فصلنامه پژوهش های راهبردی سیاست
پیاپی 49 (تابستان 1403)

Political apathy refers to someone’s disinterest, reluctance, and passivity towards political participation. The present research aimed to investigate the factors that contributed to political apathy during the period 2001–2022. To accomplish this, the study employed a meta-analysis approach to synthesize the results of scattered experimental studies and answer the question of what factors influenced political apathy and to what extent they explained it. Materials and Methods This study employed a quantitative meta-analysis approach to identify and categorize studies related to the factors influencing political apathy during 2001–2022. The statistical population comprised 23 research documents, from which 11 documents were selected based on the criteria such as method, validity, reliability, and scientific findings. The selection criteria included method, sample size, correlation coefficients, significance level, statistical population, and year of publication. Having been analyzed in terms of correlation coefficients, sample size, and significance level, the selected studies were entered into Comprehensive Meta-Analysis 2 software, and the final effect size of each research study was estimated. The funnel plot and Q-test were used to determine the homogeneity or heterogeneity. After confirming heterogeneity between the studies, the article used a moderating variable to explain the factors affecting political apathy in the period. The current research employed specific criteria to select the relevant studies for analysis, including: Specific subject area: The research must have examined the factors influencing political apathy, either as the primary or ancillary objective. Specific geographical location: Only scientific–research articles and theses conducted in Iran were examined in this study.

Only quantitative studies were selected for analysis since meta-analysis focuses on quantitative research. Research validity: Given the fact that the validity of any meta-analysis depends on the validity of the studies analyzed, the present research selected the relevant studies based on their validity and reliability which were ensured through strict evaluation criteria such as validity and reliability reports. Clarity of statistical

In line with the protocols of meta-analysis, the studies were selected based on the accurate and correct reporting of statistical findings, as well as their compliance with the assumptions of statistical tests and input criteria of the software. The research studies on the factors influencing political apathy were selected based on the above criteria, which indicates the use of a purposeful sampling method. As a result, 23 research documents were selected for analysis in the current research. Results and Discussion The study revealed a significant and positive relationship between political, social, cultural, economic, and demographic factors and political apathy. Political factors such as political distrust, dissatisfaction, alienation, lack of citizenship rights, anomie, and low political culture were found to be closely associated with political apathy. Social factors, including social anomie, commitment, health, national identity, low social vitality, organizational and occupational identity, lack of social transparency, feeling of social injustice, lawlessness, and low quality of life, were also found to contribute to political apathy. Cultural factors such as domestic media consumption, the level of religiosity, social and satellite networks, cultural anomie, and individualism were identified as influencing political apathy. Concerning economic factors, economic capital, relative deprivation, unemployment, and socio-economic class were found to be associated with political apathy. Finally, demographic factors such as education, place of residence, age, and marital status had a significant relationship with political apathy. Conclusion The study concluded that political apathy is influenced by various economic, political, cultural, and social factors. To prevent the emergence and occurrence of this phenomenon, it is necessary to encourage political participation of citizens in societal affairs by improving their socio-economic status, enhancing self-esteem and sense of efficiency, increasing political and social trust, strengthening religiosity, promoting social justice, and providing greater life satisfaction. Other strategies to increase people’s political participation and prevent political apathy include raising political awareness, fostering hope for future change, ensuring proportional reward for participation, promoting social satisfaction and sense of effectiveness, cultivating citizens’ optimism about the future, increasing political and economic efficiency, strengthening socio-political capital, enhancing political education, empowering citizens, fostering social belonging and individual motivation, promoting accountability of rulers, improving efficiency and effectiveness of institutions and organizations, preventing corruption and political violence, increasing incomes, expanding education, improving social status, building trust in the government, promoting economic development, expanding traditional political culture, and ensuring political and social equality.

The Safavid era can be divided into two distinct periods. The first extends from the inception of the Safavid dynasty to the 1639 Peace Treaty of Zuhab, while the second period spans from the Peace Treaty of Zuhab to the fall of Isfahan at the hands of Afghans. During the first period, Safavid kings exhibited warlike tendencies, and religious authorities were not allowed to interfere in political matters. However, in the second period, Safavid kings embraced Sharia principles more openly, elevating clerics to top positions in the religious structure. The present research aimed to explore the impact of Sharia tendencies on the Safavid military spirit and army. The study addressed the following question: How did Sharia tendencies and the close relations between Safavid kings and clerics influence military responsibilities and duties?

The formative years of the Safavid state began with the establishment of the Safavid dynasty in 907 A.H. and reached it apex with the demise of Shah Abbas I in 1038 A.H. Throughout this period, the kings were prominently characterized by militarism and bellicose tendencies. The Safavids came out victorious or, at the very least, undefeated in their wars with the Uzbeks and Ottomans—except Shah Ismail’s defeat in the Battle of Ghazdewan and the Battle of Chaldiran. Even the defeat in the Battle of Ghazdewan (918 A.H.) occurred in Shah Ismail’s absence. By sword, the Shah or king could consolidate his godlike power and the authority of the Safavid king as a religious leader—a position embraced by his subjects. Consequently, during the first period (from the beginning to the end of the reign of Shah Abbas I in 1038 A.H.), the Safavid kings proved their legitimacy as religious leaders by relying on battlefield prowess and warfare, establishing themselves as figures with purely religious legitimacy who would staunchly uphold the Sharia. During this period, the clerics yielded to the sultan’s authority and power without dissent.Following the Peace Treaty of Zuhab with the Ottoman Empire in 1049 A.H. and the shift from confrontation to subjugation in dealings with the Uzbeks, the Safavid kings found themselves with ample free time as they withdrew from the battlefield, hence a limited space for engaging in warfare. The reigns of Shah Safi and Shah Abbas II, the two Safavid kings, mark a transition from militarism towards closer relations with clerics. A relationship existed between the decline of warfare and the increasing influence of clerical figures. The first notable change in the transition process was the withdrawal of the kings from participationin battles, ultimately resulting in the Peace Treaty of Zuhab. The king’s participation in wars had bolstered the Safavid authority, with religious leaders yielding to the conquering king. However, Shah Safi would not show any desire for war.Shah Abbas II stood out as the last warrior king, renowned for his ambition and valor in taking extraordinary measures. He was the last king to personally lead the Iranian army and capture Kandahar. Notably, during his reign, following the peace treaty withthe Ottomans and the decreased hostility from the Uzbeks, the number of wars significantly diminished compared to the early Safavid period. Consequently, even a king like Shah Abbas II could not fully demonstrate his royal and martial capabilities in a time characterized by relative peace.

During the first Safavid period, the active involvement of Shah Ismail, Shah Tahmasp, and Shah Abbas I in battles allowed them to assert their authority over military commanders, state officials, and clerics. However, this dynamic shifted following the Peace Treaty of Zuhab in 1049 A.H. and the subsequent withdrawal of kings from the battlefield. The diminished military preparedness along the eastern and western borders resulted in a void in the king’s responsibilities regarding military affairs, thus granting the kings more free time. As the kings withdrew from the battlefield, their relationships with military and state officials underwent transformation. The cessation of battlefield activities necessitated a redefinition of the king’s role and obligations, a process which took place during the long period of peace with the Ottomans. The last Safavid kings, namely Shah Suleiman and Sultan Hussein, openly embraced the Sharia by engaging in dialogue, consultations, and meetings with clerics and religious scholars. This approach resulted in the legitimization of the king and his court in the eyes of clerics and the broader religious community. However, this shift in focus left the kings unbalanced and significantly reduced their military efficacy and performance. Therefore, the king’s attention shifted away from military, political, and governmental duties, leading to neglect of the army, drastic reductions in troop numbers, and a decline in military training. This trajectory persisted for several decades and contributed to the eventual fall of the Safavid dynasty.

The numerous social protests in Iran over recent decades indicate underlying societal issues. As a descriptive–analytical inquiry, the present study relied on Lacanian theory to address the question as to why the Iranian subject has become hysterical, expressing discontent through active protests in the past decade. Lacan attributes agency to the unconscious rather than the ego, suggesting that the subject extends beyond mere human dimensions. His theories are not merely considered as psychoanalytic techniques; instead, Lacan theorizes at an ontological level by introducing concepts such as fantasy and anamorphic reality. Rejecting the essentialist conception of human subjectivity, Lacanian theory offers fresh insights into the relationship between individual desires and social goals.

The present study adopted a descriptive–analytical method which depicts the existing reality as well as describes and explains its underlying reasons, dealing with the rational and dimensions of the research topic. During the descriptive phase, a theoretical framework was formulated to provide a robust base of argumentation in order to explain the underlying reasons. In the analytical phase, empirical details concerning the problem of the study were juxtaposed with general theoretical propositions to draw conclusions. The descriptive–analytical method is characterized by the researcher’s non-interference in the situation, conditions, or roles of variables; rather, they merely observe and describe what exists without manipulating or controlling other factors.

Lacan’s conceptual framework elucidates that a new Iranian subject was constructed following the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The divine Shia nation and ancient Iranian elements represented inherent gaps in the constitutive elements of the new subjectivity. The transformed nature of the ideological-cum-fantasy structure in Iranian society sought to conceal the gap, which was to be solidified by promoting divine sovereignty over the people. Maintaining this fantasy required a cause of desire, which is termed here as Object-A. The Iraq–Iran War in the 80s, the nuclearization project in the 2000s and the defense of holy shrines after 2010 served the role of Object-A. However, the reforms of the 90s failed to introduce Object-A, which is regarded as a symptom of fantasy. Upon the ascent of the tenth Iranian government in the 2000s, the government’s failure in the economic realm, coupled with specific cultural and political events, eroded the capability of the said fantasy in satisfying and persuading the people. As the fantasy weakened, the symbolic–social domain was rendered invalid, revealing an apparent gap between the real and symbolic and thus hystericizing the Iranian subject.

The analysis showed that noticeable economic and social deficiencies have render the ideological fantasy as dysfunctional after the Revolution, thus not satisfying the Iranian subject anymore. As a result, the Iranian subject challenges the Master’s discourse—rather than conforming to it—actively striving to construct a new fantasy. The Islamic Revolution, as the quilting point or the point de capiton in Lacan’s terminology, has been significantly compromised due to profound economic and social challenges of Iranian society. This damage stems from a gap in the Iranian subject which in turn results from the weakened dominant ideological–symbolic fantasy. This vulnerability is particularly pronounced among the youth of the 2000s, who—lacking a suitable model to ignore some of their jouissance—are driven more by the pursuit of pleasure than by reality. The norm-breaking behavior among the youth can be seen as a consequence of this phenomenon. The power structure in Iran had better rearticulate and present a model appropriate for the emerging conditions, instead of relying on coercive measures. The failure of Iran’s guidance patrol (Gasht-e Ershad) serves as a prominent example in this context. By examining the series of post-2010 events (from protests against financial institutions to the protests following the death of Mahsa Amini), it appears that the Iranian subject has profoundly questioned the prevailing fantasy, thus being hystericized in Lacanian terms. To stop this trend necessitates reformulating and presenting an appropriate fantasy to appease the subject.

Unlike Iran’s idealist foreign policy during the first decade of the Islamic Revolution, there was a gradual shift in discourse after the establishment of the Reconstruction administration in 1989. This shift revealed a growing tendency to prioritize domestic goals over transnational objectives, often referred to in general terms as pragmatism. In the meantime, the security policy of the Islamic Republic underwent new innovations which were influenced by post-war domestic conditions and emerging regional and international developments, indicating some kind of intellectual capacity based on relative consensus among decision-makers. The working hypothesis posits that pragmatism of the Reconstruction administration (1989–1997) prioritized economic development as the cornerstone of its security policy, thus equating national security with national development. Recognizing its capabilities and limitations while upholding Islamic values, the Islamic state prioritized economic reform and sought to rebuild its relations with other nations, hence a shift towards a more realist approach in foreign policy. In this respect, the present article aimed to examine the security policymaking process and the initiatives undertaken to advance new security considerations—a distinctive experience closely associated with Hashemi Rafsanjani’s Reconstruction administration. The analysis concerned the factors contributing to the security policy of the Reconstruction administration (1989–1997), and its relationship with economic development as well as the overall foreign policy of the country. The study tried to answer the question as to what relationship existed between development and security in the security policymaking of the Reconstruction administration.

Literature Review:

In an article titled “A Shift in the National Security Approach of the Islamic Republic in the Second Decade of the Islamic Revolution,” Ardestani (2013) states that the most important orientation in Iran’s post-war foreign policy was alignment with the regional and international environment. In “Discursive Transformation of National Security Governance in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Khalili (2019) underscores that the putative discursive transformation, despite shaping the IRI’s distinctive governance approach, has led to a weakening consensus, polarization, and conflict both within society and within the structures and institutions of national security. In “The Impact of the Idea of Self-Reliance on the National Security of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Dehshiri et al. (2022) focused on the reasons behind the IRI’s emphasis on self-reliance. They concluded that the realization of self-reliance and the subsequent national security—regardless of the government—is influenced by several factors, such as the national cohesion, strategic geopolitical position, historical–civilizational background, pursuit of political independence, mutual trust between people and rulers, and effective and constructive relations with regional and international actors. Another notable work is Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era (Byman, 2001). It delves into Iran’s security considerations during the 1990s, particularly during the establishment of the Reconstruction administration. Considering the related literature, the innovative aspect of the present study lies in its focus on security policy of the Reconstruction administration by relying on an analytical approach which is missing in the related literature.

The present research adopted a descriptive–analytical approach. This kind of analysis involves summarizing and describing the main features of a dataset, aiming to provide information such as measures of central tendency, dispersion, and distribution without drawing inferences or making conclusions.

A key characteristic of governmental security policies, transformability reflects both the ongoing transformation of threat focal points in line with international and regional developments, and the flexibility and modernization embedded in the government’s security decision-making structure. Transformability actually represents the breadth and depth of intellectual capacity within the country’s management system. During the post-war period, what became prioritized as the emerging security orientation under the Reconstruction administration incorporated aspects of both features mentioned above. The governmental foreign and security policymaking process was grounded in relative consensus among decision-makers, acknowledging the perilous and challenging conditions in domestic, regional, and international arenas. During the first decade of the Islamic Revolution, this appraoch sought to balance the political, security, and economic indicators, which were influenced by political–economic, ideological, and cultural factors, as well as the performance of Iran’s revolutionary institutions. While adhering to the revolutionary principles to build a strong Iran and gain international recognition, Hashemi Rafsanjani’s pragmatism involved a concerted effort to end the political isolation imposed on Iran during the Iraq–Iran War, secure the national interests, and reconstruct the country by relying on political realism. This kind of realism, coupled with revolutionary idealism, emphasized a broader understanding of expediency and underscored the significant role of rationality in formulating and planning foreign and security policies. It also highlighted the importance of recognizing the relation between pragmatism and development in the context of Iran’s security policy. According to the research findings, pragmatism in security policymaking of the Reconstruction administration goes beyond a merely historical experience, indicating an intellectual capacity within the country’s macro-management system, which can effectively guide decision-makers in critical situations.

The experience of pragmatism coupled with development is not merely a recent phenomenon in the history of Iran; it actually offers valuable insights and lessons that can guide Iran in overcoming future challenges. Achieving these milestones hinges on revitalizing the intellectual capacity of the country’s management system, enriching it, and facilitating its orientation towards societal security decision-making.

Following the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the subsequent overthrow of the Taliban government, extensive efforts were made to rebuild the Afghan nation-state and establish a democratic political system. However, over the past two decades, these endeavors failed to foster the formation of a national unity government. Moreover, the initial impetus behind the U.S. intervention, namely ousting and destroying the Taliban, gradually receded in priority. This shift became evident particularly after Trump assumed office, as the policy of withdrawal from Afghanistan and negotiations with the Taliban gained momentum. Upon Biden’s inauguration, the policy of withdrawal from Afghanistan accelerated, despite both the Pentagon and the Afghan government stressing the necessity of continued American support for Kabul. This approach provided the Taliban with a good opportunity to swiftly seize control of various districts across Afghanistan, culminating in their complete domination and the resurgence of the Islamic Emirate. Accordingly, various analyses emerged to explain the re-domination of the Taliban in Afghanistan. While the re-domination is undoubtedly influenced by a combination of external and internal factors, the pivotal role of external factors has been emphasized, overshadowing the examination of internal factors. Although America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan seems to have catalyzed and expedited this process, the primary causes of the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan lie within internal dynamics. In this respect, the present study aimed to investigate the internal factors contributing to the resurgence and re-domination of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The main research question is: What are the reasons behind the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan through the lens of Dekmejian’s theory of periodic movements?A great number of researches have delved into the Taliban government and its trajectory in Afghanistan (e.g., Hossein-Khani, 2019; Shafie, 2018; Shafie & Eiduzayi, 2012). More specifically, the Taliban resurgence in 2021 has been the subject of analysis in several studies (e.g., Arian, 2022; Bagheri-Dolatabadi, 2022; Dehzad, 2022; Moghaddas, 2022). These studies explained the various internal and external factors behind the emergence and development of the Taliban, as well as their subsequent reassertion of control over the Afghan state. However, there is no comprehensive and systematic study grounded in a theoretical framework.Relying on Dekmejian’s theory of periodic movements, the present study aimed to analyze the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan as a fundamentalist response. Dekmejian posits that the nature, scope, and intensity of fundamentalist responses are contingent upon the six attributes of the crisis environment, including identity crisis, legitimacy crisis, misrule/coercion, class conflict, military impotence, and culture crisis (Dekmejian, 1995, p. 6).

As a descriptive–explanatory inquiry, the present research relied on a library–documentary method to examine the Afghan crisis environment and the reasons contributing to the re-domination of the Taliban.

Since gaining independence, Afghanistan has experienced a tumultuous political and social history. Key milestones before 2001 include its separation from Iran, the Soviet invasion leading to the establishment of a communist government, the subsequent Soviet withdrawal and rise of the Mujahideen government, and finally, the collapse of the Mujahideen regime and the emergence of the Taliban government. Furthermore, Afghanistan’s societal landscape is characterized by its diversity and ethnic mosaic, where religion holds considerable sway. Following the 2001 fall of the Taliban, the ensuing two decades heralded a move towards the establishment of the Afghan nation–state. However, numerous challenges led to crisis milieu in Afghanistan, including fragmented identities, a lack of integrative national identity, weakness of the central government, challenges in the democratic process (esp., in elections), failure to establish a national unity government, systemic corruption, inefficiency, repression and violence by security and military forces, deepening class divisions due to ethnic and religious reasons, military dependency, failure to establish a national army, hastened modernization, and disregard for ethnic and religious values and norms by the central government. Meanwhile, the Taliban capitalized on the weakness of the central government—particularly in providing security and facilities to marginalized and remote areas, notably those inhabited by Pashtuns—thus garnering significant support from specific segments of the populace. In line with Dekmejian’s theory of periodic movements and the attributes of crisis environment (see above), the Afghan crisis environment paved the way for the resurgence of the Taliban as a fundamentalist response to the prevailing crisis conditions. Notably, the Taliban adeptly used the fusion of ethnic and religious identities, maximizing Afghanistan’s social capacities to advance their goals as an Islamic ideological movement.

While various external and internal factors contributed to the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan, it appears that the primary impetus lies within internal contexts and factors. The hasty withdrawal of American forces, though a significant external variable, merely accelerated the process rather than being the root cause, catalyzing the Taliban resurgence as a fundamentalist response to successive social crises. Although the Taliban’s performance following the establishment of the Islamic Emirate serves as a pivotal yardstick for evaluating developments in Afghanistan in 2021, it is essential to recognize that examining the foundations and contexts underpinning Islamic movements within the political, social, cultural, and economic milieu of a given society offers a more realistic criterion for the analysis of stances and decisions concerning Afghanistan’s future.

Introduction :

The diminished concentration of U.S. power within the international system and the ascension of emerging powers have decreased the structural pressure of international system on regional powers to limit their presence in other regions. This has accelerated the movement of governments like China towards the areas that are traditionally under the U.S. influence, such as West Asia and Latin America. Since the 1990s, China has established extensive relations with countries in West Asia. The present study aimed to explore the expansion of China–Saudi Arabia relations in light of China’s Look West policy, trying to answer the following questions:  What role does Look West play in China’s foreign policy? And how does Saudi Arabia fit into China’s Look West policy? This research distinguishes itself from existing literature by offering a comprehensive analysis of China’s Look West policy, specifically focusing on the expansion of China’s relations with Saudi Arabia.

The study adopted a descriptive–analytical approach and an explanatory method to elucidate how the structure of the international system influences the behavior of states.

Theoretical Framework:

Neorealism or structural realism was used to enhance the explanatory power in addressing how the structure of the international system influences foreign relations and behavioral priorities of countries. The structure of the international system is regarded as the foremost and pivotal variable in the paradigm of structural realism. This encompasses a specific conception of structure and its related components. First, structural realism considers anarchy as the enduring feature of the international system, which is even immune to shifts in power concentration. Moreover, the distribution of capabilities or the polarity of the system significantly shapes the behavior of states. Therefore, neorealism refers to the distribution of power within the international system as one of the most influential variables in shaping the behavior of states. In this light, the analysis of China’s behavior, as a prominent emerging power, requires the examination of the role of America as a key pole in the international system. For instance, China’s pursuit of Go West strategy, as a competitive policy, is understood as a response to the prevailing polarity within the international system.

Systemic Change in the International System and China’s Look West Policy
The diminished concentration of U.S. power and the ascension of other major powers promise a more diversity in the polarity of the international system, as reinforced and evidenced by the rise of China and the increasing role of Asia in global affairs. This trend has elevated China to the status of the most important emerging power, ushering in a period of systemic change characterized by a shift in polarity within the international order. Over the past decade, this transformation has emerged as one of the most significant and influential determinants shaping the foreign policies of world states. Indeed, it has presented regional powers with increased opportunities to extend their influence into other regions. From this vantage point, China is increasingly inclined towards expanding its presence across various regions worldwide, including the West. This inclination can be captured by the term Look West, denoting a focus on the West in general. In a narrower sense, the West encompasses regions such as the Middle East and notably the Persian Gulf. Based on the Look West policy, rebalancing China’s foreign policy during the period of systemic change within the international system can be attributed to the following reasons:Intensification of Strategic Competition with the U.S. in China’s Periphery The U.S. efforts to increase its presence in China’s periphery have prompted China to shift its focus to other regions of the world, particularly West Asia, aiming to establish a strategic space and foothold. China perceives that America is withdrawing from certain regions of the world, which is likely to diminish the U.S. involvement and influence.

China’s Energy Needs:

The change in the polarity of the international system has led to changes in perspectives regarding global energy supply. This shift has opened up opportunities for China to play a more active role in energy supply centers worldwide, particularly in the Middle East. One significant aspect of China’s presence in the Middle East is the strengthening of bilateral relations with countries in the region, notably with the member states of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, such as Saudi Arabia.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative:

The changes within the international system have influenced the foreign policy of world states, paving the way for the enhancement of relations between different states, particularly with those in the Global South. In this context, China, with a longstanding history of fostering unique patterns in its relations with southern countries, has identified an opportune environment for launching new initiatives, foremost among them being the One Belt, One Road or Belt and Road Initiative (also referred to as the New Silk Road). Challenges of China’s Look West Policy Competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, Saudi Arabia has been wary of Iran and its regional policies. It is thus not surprising that China’s close relationship with Iran would raise concerns in Saudi Arabia. As the influence of the U.S. diminishes in the region, China finds itself with increased opportunities to play a significant role in regulating relations between the Persian Gulf states. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia have welcomed China’s mediation efforts to mitigate their differences, which culminated in the 2023 Memorandum of Understanding between Iran and Saudi Arabia to restore relations and reduce tensions.

The United States of America:

Currently, America continues to wield considerable influence in West Asia. Despite the tensions between Washington and Riyadh, America remains Saudi Arabia’s most crucial partner, which in turn gets Washington to exert pressure on Riyadh to deter any significant expansion of China–Saudi relations.

The present study examined the development and expansion of relations between China and Saudi Arabia within the context of China’s Look West or Go West strategy. The research findings suggested that Look West policy has increasingly become an integral strategy of China’s foreign policy, driven by dynamics of power distribution within the international system, emerging opportunities in energy resource markets, efforts to counteract the U.S. influence, and initiatives such as the New Silk Road. Moreover, Saudi Arabia occupies a pivotal position within China’s Look West paradigm. The structure of the international system and the post-Cold War distribution of power (polarity) are pivotal factors shaping China’s approach to the Middle East. A competitive aspect of China’s policy, Look West or Go West strategy involves strengthening ties with countries geographically situated to the West. This strategy serves as a means to break free from the strategic deadlock with the U.S. in East Asia. Nevertheless, China’s overarching objective extends beyond this; it seeks to replace the U.S. and increase its presence in other regions, thereby diminishing American influence while broadening its own sphere of influence. China pursues this goal by continually increasing its economic interactions with the Middle East, fostering amicable relations with all countries therein, and avoiding policies that directly challenge American interests in the Middle East.

Introduction:

 The long-term crises of capitalism act as a catalyst for instituting systemic changes on a global scale. As evidenced in the longue durée contemporary history of the modern world, systematic shifts in hegemonic cycles during extended periods of crisis within the world-system can occur alongside the evolutionary progression of global systematic accumulation cycles, leading to changes in the geographical centers of hegemony. From this perspective, the dominant political, social, economic, and ideological paradigms within the hegemonic state, along with the structural managerial mechanisms that govern them, wield significant influence over the reconfiguration of the world-system and the future hegemonic management. The theoretical and practical models of Western imperialism, rooted in Western civilization paradigms, have significantly shaped the structural orientation, control, and configuration of the world-system during the Dutch, British, and American hegemonic cycles. Similarly, the aforementioned systemic trend can also bring about the resurgence of specific management models and relationships. This shift is likely to manifest prominently during the phase of systemic transition from the American hegemonic cycle to the probable Chinese hegemonic system. In the American hegemonic cycle, the U.S.A. succeeded in establishing a hierarchical and highly centralized hegemonic system, along with corresponding international institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (ultimately transformed into the World Trade Organization), as well as repressive global institutions such as NATO and other international organizations within the modern world-system. Similarly, the ongoing evolution of China’s potential hegemony has fostered the emergence of a hegemonic systemic structure in line with the Chinese consensus, distinct national management mechanisms, and the indigenous Chinese development model. At its core, the Chinese hegemony embodies specific relational and managerial models that define the potential hegemonic management of the post-American world-system.Moreover, the recurrence of cycle from industrial accumulation to financial accumulation within the hegemonic economy of the United States, coupled with casino capitalism, has contributed to the erosion of the structure of the U.S. national economy. Meanwhile, the development of productive accumulation of the basic industry within emerging BRICS powers, with China at the forefront, has established new centers of power and global accumulation. Within these concurrent changes, the geopolitical crises of the 21st century have served as a stage for the hegemonic competition in the fragile regions such as the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and the Asia-Pacific. The Ukraine war and the potential for wars in the Far East aimed at dismantling U.S. land and maritime bases could mark the climax of a transition into an uncertain fourth hegemonic cycle.This systemic transformation, on one hand, might engender structural effects in the global political economy and in the configuration of the development of the world-system development. On the other hand, it can impact intergovernmental relations and mechanisms of military operations and restorations in the world. The distinct Chinese hegemonic process could change traditional models of global geopolitical divisions. Ultimately, the final occurrence of the hegemonic systemic transition to the post-American world-system may have decisive systemic effects on the relative reconstruction of the capitalist crisis and the uncertain bifurcation of the world-system in the phase of its recent long-term crisis. Understanding the structural transformation of the world-system and the structural tendency of the recent systemic crisis of capitalism requires an examination of the systemic transmutation of international capitalism, changes in power morphology, and the performance of international and regional organizations on a global scale, with an eye to the evolution of uncertain Chinese hegemonic control. In this respct, the present study tried to answer the following question: What are the consequences of the probable transition to the fourth hegemonic cycle (i.e., the Chinese hegemony) for the reconstruction of the capitalist world-system?

Using a systemic approach to address the research question, the present study developed a theoretical model that integrates world-systems analysis with the theory of uncertainty in systemic bifurcations. The method drew upon theoretical and analytical research on recent developments of capitalism, America’s decline, China’s ascent on the global stage, and corresponding statistical data.

The structural transformations within the recent world-system have led to fundamental shifts in the reproduction of systemic hegemonic relations and models of international control and management. The structural changes, occurring within an inherently uncertain process, are poised to have irreversible effects on the configuration of hegemonic relations within the post-American world-system. Within the Western hegemonic cycles, there was a vertical relationship configured at the core of world-system, revolving around an international locus of control. Meanwhile, political levers, geopolitical containment, and international institutionalization would act as influential global forces in the systemic reproduction of hegemonic relations. Moreover, the hegemonic structure would be solidified by the hegemonic center through quasi-monopolistic control over the capitalist world economy.However, in the post-Soviet era, the rise of new centers of power and tangible changes in the formation of the world economy disrupted the historical conditions required for the reproduction of hegemonic vertical control over the world-system. Several factors contributed to this transformation: the emerging powers in Asia and South America, the new regional coalitions and alliances such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the indigenous organizations in Latin America such as CELAC and UNASUR. Additionally, the global dominance of traditional yet hegemonic currencies has been challenged by competing currencies and digital cryptocurrencies, coinciding with the expansion of globalized network capitalism within the digital economy. Furthermore, the prevalence of offensive realism in world politics has led to a quantitative and qualitative expansion of arms trade and the demonopolization of weapons of mass destruction and advanced missile-based weapons, resulting in an increase in deterrence and defense capabilities of world countries.These conditions have significantly increased the costs and long-term consequences of hegemonic vertical control in the world-system. Consequently, during the transition away from the third cycle or American hegemony, the foreign and defense policy strategies of various countries are undergoing a reconfiguration, including regional and international coalitions and alliances, or individual national measures aimed at challenging and countering the unipolar and unilateralist world-system. It is anticipated that this process will immediately lead to the strengthened multiple and dispersed loci of geopolitical power across the entire world-system.

If the structures created in the third hegemonic cycle remain unchanged, they cannot reproduce and sustain hegemonic relations with a singular locus of systemic control in the post-American world-system. Therefore, the current world-system, in the process of transitioning to a possible fourth hegemonic cycle led by China, is undergoing a transformation—in terms of power morphology and the material structure of capitalism—to a flat multipolar formation that consists of multiple geopolitical power loci, counter-hegemonic regional and international coalitions, and dispersed spaces of global capital accumulation within a horizontal hegemonic system.

The formulation of macro policies, rooted in governments’ particular perceptions of identity components and their aspiration to expand such components as subjective interests, has consistently wielded significant influence over governments’ interactions within their respective environments. To this end, governments resort to the securitization of identity in foreign policy, often resulting in heightened divergence between countries and coercive reactions from other governments. Consequently, this process compels states to focus only on military security to safeguard their political existence, thus diverting attention away from the imperative task of advancing the objective development in the country. In this respect, the present research aimed to address how the securitization of identity in foreign policy contributes to the conflict between subjective and objective interests.

As a descriptive–analytical inquiry, the present study employed library resources and statistical data to address the research question.

The theory of securitization, as proposed by the Copenhagen school, posits that a political actor can reframe or construct certain phenomena as security threats, even though they may not inherently pose the smallest threat to their existential security. Securitization, discussed here in relation to the concept of identity, may legitimize the use of hard levers in foreign policy under the guise of maintaining security. However, a pertinent question arises as to why some world states seek to recast identity components as either non-security or security strategies to advance their foreign policy objectives. The question can be addressed within three decision-making approaches; globalization, reaction to humiliation, and metaphysical coercion. First, the globalization approach relies on employing soft power tools to influence global public opinion to accept the identity components championed by the actor state. The objective is to attract rather than coerce others into embracing the desired identity components. The second approach, namely reaction to humiliation, is akin to a kind of cultural revanchism. This approach seeks revenge for the past actions by certain governments against a nation or its current political elite, grounded in both security and non-security expansion of identity in foreign policy. Third, metaphysical coercion shapes the overarching framework of foreign policy based on the ruling elites’ specific perceptions of identity components. It aims to compel nations to adopt the identity conception deemed favorable by the rulers of a country.Therefore, the securitization of identity emerges as an overarching strategy within the metaphysical coercion, and a significant strategy within the reaction to humiliation. The globalization approach appears to lack a strategic utilization of securitization of identity in foreign policy. Moreover, it is possible to combine the approaches, as in coercive–reactive approach which labels its users as possessing conflicting identity at the international level.Conflicting identity refers to securitized cultural, social, and political identities that seek to forcefully supplant others by relying on a deterministic belief in one’s supernatural superiority. Consequently, such an identity, as a whole, becomes targets for coercive reactions from those who fear the erosion of their own identity foundations. Nazi Germany serves as an example of conflicting identity in the early 20th century. Nazi Germany resorted to securitization of metaphysical ideas as in ethnicity and race, and mixed them with post-Versailles humiliation, thus forging a kind of conflicting identity. However, the Nazi securitization process ultimately led to Germany’s defeat and the demise of the Nazi regime, as they sacrificed objective interests in pursuit of metaphysical ideals. A coercive–reactive approach, as discussed in the case of Nazi Germany, may initially rally public support for the government’s coercive measures, temporarily deferring internal discord and friction between them. However, the inevitability of friction, even despite its delay, pertains to the issue of objective development.Securitization of identity in foreign policy not only compels governments to allocate national resources to security and military efforts but also tarnishes the nation’s image on the global stage, leading to the severance or reduction of political andeconomicties and subsequent imposition of numerous sanctions. The prime examples are the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Political identity was the cornerstone of the Soviet Union’s resort to securitization in foreign policy. This entailed security-infused conceptions in foreign policy (e.g., mobilizing national resources for exporting the Marxist revolution), which in turn resulted in U.S. sanctions and economic stagnation of the Soviet Union, compared to its Western counterparts. Finally, this course of action seriously contributed to the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. Similarly, the security measures adopted by the People’s Republic of China also revolved around political identity. The Chinese approach involved the resource waste resulted from exporting the revolution to Third World countries, and the ensuing exclusionary actions by other countries (e.g., in the case of the U.N. seat). This evidently led to the stagnation in terms of objective development. However, with the ascent of Deng Xiaoping to power, the securitization of identity was phased out from China’s foreign policy agenda, and developmentalism has become the country’s primary strategy.As evidenced by these cases, the securitization of identity in foreign policy would inevitably lead to political, economic, social, and cultural deadlocks. Those who adopt this strategy are eventually compelled to acknowledge failure and retreat from their fundamental principles.

Securitization of identity in foreign policy, whether rooted in metaphysical coercion, reaction to humiliation, or their combination, will inevitably result in a conflict between subjective and objective interests. This conflict arises due to the depletion of national resources, the exclusionary reactions of other countries, and the imposition of objective pressures on society. Broadly speaking, relying on securitization of identity across all administrative levels, including foreign policy, skews the epistemic validity of actions towards ideological biases, thus neglecting human reason. Consequently, securitization of identity for legitimizing coercive measures across various domains only ensures the subjective security perceived by the government internally, albeit for a limited duration.