Prophesy", "Phrygian heresy", and "Montanism". This new sect, in the first place, was not opposed by church authorities; rather, it gradually opted anti-church tendencies and stood against representatives of mainstream Christianity. However, Montanism rapidly spread across Asia Minor and attracted many people, including some women.
According to the accounts of the Church Fathers, Montanism appeared as a new movement in Phrygia located in modern Turkey in the 2nd century and continued to spread across the ancient world. Nonetheless, the new movement declined in the 6th century. Contrary to the early Christian so-called heretical sects, the opposition between Montanism and the representatives of mainstream Christianity did not result from the Trinitarian and Christological doctrines. This sect, which was known as "New Prophesy", mainly agreed with church authorities regarding the soundness of the Holy Bible, the world after death, and the doctrine of the Trinity. However, for various reasons, the church authorities took action against Montanists and excommunicated them. Montanism merged with Millennialism, while Montanists were now waiting for the coming of the end of times. Perhaps, the current situation, Jewish apocalyptic writings, and the book of Revelation resulted in millennial doctrines among Montanists. Montanist prophets and prophetesses enthusiastically began to proclaim the end of times and asked people to leave their homes, wives, and families and be ready to face such apocalyptic events. Influenced by such apocalyptic visions, these future tellers uttered some "paradoxical sayings" that caused the Church Fathers' opposition. The prophets even called themselves "Paracletes". Contrary to their anticipation, the world did not reach its end and for this reason, the church authorities condemned them as "false prophets". Moreover, Montanist future tellers introduced Pepouza rather than Jerusalem as the center of Messiah's millennial rulership and differently approached certain doctrines like martyrdom so that caused a kind of confrontation with the representatives of mainstream Christianity.More importantly, the prophets' "ecstatic utterances" and their identification with "paraclete" resulted in the Montanists’ condemnation. Thus, the opponents labeled them as those, who had been possessed by evil spirits. Nevertheless, during his final years, Tertullian, an important Latin Church Father, converted to Montanism and spread it extensively. Examining his Montanist ideas requires further studies.

God’s attributes are divided into two categories: intrinsic and actual attributes. Intrinsic attributes are those that are abstracted from the divine essence and their essence is due to the permanent connection between the essence of transcendence and attributes. Present attributes are attributes that are abstracted from the relation of the essential essence of existence with the creatures with an addition or a special relation considering that relation. Among the current attributes of God, the attribute of innovation has attracted many Imami and Ismaili theologians’ attention due to its wide application in Qur'an, Neoplatonic traditions, and philosophy to such an extent that such well-known personalities as Kennedy, Farabi, Sadiq, Mufid, Ibn Sina, Seyyed Morteza Alam al-Huda, Tusi, Tabarsi, Shahrzuri, and Hali from Nasafi’s Imamiyya Sect, Abu Hatem Razi, Sajestani, Ghazi Noman, Akhvana Al-Safa, Kermani, Nasser Khosrow, and Abu Faras from Ismaili Sect have discussed about the definition of innovation, as well as different related theories, and expressed its differences and similarities with other terms, such as creation, invention, command, emission, and will.The purpose of this study was to have a comparative view on Ismaili and Imami theologians’ theories and discover the similarities and differences between the them, as well as the components influencing on the definition of innovation and the difference between innovation and other near-meaning words.To discover the Imami and Ismaili thinkers’ views, especially the Ismaili’s, the books attributed to him were used as a criterion for judging and the works of the opponents of Ismailism and even those, who were in doubt about being in the group of Ismaili Sect though they were not included in the sources of this research.The Imami thinkers’ views on the definition of innovation were firstly ambiguous. Secondly, it was related to the period of presenting its minimum and maximum definitions. Thirdly, it was contradictory in terms of the condition expressing the statement of "I am not an object". The Ismaili scholars’ views were firstly highly contradictory and secondly a contradiction of "I am not an object"..Influenced by Neoplatonic philosophy, the Ismailis discussed the attribute of innovation more than the Imamis. The Imamiyyas and Ismailis considered innovation as one of the current attributes of God. They enumerated the most conditions for innovation. In both groups, there was a mistake in defining innovation as "creating me nothing". Some definitions of innovation in Imami and Ismaili theology were made with words, such as creation, construction, invention, etc., while their use seemed to be incorrect due to the semantic difference between innovation and those words. Ismaili theologians had made more efforts than merely introducing such terms as creation, construction, authorship, invention, etc. and explained better and more differences and similarities of the mentioned terms with innovation, whereas the ambiguity of the meanings of those terms still remained in the texts. The Ismailis had left fewer texts than the Imamis. Some thinkers of both groups discussed the attribute of innovation more than others and thus, their contents about innovation and the topics in its subset were not comparable to others. A noteworthy volume of the discussions on innovation in Imami theology was given in the interpretive texts on the occasion of the interpretation of the word "novel" in Quranic verses.

Moral semantics is one of the subjects of moral philosophy which discusses the semantic analysis of moral conceptions and propositions. Moral semantics has a close relationship with the ontology of ethical terms. The major issues in moral semantics are the study of the concepts of subject, predicate, and concepts in morality. The present study aims to investigate Mohaghegh Tusi's innovations by reviewing ethical concepts in his thought. Mohaghegh Tusi has studied the basic virtues in examining the concepts that are used in the subject and classifies the four famous virtues with the two criteria of quantity and quality. Like the famous thinkers of ancient Greece, he considered the basic virtues to be justice, wisdom, courage, and chastity. He has sometimes categorized these virtues by quantitative criteria. That is, justice is the degree of attainment of perfection of the other three virtues, namely wisdom, courage, and chastity, and each of these three virtues includes many other virtues. Justice includes all other virtues, has more territory, and wisdom in its sub-category and is higher than wisdom because, in addition to pure wisdom, it also has other virtues. In the qualitative classification, Mohaghegh Tusi considers wisdom to have a higher degree. In the qualitative division of virtues, he first divides virtues into two categories: virtues related to the soul, and virtues related to the body. Wisdom is a carnal virtue related to thought, and other basic virtues are related to the action and behavior. The manifestation of wisdom is the rational soul. In the importance of theoretical virtue, it is enough that theoretical virtue is more stable, but other virtues are not. In an innovative division, Mohaghegh al-Tusi divides the power of the human soul into two basic categories: the power of perception by essence, and the power of voluntary stimulation. Each of the two types has a secondary category. The power of perception by essence creates wisdom on the basis of the evidence of theoretical reason while on the other hand brings about justice on the basis of the evidence of practical reason. The power of voluntary stimulation is also divided into lust and anger resulting in moderation, chastity, and courage. In defining justice as a widely used concept in the subject of moral sentences, Mohaghegh Tusi believes that justice means equality, but equality means equality based on proportion in objects. Wisdom, as another widely used concept in the subject of moral sentences, according to Mohaghegh Tusi, refers to knowing things as they are and knowing voluntary actions as they should be, so that man can achieve happiness through those actions. Thus, wisdom is divided into two types: practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom. Theoretical wisdom means the result of knowledge of beings and facts, which includes metaphysics, mathematics, and physics while practical wisdom is the perception of man's voluntary actions. In another division, practical wisdom is divided into two types: individual actions that have nothing to do with the society, and social actions that take place with social participation. Individual actions are called personal ethics, and social ethics is divided into house and civil politics. Mohaghegh Tusi considers the meaning of moral good and evil as the real relationship between "happiness and cruelty of the behavior" and "praiseworthy and reprehensible". Explaining the concept of perfection, which is a widely used concept in ethics, he believes that every creature has a property due to its nature. That is, a property in which no other being participates with this being, and this is his perfection. Mohaghegh Tusi paid close attention to the semantics of virtues and vices and introduced innovations in the theory of mediocrity so that by considering the quality in mediocrity, he has more accurately expressed the realms of basic virtues and vices. However, he does not seem to have paid enough attention to the good and bad moral semantics that have accepted the separation of the three meanings from Fakhr-e Razi, because it is possible to combine these meanings in one category. It seems that he has not proved the true relationship between the granting of divine blessings and the necessity of worship in explaining the ontology of morality. In any case, Mohaghegh Tusi is considered as realistic, absolutist, and morally monist

The issue of prophecy as the second doctrinal principle has a special place in the system of thought and belief because the prophet is the means of human evolution and has reached the truth of humanity. In this research, an attempt has been made to compare and analyze the view of Sheikh Tusi, one of the great theologians of Baghdad in the 4th and 5th centuries AH, with Mulla Sadra, an 11th century philosopher from Isfahan school, in order to highlight the role of philosophy in explaining important issues like prophecy. Sheikh Tusi with the help of the theological rule of grace proves that the existence of a prophet is obligatory. Since human intellect is unable to comprehend some deeds, the Almighty God has compensated this shortcoming by sending a prophet to guide human beings. With this rational explanation, Sheikh Tusi has considered the prophet as an example of the rule of grace. It is noteworthy that he has limited the necessity of the existence of a prophet only to the dimension of legislating divine laws and has not considered regulation of people's political and livelihood affairs to be obligatory for the prophet. This attitude is due to the limitation of his intellectual horizon. However, with the help of philosophy, Sadra Hakim has paid attention to this issue from 4 different angles and has been able to prove the necessity of the existence of a prophet with a deeper vision. In the field of ontology, he has considered the consistency of existence dependent on the existence of a prophet (a perfect human being) and in the field of epistemology, his book has referred to Man for achieving knowledge and introducing obedience to the prophet’s commands both scientifically and practically. He has also paid attention to the social life of human beings and their worldly and livelihood problems and considered it possible to meet these needs under the rule and leadership of a prophet. The event of reforming the worldly life of human beings has been considered as a prelude to happiness in the hereafter and as one of the duties and missions of the prophet. Sadra's attention to the dimension of love and attainment of spiritual pleasure has shown his attention to human needs, which, of course, are satisfied only by obeying the prophet and connecting with him, who is a complete mirror of the divine perfection.These salient differences in the philosophy of prophecy stem from differences in the principles and methods of the two thinkers. The most important differences between these two scholars are the differences in the purpose of the existence of a prophet and their attitudes towards human truth with the explanation that Sheikh Tusi has considered human truth as the same objective being and the same tangible body, while a prophet’s goal is restricting the performance and duties of the obligated servants. However, Sadr al-Muta’allehin, with his philosophical view, has considered the truth of a tame human being is a combination of soul and body. He has regarded the evolution of the soul for reaching human truth as the purpose of the existence of a prophet. The necessity of the prophet is atomically clarified by his explanation of human truth. Regarding the methodological difference between these two thinkers, it should be said that the Mulla Sadra’s reason for the necessity of prophecy is clearer than that of Sheikh Tusi although both of them have apparently explained this issue with their rational methods. The difference in their methods becomes clear by reflecting on the rationalism of each of them. There is no need for revelation, but its scope is limited to reasoning and argumentation. Mulla Sadra has considered reasoning to be the lowest reason. He has regarded reasoning activity to be possible up to the endless stage of intuition. This philosophical system, along with special attention to quotations and intuitions, is considered comprehensive.

“The Consolation of Philosophy” is one of Boethius' treatises representing Boethius' philosophy. Boethius’ political collapse has occurred at the time of writing “The Consolation of Philosophy”. In this treatise, he has sought to find out whether happiness, such as wealth, power, honor, etc., which are not lasting and eternal, can give true peace to Man. In fact, he has sought an eternal peace.Just as a political collapse causes loss of power, wealth, honor, etc. for Boethius or any other politicians, Corona disease, with its peculiarity of "epidemic" process, has imposed heavy economic and psychological consequences on humans. This article sought to find out whether Boethius's consolation of philosophy in dealing with false happiness could be generalized to a pandemic like Corona similar to the cases of political collapse and its aftermath. To this end, we analyzed Boethius' views on false happiness and true goodness in “The consolation of philosophy”.According to Boethius, what distinguishes the true goodness from false happiness is its stability. True peace depends on achieving happiness that is eternal. True goodness should not be like happiness of Man’s material part, which is unstable and may be destroyed at any moment by the factors that are considered necessary for the unstable world. Thus, for Boethius, true goodness is related to Man’s immaterial component, the soul, which is immortal. In fact, philosophy has helped Boethius to become acquainted with the true nature of welfare and realize that changes in wealth and welfare are inherent, concluding that what is variable cannot be eternal. The only real property and wealth that worldly events and changing things cannot take from Man is his own truth, to which he must pay a due attention. Boethius is of the belief that even if Man loses all the qualities that distinguish him from others and what he possesses, he is still a human and his humanity is not destroyed by losses. Therefore, the purpose of his life must be drawn out on the basis of this true essence. If this is Man’s basic criterion of life, his losses, illness, political downfall, etc. do not matter anymore. What is important is to return to his self-nature. What we achieve is always with us and we will not be at peace until we achieve it.The desire for true goodness is naturally in human’s  soul and what keeps Man away from this goodness is paying attention to false external happiness such as wealth, honor, power, etc. Boethius believed that all creatures seek to achieve a single goal, namely happiness, in different ways and this happiness is the most perfect good. Since it encompasses all goodness, there is no goodness above it; thus, whoever achieves this supreme goodness would not seek anything else. Philosophy helps Man to be guided towards goodness, i.e., God, through self-knowledge and the process of returning to his self.Boethius believes that these new conditions are not the result of a political collapse that changes wealth and welfare, but that change and instability are inherent in them and appear only in new conditions, no matter if this new situation is a political collapse or an epidemic or any other phenomenon. The importance of these new conditions is in reminding the instabilities of wealth and material prosperity and human's need and desire for an eternal thing -- a real and fixed thing that cannot be lost. Recognizing and evaluating the new conditions and analyzing the reasons for these misfortunes and losses serve Man as a reminder to know himself and the end of his life, thus trying to achieve the eternal truth. This is the path that Boethius takes in the wake of the political collapse and its necessities. Therefore, there is no difference between Corona disease and political collapse or between one person and many people; the nature of unhappiness is variability and instability. Whether it is related to a natural phenomenon, a disease, or a political equation, it reveals a changing nature.

According to Suhrawardi, there is a remarkable agreement between Plato's philosophy and Oriental Wisdom in general. This agreement, which is rooted in the Perennial Substance of Wisdom, not in purely historical influences, can be considered in 3 aspects: first, in terms of the main content of this wisdom; second, in terms of the method of its realization; and third, in terms of its mode of expression. The reason that Plato is highly esteemed by Suhrawardi seems, in addition to thematic agreement and unity, to be agreement in terms of method, which is something beyond philosophical arguments or, in other words, something beyond discursive wisdom, constituting the spiritual and initiatic dimension of Plato's philosophy that ultimately leading to the contemplation or vision of divine truths.In this research, we set out to further explore the thematic and especially the methodological agreement or rather the unity between Suhrawardi’s philosophy and Plato’s philosophy. Through this, we tried to clarify and verify the validity of Suhrawardi's claim about the close connection between Illuminationist Wisdom and Platonic philosophy. To achieve this goal, our focus was on the issue of Disengagement with Worldliness (Tajrid), or in Plato's words, the "practice of death," as well as its consequent goal -- "Godlikeness".The method used was refering to the original texts of these two philosophers to compare the concepts concerning the issue of Disengagement with Worldliness (Tajrid). In Suhrawardi and Plato’s works, in addition to discursive and argumentative expressions, symbolic expression had a very important place in conveying spiritual meanings and transcendent truths. The idea of symbolic expression, therefore, afforded a common fundamental element that enabled us to understand the agreement between Suhrawardi and Plato. Thus, the current research focused on the symbolic-allegorical expression of the issue of Tajrid.This paper has two main parts. First, there is a detailed discussion of the issue of Tajrid in the works of these two philosophers regatding the issue of Tajrid accounted as the central idea in the "method" of Illuminationist Wisdom and Platonic philosophy as a kind of "spiritual initiation". Then, the goal of Tajrid and the idea of Godlikeness is examined.It should be noted that the concept of ​​philosophy or wisdom as a spiritual practice whose ultimate goal is to become Godlike relies on the homogeneity between human truth and divine truths. In other words, according to this concept, Man has a divine essence and thus, the capacity to achieve such a transcendent goal lies in his nature. Therefore, the beginning of spiritual practice is remembrance of Man’s divine essence, which is veiled by the constraints and contingencies of the natural and physical world in his present terrestrial state. By paying attention to the true self, the main stage of spiritual practice begins, that is the gradual withdrawal of ego immersed in worldly life and its concomitants through Tajrid or the practice of death.In both Suhrawardi and Plato's philosophies, Tajrid has two stages: (1) turning the soul away from the natural world by means of refinement and purification of the soul and (2) turning the soul towards the transcendent and divine truths. In the first stage, Man realizes that his soul is bound by the natural faculties of the soul on all sides; therefore, he strives to control the external and internal sense faculties as well as the two faculties of lust (concupiscence) and anger (irascibility). In the second stage, by acquiring certain knowledge, thinking about divine signs and benefactions, saying prayers and doing spiritual meditation, and refining the faculties of sensation and imagination by means of beautiful audiovisual forms, Man directs the whole soul to his own world -- the world of divine truths. In this second stage, love of beauty causes Man to die from his human-created qualities and become a mirror for all the divine attributes he has loved as transcendent truths. Hence, the goal of such a philosophy, which relies on the educative principle of Tajrid or voluntary death, is to become Godlike. This likeness to or reflection of the divine attributes, particularly according to Plato, is represented as the birth of true virtues, which, in principle, belongs to Divinity.Commensurate with the expressions of such lofty themes and meanings, symbols could be found in the works of these two philosophers, which despite their apparent differences, has a fundamental similarity and agreement with the expression of one and the same meaning. Symbols, such as trap, snare, leather, armor, tomb, and well, in Suhrawardi’s texts and shackles, chains, tomb, and coffin in Plato’s texts refer to the body and its faculties. Correlated with these symbols were the ones like liberation, cutting, and tearing, which refer to voluntary death.

Interpretation of the existence and text is a type of esoteric (rational-intuitive) excavation of a subject that leads to the discovery and extraction of new propositions. Mulla Sadra, as a philosopher, is of rationally grounded principles in epistemology which have influenced his hermeneutical style. The study and analysis of these principles, the inference and identification of the rules that are based on these principles, and also the scope of the influence of these principles and rules on Sadra’s hermeneutical interpretations are among the main goals of the present essay. The methodology of the present study is descriptive-analytical focusing on Mulla Sadra’s works. The main extracted rules consist of the movement from the acquired knowledge to the knowledge by the presence of intuitive interpretation. To put it more clearly, human understanding of the text of existence can make its way from the acquired knowledge of objects to the sense of the presence of objects. This process of the reading of existence is what we refer to as the hermeneutical method that has its origin in the belief in the sacredness of the text of existence as a divine manifestation.When one encounters existence in the form of presential intelligence, a hermeneutical effort has taken place, but it is not so that this process has come to its end; because existence does not stop by its manifestations and its messages are infinite. The second rule is the active and productive role of reason in rational interpretation. Reason in this context as the source of human knowledge is indeed discursive theoretical reason which represents the stage of the acquisition of the theories and the intelligibilia (actual reason) from the meanings of the quadruple stages.In “Breaking the Idols of Ignorance”, Sadra insists that if the argumentative reason is not strengthened, imagination would get activated and thus cordial openings are replaced with imaginative pictures. The application of reason for hermeneutical interpretation consists of the supervision of the hermeneutical understanding and those requirements inferred from the surface of the text which should be correspondent to the rules of interpretation. These rules are discussed at the end of this study. Moreover, discursive reason in the course of the evolution of the epistemic foundations of interpretation can also play its role. Theories of knowledge each one of which has been rationally grounded in its particular school are theories that consider knowledge to have a process the outcome of which is knowledge or consciousness. For example, if in the knowledge we believe in the theories of intellects, in the theory of ideas, or even Kant’s epistemological doctrine, each one of these understands knowledge in terms of a particular process. Accordingly, each of these epistemic perspectives respectively traces the origin of the emergence of hermeneutics or interpretation back to active intellect, ideas, or the structure of the human mind.Sadra believes that intuitive truths that are revealed to the person under particular conditions lie outside the scope of rational activity and argument in its specific sense; then, reason does not have access to the border of opening and intuition. When the soul reaches the knowledge through thinking, we call this mode of knowledge “reason” while if this knowledge is acquired directly from God it is called “heart”. Reason moves forward in the course of the acquisition of knowledge through delimitation and creation of connection and conditions while the heart traverses this course via transcending the conditions and limits.Receptivity and passivity of cordial perception in intuitive interpretation, the necessity of the harmony of rational-intuitive interpretation with the primordial perception, and the hierarchical nature of the structure of intuitive interpretation are among the other rules discussed in the present study. Dynamicity of hermeneutical interpretation is rooted in the dynamicity of truth not in our capability of arbitrary reading of truth because this dynamicity is due to the dynamicity of divine inspirations and manifestations. Human connection with the existential world is proportionate to his ascension and he will turn into the truth of that world insofar as if he reaches the world spirits, he will face the original truths. The intermediate role of the world of ideas and imagination in intuitive interpretation is the other rule. Sadra’s theory of the immateriality of imagination becomes explicated in his discussion of imagination in interpretations of purgatorial and otherworldly ideas. Moreover, according to Sadra’s theories, the intermediate role of the world of ideas and imagination is uncovered in the depiction of intuitive ideas and interpretation. The necessity of controlling the sources of knowledge in the interpretation (the necessity of regulation in particular) is the last rule which we have discussed. Sadra reiterates that the essence and secrets of the text of the Quran are not in conflict with its interpretative appearance rather complete it. In hermeneutical interpretation, metaphoric use does not occur. Therefore, the correct interpretation is the one that is in harmony with the surface of the Book and the Sunnah. The present study not only demonstrates part of the logical and philosophical rules governing the textual interpretations, but also presents an analysis of hermeneutical knowledge sources (reason and heart) which can contribute to a deeper and practical understanding of transcendent philosophy.Epistemological rules are concerned with the existential mode of human epistemic faculties in particular though these rules are mostly pre-hermeneutic. In other words, our knowledge of them can explain the substructure of Sadra’s interpretations. These rules have been inferred from Sadra’s works and enriched with the texts which are in line with Sadra’s ideas. These heptafold rules are grounded in semantic realism and textual understanding, the theory of author-centeredness and textualism, and finally in ontological realism. Sadra’s interpretations are divided into two rational and intuitive types. The reason is of an active role in these Sadraean interpretations and is concerned with production and creativity but this creativity is controlled with interpretative regulations. According to Sadra, the reason is prior to tradition and basically intuition is a level higher than discursive reason which lies over it. The results of this study show that without paying attention to the aforementioned principles and their relevant rules, one cannot reach a tridimensional and deep understanding of Sadraean interpretations. Failure of correct understanding of the place of hermeneutical interpretation in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy is itself the source of many of the views and criticisms that are expressed by the opponents and critics of Sadraean philosophy.