فصلنامه آیین حکمت
پیاپی 52 (تابستان 1401)

The state of being, occurrence, essential possibility and the possibility of need are among the criteria that have been proposed to justify the need of some things. Each of these criteria has been criticized and denied by others. Some contemporary thinkers have also criticized and rejected the last point of view, the poverty possibility, and have introduced the possibility of meaning as the only correct criterion of need for cause. In this article, according to the two meanings of the criteria (cause and reason), the above views have been examined and shown that all of them are facing challenges. By dividing cause into analytical and external, semantic possibility has been introduced as the criterion of need for the cause in analytical causation and the cause itself as the criterion of need for the cause in external causation. Also, by dividing causality into agent, final, material and formal, complete and incomplete, direct and indirect, longitudinal and transversal, real and as ground, the criterion of need for each of them has been determined separately.

According to the originality of existence, thevery actual reality is existence. So the reality of all the facts is based on existence. The existence-based facts are divided into existential facts and natural facts. Since this division is philosophical, it must be rooted in reality. Among the words of the sages, there are differences for how to realize these two parts. including that the nature is the limit of existence or the mode of existence and. Therefore, in this article, considering the importance of this division in philosophy, the validity of these criteria and the arguments that led to the expression of these differences have been examined. The method of collecting library information is through file scanning, and the writing and editing of the materials is done by descriptive-analytical method. The conclusion reached in this article by examining these evidences is that none of these criteria can represent a logical criterion to express the correct and accurate difference between these two types. Because either the criteria are not correct and in accordance with reality, or even given its correctness, they cannot be a positive difference between these two types of reality. In other words, the proposed criteria are faced with failure in reasons and breach in cases. Therefore, none of them can be considered a precise philosophical criterion.

The fundamentals, as a foundation for all theoretical knowledge, has always been and still is the focus of epistemologists. The criterion of truth, however, in such cases is the focus of this attention. Prof. Misbah guarantees their truth by referring to the knowledge by presence and claiming that our knowledge of these propositions is by presence, we have presence awareness of the referring, the referred and the reference. The theory of establishing the fundamentals on knowledge by presence is based on some principles lacking attention to them, it will be difficult to understand it and face problems. Among these basics would be the what of the world of presumption and the how to know it. This article, using a librarian way of gathering data, first explains the main problem and the brief answer of Allameh Misbah with a descriptive-analytical method, and then explains Allameh's answer with an analytical method, and in the meantime, it tries to understand the what of assumption and clarify how it is realized in connection with construction of the fundamentals and theirs validity. The result of this research is that fundamentals, with the same famous definition, are of same nature as truth propositions, and the nature of these cases and their world of reference are mental assumptions, not the external world, and they do not refer to real case in the external world, and, lacking any real case, are also true. In other words, the referred case of these propositions is simply the relationship that we find between the presumption of the reference for the concept of the subject and the predicate. Since the place of assumption is also the world of mind and we find the connection of mental assumptions directly in these propositions, this understanding is present; In other words, in addition to the intuitive awareness of the referring as mental concepts, we know the referred cases of these propositions and, as a result, their matching with their referred cases also.

The issue of the role of sense and reason in mental ideas and judgements is one of the most effective issues in the epistemological evaluation of scientific propositions, which many prominent philosophical schools and such philosophers as Ibn Sina and Allameh Tabataba'i have also paid attention to. The basic question may be taken as: What is the role of sense and reason in the emergence of mental ideas and judgements? The present article examines this issue in the opinions of the two philosophers discussed with an analytical and rational method. Ibn Sina and Allameh Tabatabai believe that in the field of mental ideas,  perceptions begin with sense. They consider sense as the receiver of particulars and intellect of universals and sense as both internal sense and external sense. of course, Allameh puts more emphasis on the knowledge by presence. Also, both of them believe that the intellect creates general concepts by using concepts derived from sense. Then, from them, it creates elementary self-evident judgements, which are prior to other judgementss. Therefore, in judgementss, both believe in the existence of intellectual judgements prior to sensory judgements and propositions, which are the criteria for the validity of perceptible sensations or sensory propositions and their related propositions. They consider sense to be the basis of the concept of the subject and predicate of these cases, and reason to be the maker of judgments, and by referring knowledge to basic axioms, they justify their validity and provide a solid basis for human knowledge. This is how they invalidate the exclusive reliance of all human knowledge on sense and sensory experience.

Achieving the meaning of divine monotheism depends on such bases as the inherent simplicity of the Almighty. In the mental system of Mr. Sadra, divine simplicity is complete and pure, and it is a truth that is free from any kind of combination, and therefore it will be Unit and the One; That is, true simple existence is also a true unit; that is to say, there is a necessary link between the existence of simple completeness and the true monotheism of God. Based on the evidence that he considers as Arshi and one of the confirmations of God, he has stated that the proof basit al-haqiqah is the proof that the Truth of Necessary Being without the intervention of anything outside of its essence and without any intermediary is the only case for necessity. That is, the true simple existence of God, which is exempt from all possible attributes and defects, therefore, by its nature, contains all perfections. In this way, the existence of God is pure and simple, which not only does not contain any combination, but is the superior external existence of all essences and perfect concepts, and is not the special existence of any of them. Therefore, the truth of the existence of the Supreme Being, which is simple and true, will be the same as the true unity. In this area, we are looking for whether this view of divine monotheism and its accessories has documentation in Imams`s prayers or is it just a philosophical idea? In the first case, with the special language of the imams and their special communication with Hazrat Haqq, we will have access to "true monotheism".

The issue of vacuum, following space, has been of those which has occupied the minds of ancient philosophers and intellectual-philosophical currents of Islamic scientists and physicists since long ago, and different and sometimes contradictory views have emerged in explaining the ontology of space. As the results of a comparative study between modern physics and different philosophical approaches showed that in classical physics, void is possible and physicists are trying to reach complete vacuum. But in the quantum perspective, there are quantum ups and downs caused by the field everywhere, and the world is full, which is consistent with Sadra's view. Of course, it should be noted that there is a difference between the concept of fullness in quantum physics and its concept according to Molla Sadra. Because at the time of Mulla Sadra, the subject of ups and downs and quantum fields was not discussed at all. Therefore, it is necessary to make the ontology of the vacuum in different ways in a comparative way, and in the first step, in this research, this ontology is investigated from the perspective of Sadra and modern physics, and comparative study of other schools in the field would be left to future researches. The current research collects information in a library form and examines it in a descriptive-analytical form.