فصلنامه آینه معرفت
پیاپی 69 (زمستان 1400)

Most Muslim logicians divide the acquired science into the obvious and theoretical with the criterion of thought. The purpose of this study is to investigate the usefulness of this division in the logic of affirmations. The main benefit of this division, with the aim of finding out the truth in the science of logic, is to show the need to the science of logic in moving from the obvious propositions to theoretical ones; but in relation to the obvious immediate perceptions, because of their being certain, there is no need for this science. Analyzing the thought and various obvious propositions, we can conclude that "obviousness" cannot be a factor in the certainty of affirmation, because some of other people's immediate perceptions are false in our view. The certainty of each immediate perception is related to factors other than their being obvious. Although all our immediate perceptions are certain for us, we do not pay attention to the other people's acknowledgment factor in evaluating their thoughts. We examine their arguments in terms of the formal and material rules of reasoning. The thought is not discussed anywhere in the science of logic except in the division of science into the obvious and the theoretical, and this is a proof of the uselessness of this division. An alternative division, based on the existence or absence of argument, divide science into sub-structural and super-structural. The validity of the argument in super-structural affirmations is checked in the science of logic. The logic of affirmations is the science of error detection in reasoning, not thought.

Avicenna put the soul and its related issues at the forefront of his philosophical pursuits, and explained them in such a way that the later thinker could not ignore his views in their study of the topic. In his studies, he has dealt with the issues related to internal faculties of the soul in detail. One of these issues that he has introduced is the estimative faculty. He is considered as a pioneer in introducing this faculty among the other soul internal faculties. He has dealt with this faculty, its function for the soul, and its position in his works like Al Shifa and Al Isharat. The present study aimed to examine Avicenna’s views and evaluate their efficiency and characteristics. Based on the results of the study, conclusions are made about the principles of this faculty and its subordinated ones, and also distinctions are made between human beings and animals in terms of the faculty principles, their implications and products. Avicenna’s logical judgments in relation to the implications and the falsity and invalidity of a lot of judgment criteria among human beings are identified and the criteria sanctioned by Avicenna are revealed.

Rational unity is one of the central issues in transcendental wisdom. The weight of its proof and the inferences made on its basis goes to paying careful attention to the method and the specific principles of transcendental wisdom. Its proofs, much like the problem itself, keep distance from conventional philosophy. In this regard, some recent scholars, with the mentality that Sadra’s views and those of other theologians share the same method and basis for the doctrine of unity have interpreted the doctrine and its arguments and with the claim of adopting a critical view have produced no result other than creating doubt. Hakim Sabzevari has provided an argument for the doctrine of unity which is based on Sadra's specific principles. His argument is based on observing equivalent intellects when understanding generalities with not mentioning the idea of reality and tenuity’. One of the recent scholars, who has tried to claim that the argument is more general than the claim itself, has distorted the argument and consequently the doctrine of rational unity because of the inefficiency of using the reality and tenuity idea in proving the doctrine. The purpose of this article is to analyze the claims and evaluate the quality of the underlying assumptions. It is concluded that studies with no sufficient depth have made some researches go astray and create doubts about the most exalted theories of transcendental wisdom.

In the theoretical mysticism and Islamic philosophy, not associating any partner with God has always been subject to different interpretations. When Muslim philosophers refer to unity, what they mean is negation of associating any partner with God, as the Necessary Existence by Nature (Wajeb-e-Be-ahzat). From Mulla Sadra's point of view, God’s having no partner means that it is impossible to assume God with a partner. This extends to include the other attributes of God, like knowledge, power and thingness. Neo-Sadrian thinkers have proposed different interpretations of Sadra's view of associating a partner with God. The present article is an attempt to explain three Neo-Sadrian interpretations and try to show how close they are to Sadra’s views. Molla Abdollah Zanuzi, and Agha Ali Modarres try to explain Sadra's view based on the distinction between Per Se Existence and Per Accident Existence, or the Owner and property, but Allame Tabatabaee believes that in relation to the attributes that are common to God and humans, God has no partner due to the typicality of instance.

Violence against and intolerance of followers of other religions or disregard for ideological and religious pluralism is one of the accusations made by a large number of Orientalists against the Qur'an, the Prophet of Islam (PBUH) and Muslims throughout history. The emergence of these accusations in the minds of Orientalists mainly stems from issues such as jihad and the Prophet's treatment of his opponents in Medina and the three Jewish tribes of the Bani Qinqa, the Bani Al-Nadhir and the Bani Al-Qurayzah and the Jews of Khyber and Fadak and especially the Prophet's confrontation with the Jews of Bani Qurayzah after his prophetic mission. Some orientalists have qualified these wars in which the Holy Prophet (PBUH) was involved with worldly desires such as colonization and political, social, cultural and economic domination. In fact, a lot of Islamologists, in their definition of the concept of jihad, have considered it as devoid of divine motives and in this way made it difficult for non-Muslims to understand. They have evaluated the verses of the Qur'an and the behavior of the Prophet (PBUH) contradictory and without rational thought. They are of the view that contradictions which are due to the difference in behavior at times of weakness compared with times of strength are the root cause of the spread of violence. The accusations made by the Orientalists are not in line with the philosophy of the prophetic missions of the divine prophets because the prophets’ mission is to determine human rights and establish justice, equality and lasting peace among people. The basic principle of Islam is to respect the rights of all human beings and to communicate with all based on peace and peaceful life. Jihad has always been defensive in Islam and all the wars in which the Prophet (PBUH) was involved in the early days of Islam were fought to defend the territorial lands of Islam and to protect Muslims. The study of the legislative course of jihad in Islam shows the Prophet’s logical stance regarding the interaction or confrontation of Jews and Christians with Islam and Muslims. What is certain is that at the beginning of his arrival in Medina, the Messenger of God signed a covenant of peaceful concord with the Jewish tribes living in Medina, respecting their material and spiritual rights, and asking them to refrain from cooperating with the enemies of the Muslims, but unfortunately all the three aforementioned tribes broke their promise. The Jews broke the treaty one after another and betrayed Muslims, so the expulsion of the two Jewish tribes of the Bani Qinqa and the Bani Nadir from Medina was a measure commensurate with their betrayal. The accusations of some sources on the history of Islam and some Orientalists regarding the Bani Qurayzah and the massacre of the male slaves and accusing the Holy Prophet of extreme violence is consistent with the Torah selected by the Jews regarding violators. However, they are not consistent with the clear stance of the Holy Prophet and Ali (PBUT) and the content of verse 26 of Surah Al-Ahzab about the story of the Bani Qurayzah.

The question of whether Sharia’h laws should follow or not follow the considerations of common good and depravity is an interdisciplinary issue lying at the intersection of theology and jurisprudence. In this regard, the Shiite thinkers disagree with the Ash'arites, who insist on non-following side of the issue. However, Shiite thinkers themselves are not unanimous in their views on this issue. Some put emphasis on the absolute adherence of the laws to the considerations of common good and depravity, and some believe in the relative adherence of the laws to those considerations. What this article seeks to do is to show the impact of the theological principles on the resolution of this issue. To solve this problem, it seems that we should clarify our position toward the four important theological and intellectual bases: essential and legal good and badness; Divine justice, God's purposefulness in actions and the impossibility of preponderance without there being preponderance. By showing how these principles affect the solution of this problem, the author has ultimately taken side with the theory of absolute adherence of the laws to the considerations of common good and depravity.

The identification of the term ‘Ibadeh’ (worship) has a long history in the writings of philologists. The sect of ‘Wahhabism’, by its misunderstanding of the meaning of worship, has excommunicated the Muslims. In contrast, Ayatulah Sobhani, in most of his works, has presented an analysis of worship, which is closer to the reality of Sharieh (Islamic Law). The present paper aim to examine critically the definition of worship proposed by Ayatullah Sobhani. He believes that worship has two constitutive elements: internal and external. Its internal element is the worshiper’s ‘Khuzu’ (humility) and ‘Tathalul’ (abjection), and its external element is classified into four groups: in the first group, ‘Uluhiyyeh’ (deity) is the base, and worship means the humility before Allah; in the second group, the base is‘Rububiyyah’ (lordship), and, worship is the state of humility in which a person believes in Âllah’s Lordship; in the third group, the base is ‘independence’, and, in the fourth group, the base is “Tafwiḍ” (resignation). In the third group, worship is the humility before God who is the creator and the independent being. In the fourth version, worship is humility before a being other than Allah, such as idols, stars, angels, prophets and God’s saints, to whom the affairs of the universe have been delegated. The authors define worship as expressing abjection and obedience before the Divine Lord, which not only is a conclusive definition, but it is also devoid of the defaults of Ayatullah Sobhani’s definition. The method adopted for the present study is a descriptive and analytic one.