نشریه آموزه های فقه عبادی
پیاپی 5 (پاییز و زمستان 1401)

Adhān (Arabic: اذان, Islamic Call to Prayer) is a sign among religious teachings that indicates the arrival of the time of prayer. Therefore, it has a special place among Muslims. Two different readings of adhān and its effectiveness in the meantime can be achieved by referring to jurisprudential books, so that according to an approach, adhān does not have any character in itself and trust in it is in the light of the certainty that it is achieved for the accountable (mukallaf). Therefore, it is only possible to say prayer with confidence in it when the certainty of the time is reached. According to another view, adhān is an independent institution and its indicating is relative to entering the taʿabbud (Arabic: تعبد, compulsory obedience) time of worship, meaning that you can stand up for prayer, when you hear adhān. it is essential to have this discussion considering the presence of Shīʿites and Sunnīs in each other’s lands and the necessity of a magnificent presence in religious ceremonies. For this purpose, in this study, which was based on library and descriptive-analytic method of gathering information, the method of indicating adhān from entering ṣalāh (Arabic: صلاه, prayer) time in Islamic sources was re-read. The results show that adhān is an independent institution that its indication from entering the time of prayer is taʿabbud (Arabic: تعبد, compulsory obedience) and can be used to enter the prayer by relying on it.

Joking is approved by Sharīʿah when it is not prohibited (Arabic: حرام, Romanized: ḥarām) by titles such as lying, insulting, or offending. The ruling of joke as lying has been disputed from the opinion of Jaʿfarī jurists, which is effective in various chapters of jurisprudence, such as the justice (Arabic: عداله, Romanized: ʿidāla) of Ḥākim al-Sharʿ (Arabic: حاکم الشرع, the ruler of Sharia), judge (Arabic: قاضی, Romanized: Qāḍī), witness (Arabic: شاهد, shāhid), etc if it is considered to be a major sin (Arabic: کبیره, Romanized: kabīra) of lying. This article answers the question whether it is permissible to joke with a lie or it is forbidden under the evidence of sanctity of lying. This article answers the question whether it is permissible to joke with an intention of lying or it is forbidden under the evidence of the prohibition of lying. The mentioned issue can be imagined in two forms and evaluated, and its sharīʿa ruling can be reached. The first is that lie must be with joking by a motive of joking without intention of the signification and the context of the word, and the second is that the speaker must intend to signify the meaning of the word. The current research is descriptive and analytical and uses library tools. The result of the present article, by examining and evaluating the views and evidences related to the issue of joke as lying, is that if there is inferential circumstances or specific literal circumstances, based on the position of a joke in the word, the joking is not included under the evidence of the prohibition of kidhb (Arabic: کذب, lying) and joking is permissible.

The concept of caution (Arabic: احتیاط, Romanized: ʼIḥtiyāṭ) is considered a desirable thing according to reason (intellect) and sharīʿah (Arabic: شریعه). However, it is appropriate to determine a limit and criteria for it due to some possible unfortunate consequences. Paying attention to this issue is necessary in determining the religious rulings (Arabic: الاحکام الشرعیه) of accountable (mukallafīn) people and in the form of one of the pillars of methodical Ijtihād (Arabic: اجتهاد). This article utilizes cited sources by exploratory and analytical methods to explain the most important ways to prevent the disproportionate caution of mujtahid (Arabic: مجتهد) in the position of ʼIftāʼ (Arabic: إفتاء, English: Act of issuing a fatwā or a legal opinion by an authoritative consultant in matters of law and jurisprudence). In order to achieve this goal, the concept of caution in the first step for issuing is explained and after that, the arguments of those in favor of using this method have been challenged. After that, the unfortunate consequences of this method have been explained to prove the necessity of reducing such cautions. In the next step, the following solutions have been introduced in the form of the necessity of the Ijtihād method in the position of issuing: reducing the influence of previous scholars in three areas of consensus (Arabic: إجماع, Romanized: ʼijmāʿ), tradition famous through juristic opinion (Arabic: الشهره الفتوائیه) and understanding of the companions, appropriate thematology, considering the interests of Islam and Muslims, paying attention to the effective propagation of religion and paying attention to the principle of latitudinarianism in rulings.

Some groups of accountable (mukallafīn) people may sometimes have difficult jobs and may not be able to fast Ṣawm (Arabic: صوم) during the holy month of Ramaḍān at all, or in the summer, for example. The present research is a descriptive-analytic method, after preliminary statement about the terminology of ṭāqah (Arabic: طاقه, endurance) in the word and the Noble Qurʾān, as well as the examples of “upon those who are able [to fast, but with hardship]” (Arabic: علی الذین یطیقونه, Phonetic transliteration: allatheena yuteeqoonahu, the Noble Qurʾān 2:184) to investigate and express the fact that according to the traditions and opinions of jurists, even if the owners of hard jobs are not able to perform fast and carrying out or fulfilling the fasting (Arabic: قضا, Romanized: qaḍā of missed fasting) until the end of the working period (e.g., 30 years), due to difficult working conditions such as: the inability to leave or change a grueling job, the shift of working hours, not having vacation all year round, etc., and they are obligated to perform their fasts while they are alive after retirement and the end of service, because they are not like an old man or an old woman and a thirsty person after their retirement that fasting is harmful for them to be able not having qaḍā and satisfied with paying fidya (fidyah) for fasts missed out of necessity. But they will be considered examples of “upon those who are able [to fast, but with hardship]” (Arabic: علی الذین یطیقونه, Phonetic transliteration: allatheena yuteeqoonahu) and will be excused from performing fasting during the work, according to the above-mentioned conditions.

In recent decades, the views of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī as one of the contemporary religious scholars in various subjects of Islamic sciences have been taken into consideration by religious scholars and researchers. The studies conducted around the views of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī were mostly in Qurʾānic, philosophical and mystical subjects. In the meantime, not much research has been done about his “method of tafsīr of jurisprudential verses”. In this regard, in addition to the explanation (sharḥ) of “Kifāyat al-uṣūl (Arabic: کفایه الاصول)” of Akhund Khurāsānī (Persian: آخوند خراسانی), in tafsīr (Arabic: تفسیر, English: Explanation) of al-Mīzān fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān (Arabic: المیزان فی تفسیر القرآن, often known as Tafsīr al-mīzān), they have mentioned valuable commentary points under Ayāt al-aḥkām (Arabic: آیات الاحکام) or Fiqh al-Qurʾān (Arabic: فقه القرآن) that refers to the verses of the Qurʾān in which the Religious rulings are explained or from which rulings can be extracted and inferred. This article attempts to extract the most important fundamentals of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī in tafsīr of jurisprudential verses in the Qurʾān. It has been concluded at the end of this conclusion, that ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī used various rules and fundamentals in tafsīr of jurisprudential verses of the Qurʾān, including such things as the “reliability of the apparent Meanings (ẓawāḥir) of the Holy Qurʾān, the legality of the verses of the Holy Qurʾān, the validity and reliability of the Sunnah (Arabic: السنه) or the tradition, the rules of the principles of jurisprudence (Uṣūl al-fiqh or Principles of jurisprudence (Arabic: اصول الفقه), the rules of Arabic literature, Qurʾānic studies (Qirāʼah or recitations or readings, Sabab al-Nuzūl [Arabic: سبب النزول, cause of revelation] and its plural Asbāb al-Nuzūl [Arabic: اسباب النزول] and abrogation)”. The findings indicate that his rules and fundamentals in tafsīr of Ayāt al-aḥkām are aligned with the views of famous Jaʿfarī jurists and his understandings of tafsīr are not much different from the famous ones.

If a person performs the congregation and Imām of congregational prayer or Imām al-jamā‘a (Arabic: إمام الجماعه) recites ‘Azāim or ‘Azāʾim al-Sujūd (Arabic: عزائم السجود) but does not perform the prostration of sūrah al-‘azīma in ṣalāh (Arabic: صلاه, prayer), on the one hand, the person who prays behind that imam must perform his/her prostration in order to hear the verse of Sajdah, and on the other hand, performing this prostration may cause interruption in prayer and the person who prays behind an imam (Arabic: ماموم, Romanized: maʾmūm) has a problem about which side to accept. Therefore, how can an accountable (mukallaf) get out of this challenge? There is a difference of opinion among Jaʿfarī jurists in this regard. According to one theory, following the imam requires that the person who prays behind an imam must also leave prostration. The second theory states that maʾmūm must prostrate and that it is not permissible for maʾmūm to follow the imam in this situation. The second theory has offered different solutions. Some jurists say that in this case, maʾmūm must perform the substitution of sajdah (by gesture). A group of jurists said that maʾmūm must use gesture and perform sajdah after finishing the prayer, and according to others, maʾmūm’s obligation is only to perform sajdah after the prayer. This article, which has studied the jurisprudential documents of the issue in analytical-descriptive way by studying ancient texts, has concluded that by following an imam, maʾmūm must not perform prostration, but due to the existence of necessary and lack of obstacles, performing gesture and pointing is obligatory for maʾmūm and maʾmūm’s prayer is correct and valid.