نشریه مطالعات تاریخی جنگ
سال هفتم شماره 1 (بهار 1402)

With the aim of developing military education, the Nezām schools were established in the middle of the Qajar period and were developed more and more during the Pahlavi I period as Madares-e Nezām. These schools were established along with other military schools in line with the reforms of the statesmen for the structural-content evolution in military education and the formation of a modern army. This study, using the historical analysis method, was primarily aimed at illuminating the role Nezām schools played in the development and evolution of military education during the Qajar and Pahlavi I periods. The research concluded that the schools of the Qajar period were originally founded in competition with Dār ul-Funun school often to serve the political and personal goals of princes and military commanders. Therefore, although the Nezām schools failed to bring about a specific change in the military educational system of the Qajar period due to their limited number, lack of variety and structure of the educational package, they played a significant role in the process of military education and public educational modernization during the Pahlavi I period thanks to their coherent organization, acceptable educational quality and training of students and candidates for military purposes.

The formation of the Safavid state (1501-1722) happened with the help of the presence and power of Qizilbāsh soldiers affiliated with Turkmen tribes, who established a morid-morad relationship with the Safavid sheikhs and kings with the religious connection of the Safavid Sūfī order in Ardabil. This relationship was strengthened with the officialization of the Shi'a religion in Iran, in the form of Shāhelahi-Ghāzī, a passionate Shi'a-Sūfī warrior. These soldiers achieved various privileges in the Safavid government due to their military role in the battles of Shah Ismail (1501-1524) with the ruling families, internal rulers and rival ruling dynasties such as the Ottomans and the Uzbeks and their efforts in the establishment, stabilization and continuation of the Safavid government. And after the royal family, they were placed in the second position of the social pyramid and power structure. This research aimed to investigate the status and privileges of Qizilbāsh militaries in the government of Shāh Ismāil I, using a descriptive-analytical method based on the data of library sources. The basis of the investigation was identifying the determining factor in the status and privileges of Qizilbāsh troops in Shah Ismail's government. The research assumption emphasizes the military strength and tribal support of the militaries as the determining factor. The findings of the research showed that the basis of Shāh Ismāil's power was related to the presence and power of Qizilbāsh soldiers. The various roles of these soldiers in the field of militarism, internal relations, the government of the states, as lala (statesmen) of the princes and even in the field of foreign relations, depicted the multiplicity of duties and responsibilities of the soldiers in this period, and raised their position and scope of influence in the government, so that they were appointed as chief officials of the government.

The Safavid era is one of the challenging periods in the Iranian history during when foreign disputes significantly influenced Iran’s environment. During this period, extensive wars against the Ottomans and Uzbeks occurred in the western and eastern regions of the country. These wars, in addition to causing human and financial losses, had considerable destructive effects. The present article examines the environmental damages resulting from the wars of this period. The results of the study showed that the extensive attacks of the Ottomans or the Uzbeks on Iranian lands, as well as some defensive policies of the Safavids against these attacks, led to the destruction of water resources and serious damages to food resources, which caused famine and various diseases in the society. Given the extent of the wars and the large number of battles, the famines and disease outbreaks were inevitable. Therefore, it is clear that the wars of the Safavid era had extensive and profound effects on Iran’s environmental space.

After Saladin destroyed the Fatimid caliphate, a foremost part of the Ayyubids' military had to suppress the Egyptian forces that were still loyal to the Fatimids. Saladin's efforts to overpower and exile the Fatimid forces faced the newly established Ayyubid government with the shortage of military parties that needed to fight the Crusaders and the rest of the dispersed Zengid dynasty in the Levant and the Jazirah. At the beginning of Saladin's reign on the Jazirah, he organized his actions to gain the necessary feudal force to confront the Crusaders. However, when Saladin's authority declined among his troops and failed to achieve a decisive victory in the short term, this feudal force became temporary. This paper analyzed the number of Saladin's combats, the number of his troops, the extent of his successes in battles, and the role of groups impacting his victories. Along these lines, Saladin's failures were also investigated. According to the findings, destroying the Fatimid Caliphate forces drove Saladin to rely on the only Muslim military organization on the Jazirah. Their temporary presence in the spring and summer cost him his ability to completely force the Crusaders out of Syria after Hattin, and the Crusaders recaptured the shores of Syria.

The constructive role of war in the life of human societies has led historical studies to provide multiple explanations of this social phenomenon. If we accept that this confusion and multiplicity of explanations is the result of historians' different epistemological perspectives, then recognizing the paradigmatic foundations of explanatory models will be the way to overcome this confusion. Based on this, the article seeks to explore the criteria determining the correct application of explanatory models in historical studies of war. If we assume that the social ontology of historians has methodological implications that are more compatible with an explanation model, then the problem of the article can be answered by formulating three paradigms of explanation in the historical studies of war. Based on the understanding paradigm, the application of the understanding model of explanation implies accepting the atomistic answer to the problem of agency and structure and denying the determining role of social structures in the occurrence of wars. In the deductive-nomological paradigm, the application of the covering law model of explanation will be correct only if the claim of holistic ontology on the determining role of social structures and culture is taken for granted. In the narrative paradigm, in order to explain wars as social phenomena, one must consider the agency and structure as overlapping dualities, with reference to structuration, and plot the narrative by taking into accout the two-way effect of social situations and the response of historical agents to the situation.

War poetry of the 20th century in many cases implies a voice for peace. Gheysar Aminpour (1959-2007) and Wilfred Owen (1893-1918), famous war poets of this century, were selected for this comparative study, which using a descriptive analytical method focuses on the existence or non-existence of the voice of peace in the two poets' war poetry based on American School of comparative literature. To this end, ninety-five war poems of each poet were initially reviewed. Then, thirteen poems of each poet were chosen. Finally, four poems with the highest degree of relevance to the voice of peace were selected. The findings show that both poets call for peace in different ways. That is, lyric speakers in Aminpour directly call for peace while those of Owen, through depicting the calamities and horrors of war, indirectly address the unconscious of the readers. The findings of the research can be used in comparative studies with emphasis on hidden themes in war prose and poetry that should be unearthed.