فصلنامه نقد و نظر
سال بیست و هفتم شماره 1 (پیاپی 105، بهار 1401)

How does ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī define human sciences? It has been claimed that he treated human sciences as constructed (iʿtibārī) and practical sciences. In this article, I examine constructed meanings, and deploying the library method in collecting data and adopting the descriptive-analytic method in inferences, I scrutinize the above claim. I believe that ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī does not put forward an explicit definition of human sciences. What he says in his theory of constructions (iʿtibāriyyāt) does not have to do with sciences as systematic pieces of knowledge. Nevertheless, I seek to examine his view of whether fields of study and propositions of human sciences are real or constructed in terms of two senses of construction: the general and specific senses. A scrutiny of ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s remarks suggests that there are serious challenges before any attribution of the following views to ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī: the construction of all Western sciences, treatment of each science as a science through a compromise or agreement by experts, practical sciences not being constructed and their restriction to conventional sciences, and treatment of sciences such as ethics and law as constructed.

According to some Muslim scholars, manners of living are not exhausted by modern style of living (regardless of prior traditions)—we might still turn to Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), find the Prophet’s words, and live accordingly. The nature or spirit of Islamic jurisprudence is the discovery of the practical doctrines, or rulings, of Islam. A jurist is not therefore a lawmaker, but a discoverer of laws. A jurist’s process of ijtihad (or inference of rulings) ends with an inferences of a proposition that suggests a jurisprudential ruling. Of the prominent Shiite intellectual trends, both Akhbāris and Uṣūlis endorse metaphysical realism about divine rulings. The main problem with which this article is concerned is an assessment and critique of the mechanism of realism in jurisprudential inferences in Shiite principles of jurisprudence. Based on the results of this research, which are obtained through description and analysis of content, although realism is part and parcel of the principles held by Imami Shiite Uṣūlis, the solutions proposed to achieve the goal are inadequate because of their confusion of existential and legislative effects of certainty, and thus, they cannot do justice to the concerns of Akhbāris in reaching the reality. For this reason, it is necessary to account for a more efficient mechanism of realism through a revision of the common elements of Uṣūli arguments and how they arrive at an authoritative reason or proof. It seems that by transferring the locus of inculpatoriness (munajjiziyya) and exculpatoriness (muʿadhdhiriyya) from the essence of certainty (qaṭʿ) to its causes, and the minimization of the impact of psychological states on inferences, the ground can be prepared for realism and further justification of the propositions in the principles of jurisprudence.

The theory of fallibility (takhṭiʾa) in theology and the principles of jurisprudence, if properly understood, can make a significant contribution to prevent violent extremism. Although religious tolerance is considered a modern discourse, this article argues that Muslim theologians had laid down the theoretical foundations of religious tolerance in the eighth century by advancing the theory of fallibility in Islamic theology. Through the fallibility theory, Muslim theologians have concluded that an individual should be excused or rewarded by God even though his/her dogma is false. This would yield an epistemic ground for coexistence among followers of different religions and denominations. Yet, distortions or misapplications of the fallibility theory in the past several decades have led to the emergence of violent extremism across the Muslim world. While revisiting the theory of fallibility in theology and the principles of jurisprudence and by deploying textual analysis in historical contexts, this paper argues that Muslim theologians had laid down the theoretical foundations of religious tolerance on epistemic principles. I conclude that revisiting the theory of fallibility can play a crucial role in preventing violent extremism inside and outside the Muslim world.

Although there is a hadith from Prophet Muḥammad that faith (īmān) is “verbal profession, cognizance in the heart, and doing the pillars,” the political social circumstances of the newly emerged Islamic society developed in such ways that the element of action or “doing the pillars” gained a great significance, leading to a view that we might refer to as “deontologism.” There are two ways in which the view is important: first, it is an influential theory of faith in the history of Islamic theology, and second, it directly or indirectly overshadowed other theories of faith. In this theory I seek to examine the approach and its characteristics by deploying the analytic-comparative method, but I am mainly concerned with how it was received by Imami Shiite theologians in the fifth century AH (eleventh century CE). I argue that the deontological approach to faith was practically tied with the tendency to “threats of divine punishment” (waʿīd) and the belief in “failure” (iḥbāṭ) of deeds. Imami theologians encountered the approach in three ways: it was endorsed by al-Shaykh al-Ṣadūq; al-Shaykh al-Mufīd adopted a virtue-based approach, and thus, modified the view. That is, he emphasized the knowledge or cognizance component of faith, seeing the “action” as an integral part of faith. Finally, the approach was rejected by Nawbakhtis and al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā, who believed that faith belonged to the category of confession or endorsement, although they disagreed over the “failure” of deeds.

A study of the history of theological ideas in the early centuries clearly suggests that Imami Shiite theologians of the period viewed the will as an incipient (ḥādith) entity, distinct from God’s knowledge and power. In the history of Islamic theology, the identification of God’s will with knowledge was first proposed by the theological trend of Iʿtizāl, but in the Imami trend of theology, such an account of the will was proposed by middle-period theologians; that is, those belonging to the theological schools of Rey and Hillah. Imami theologians of the period identified the will as a motive (dāʿī), and identified the motive in turn as knowledge of the interest (maṣlaḥa) within the action. Although the heritage of this group of theologians remains undecided as to whether the divine will is incipient or eternal (qadīm), there is evidence to the effect that it had preferences for the incipience of the will. Drawing on the library method and the method of historical analysis, this article seeks to see how such an epistemic shift occurred in accounting for the divine will. The conclusion of historical analyses of this phenomenon leads us to the idea that since the official theology in this period parted ways with the hadiths from the Household of the Prophet and turned to the late theological trend of Iʿtizāl, Imami theologians of the period endorsed theological analyses and accounts of Iʿtizāl as solutions to epistemological problems posed by the philosophical trend of thought, and introduced them to Imami theology.

The majority of Shiite and Muʿtazilite theologians have endorsed the validity of the principle of grace (qāʿidat al-luṭf). In this paper, I begin with an account of the principle of grace. It turns out that things by which compliance with God is enabled can be proved by the principle of “enablement” (tamkīn), and once these come to exist, the principle of grace arises as additional to the principle of enablement. Next, I consider the validity of the principle of grace. The theory seems to face serious challenges. First, it is necessary by light of human reason that God should create things without which obedience of God is not possible, but human reason never rules that God should create what makes one closer to obedience. Instead, sometimes God’s wisdom requires that He does not exhibit grace as a test for His servants. Second, there are things which, by the principle of grace, should have come into existence, but they have never existed. To solve the second problem, one might claim that the principle of grace does not encompass personal instances of grace, but the proposed solution faces its own sorts of problems.

The identity of Islamic denominations is closely tied to the Quran and its exegesis. Moreover, the core identity of the Quran is nothing but monotheism. In this research, we deploy the library method to study prominent, selected Shiite, Ashʿarite, and Muʿtazilite exegeses of the Quran, establishing that the most authentic idea and process of approximation between Islamic denominations is the monotheistic theory of approximation. Accordingly, just like all other Islamic doctrines, approximation is originated from monotheism, figuring in a world of concepts with a central role by monotheism around reason and wisdom. This theory has at least two outcomes: first, it makes no sense to negotiate over explicit monotheistic texts, but as for apparent meanings and ambiguous phrases of religious texts, one might seek harmony and reconciliation. Moreover, differences result from contradictions or conflicts. As long as such differences do not contradict the belief in monotheism, they are included in the scope of approximation and reconciliation, and when such a contradiction occurs, approximation makes no sense.