نشریه اندیشه فلسفی
پیاپی 8 (پاییز 1401)

The performative deletion analysis approach, does not assume the presence of speakers, hearers, and verbs, but rather the presence of the words "I", "you", and performative verbs. In the approach of conversational postulates, it is also possible to formalize principles of conversation and show that there are rules in grammar that are dependent on such principles. But according to John Searle, both approaches to the performative deletion analysis and the conversational postulates show a misunderstanding of the place of theory of speech acts in the general narrative of language. Searle's objection to these two approaches is that they both fail to use the sources of current theories of speech acts. Both theories, when confronted with confusing data, assume a solution that requires the introduction of additional and unnecessary components. In each, a correct understanding of the role of speech acts enables us to justify this data without providing these additional and unnecessary components.

In his book, Finite and Infinite Goods, The prominent Christian philosopher, Robert Adams, defends a weak version of divine command theory. According to this view, the nature of moral obligations is identical with being commanded by God. His argument for view has two stages. In the first stage he tries to show that the notion of moral obligation is essentially social in its nature. That is, moral obligations are constituted by social notions such as demands or commands of a third party such as a third person or the moral community. In the second stage he argues that this third party cannot be anything but God. In this paper I will try to criticize his argument in its first stage. I will show that his reasons and arguments for the claim that moral obligations have a social nature are inconclusive.

In Sadra's philosophy, existence is introduced as good, and levels of existence are also levels of goodness. He in his Ethics believes in intrinsic and rational goodness and ugliness. In this article, we will discuss the relationship between these two parts of Sadra's thought and we will show that Originality of existence can be a rational basis for defending inherent goodness and ugliness. The main claim is that the originality of existence and levels of existence also have normative dimensions. In the following, Sadra's ethics will be compared with the view of his two contemporary philosophers and it will be argued that Sadra's moral system is opposed to Cartesian voluntarism because he defends moral goodness by relying on intellect and does not consider moral rules to be subject to human will. Also, his realistic ethics is different from empirical utilitarianism and because he accepts the relation between existence and goodness, his ethics is a practical obstacle against meaninglessness and nihilism.

Orexis or desire in Aristotle’s point of view is divided into rational and irrational desires. Rational desire includes Boulêsis while irrational desire includes Epithumia (appetite) and Thumos (passion). The study of Aristotle’s ideas shows that rational desire is different from other types of desire from different aspects. Firstly, rational desire as compared to the appetite and passion belongs to the rational part of the soul and thus is exclusively for human being whereas appetite and passion exist in animals too. Secondly, rational desire is concerned with goals which are realized through rational deliberation and such goals are good from the point of view of the agent instead of being merely pleasant and pleasurable. Thirdly, rational desire is engaged with the identification of truth and also contrary to the appetite and passion is a future-oriented desire. Finally, the striking feature of rational desire is its being an origin for moral actions; because the issue of rational desire is a rational goal; something from which the animals are deprived.

Thought in Frege’s point of view is accompanied by innovations as well as ambiguities that have been examined from various points of view. But Frege's view of conventional definitions of truth and rejecting them is the main topic of this article. In his explanation of propositions containing thought and judgment, Frege doesn’t accept the conventional definitions of truth for their sequence, and in order to solve the problem of achieving the truth and value of propositions, he proposes "Thought" and tries to replace it. In order to clarify this claim, we first examine language and thought from his point of view, and then by entering into the subject of thought and discovering its characteristics, we will try to understand Frege's claim to replace it with the definitions of truth. Finally, with the plan of seven critiques, the author believes that this replacement is not possible and fruitful.

Non-epistemic values in scientific reasoning bring many discussions. One way to justify the role of these values is the argument from inductive risk. The aim of this article is to examine a version of this argument that is presented by Douglas. By raising the question about "evidential sufficiency", Douglas advances her argument to justify the influence of non-epistemic values. Assuming the correctness of Douglas' argument, we try to determine the answer of "evidential sufficiency" based on the conclusion of her argument. Even considering both epistemic and non-epistemic values, we will show that the question of sufficiency will not have a proper answer. Because to determine evidential sufficiency, we will either confront circularity or force to add other ambiguous things. Also, we will explain that Douglas should have sought the "evidential sufficiency" by emphasizing more on the practice of scientists in actuality, in which there is no requirement to incorporate scientific claims with policy-making claims. This criticism is sympathetic to some other criticisms of Douglas, according to which she incorporated pragmatic and epistemic domains of science.