فصلنامه روش شناسی علوم انسانی
پیاپی 119 (تابستان 1403)

Management researchers have different ontological assumptions. Critical analysis of these assumptions is necessary. This article discussed the possibility of influencing the ontology of Transcendent Theosophy (al-hikmat al-muta’āliyah) on the fields of organization and management studies. Regarding the being of management, we are faced with two imaginary entities: the being of management, which is an imaginary category, and the addition of this category to duty, responsibility, and authority, which is abstracted from concrete examples of managerial behavior. These categories come into being following expedients that have been discovered by the theoretical wisdom, and to realize it, the practical knowledge along with the will, begins to forge imaginary in the name of management and organization. The requirement of such an imagination is formative intervention from the management position. Management interventions that appear in behaviors and under various concepts are limited and distinct facts. These distinctions go back to the existence of behaviors and, according to mental analysis; they represent two dimensions, fundamental and non-fundamental. Fundamental is the existence of objective behaviors and non-fundamental is the things that cause the formation of distinct concepts of behaviors. Spirituality and stability in religious belief is a way to return to the fundamental fact, which leads to a superior perception and finally a return to the self-high national politics from a philosophical point of view.Management knowledge is built upon diverse ontological assumptions, necessitating critical examination. This paper investigates the potential influence of transcendent theosophy (al-hikmat al-muta’āliyah) ontology on organizational and management studies.Issue: The ontology of management deals with two conceptual categories: Management Category: This category is added to the duties, responsibilities, and authorities abstracted from concrete instances of managerial behavior. Organization Category: This category is perceived as a container and context for achieving management goals.Approach: This paper analyzes the ontology of management based on Transcendent Wisdom. In this regard, concepts such as "interests," "theoretical intellect," "practical intellect," "will," "constitutive interventions," "essence of behaviors," "mental analysis," "authenticity and inauthenticity," "spirituality," and "sustainability" are examined. Management and organization categories are conceptual entities constructed in pursuit of interests discovered by the theoretical intellect and aimed at their realization by the practical intellect and will. Managerial interventions, manifested in various behaviors and concepts, represent limited and distinct truths. Distinctions among these truths stem from the essence of behaviors and reflect mental analysis and the differentiation between authentic and inauthentic dimensions. Authenticity pertains to the essence of objective behaviors, while inauthenticity refers to the characteristics that shape distinct conceptualizations of behaviors. Spirituality and sustainability in religious belief provide a path to return to authentic essence and superior perception, ultimately leading to a transcendent political order from a philosophical perspective. The ontology of transcendent wisdom can enrich the theoretical foundations of management and offer a novel paradigm for Islamic management. According to limitations of positivist ontology, which underpins much of management theory in fully comprehending the nature of behavioral entities, it argues that the perceived constraints and limitations of behavioral entities stem from the limitations of theoretical wisdom that govern practical wisdom and will.The static and deficient nature of behaviors often portrayed in management theories, from a transcendent ontology perspective, reflects a regression to static and deficient actions in the behavioral interactions of the human soul. This regression, in turn, has implications for the behavioral consequences of these interactions.The limitations of positivist ontology confine behavioral findings to a horizontal progression, rather than a vertical ascent in the levels of existence. The evolution of management and organizational theories, while incorporating insights from transcendent ontology, remains largely confined to this horizontal progression. From the perspective of transcendent ontology, the powerful, pure, and complete essence of existence is never separated from the seemingly limited and deficient essences. These essences are enveloped and intertwined within that superior and authentic existence. The more attention these essences shift from the deficiencies of their limited level of existence to the superior attributes of higher existence, the more their level of existence intensifies, and they can better represent their true position in existence. Consequently, they become more complete, resolute, and aware expressions of their existence.Management interventions and behaviors, as manifestations of absolute existence in action, are imbued with life, growth, power, and will. These behavioral attributes enable human beings to progress and develop. Every behavior and intervention, by its existence, exhibits life, power, knowledge, and will. It is an organizational transformation through vertical and horizontal ontological progression. This organizational transformation entails a dual process of progression. Vertical ontological progression upward movement involves transcending the limitations of each level of existence and ascending towards higher levels of intensity, perfection, and completeness. Also horizontal ontological progression entails moving from one veil of existence to another, gradually shedding limitations and gaining deeper insights. Theoretical wisdom plays a crucial role in uncovering this expansive existence, while practical wisdom, guided by will, serves as the driving force for translating theoretical insights into tangible actions. Within this framework, management is viewed not merely as a set of administrative tasks but as a transformative force capable of shaping an organization's trajectory toward its ultimate purpose. Through deliberate interventions and actions, management can guide an organization towards a state of "perfect governance" or "total annihilation”.As the organization progresses along these paths of transformation, it becomes a manifestation of the Divine Names. These Divine Names represent the attributes and actions of God, such as power, knowledge, life, and will. These attributes, ultimately united under the comprehensive Divine Name "The Living, the Self-Subsisting", become embodied in the organization's functioning and the behaviors of its agents.The Islamic Management Paradigm, rooted in transcendent ontology, offers a profound perspective on management as a transformative force capable of guiding organizations towards a state of alignment with higher levels of existence and becoming a manifestation of Divine Names. This transformative journey requires a deep understanding of the expansive nature of existence, the interplay between theoretical and practical wisdom, and the conscious pursuit of vertical and horizontal ontological progression.

Some economic policies, such as income policies, are expected to create changes in the distribution or redistribution of income, which are called welfare needs, such as improving the condition of the poor and reducing the wealth and income of some people in society. Welfare requirements are discussed and investigated in economic knowledge related to social welfare. These requirements are completely intertwined with moral values ​​and theories.The history of using moral theories in welfare economics goes back to Pigou's initiative to introduce Bentham's utilitarianism into his theory of welfare economics. After him, doubts were raised about the competence of economists to enter the normative realm and judgment about welfare situations, as a result of which some tried to free the area of ​​welf  are economics from normative discussions by focusing on Pareto optimality; but by inventing the social welfare function, Bergson showed that it is possible to introduce normative ethics theories into welfare economics in such a way that it does not harm its science and can support normative welfare policies. One of the most important and famous theories of normative ethics borrowed from the philosophy of ethics to be included in the function of social welfare is the theory of utilitarianism. This moral theory has been accepted as the main subject in the welfare function of utilitarians, but despite the application of the utilitarian moral point of view in the social welfare function, the relationship between this moral issue and the social welfare function is still not very clear; therefore, it seems that clarifying the concepts and the characteristics of the utilitarian moral theory and the social welfare function, as an introduction and explanation of how to apply the utilitarian moral theory in the utilitarian welfare function, is one of the essential topics that will be examined in this essay.

Social welfare functions are presented as mathematical functions in related works; on the other hand, utilitarianism is described descriptively as a normative theory in moral philosophy. This duality in the method made it very difficult for the author to present an article about "the investigation of the application of the moral theory of consequentialism in the social welfare function of utilitarians". Therefore, inevitably, the main elements of the social welfare function had to be changed from a mathematical expression to a descriptive one, so that uniformity in the method would occur, and as a result, it would be possible to communicate between these two different issues. After changing the mathematical expression to a descriptive one, with analysis and accuracy in the concepts of social welfare function as an economic topic and utilitarianism as a theory in normative ethics, the relationship between the two became possible and the discussion about this application was completed.

There are many ambiguities in the research about the application of consequentialism in the utilitarian social welfare function. This article clears the most important ambiguities as follows:* Social welfare functions are directly related to utilitarianism, in which the criterion of the goodness of an action is the result that reaches the general human beings, and since consequentialism is a broader concept than utilitarianism and ultimatum is a broader concept than consequentialism, it is indirectly related to both.* Social welfare functions are normative and are related to normative ethics. The independent variable in these functions consists of the welfare status of all members of the society. The dependent variable is the desired "social welfare" in a society, which must be provided for the society. The relationship in this function states: how much change in the social welfare will be caused by any change in the existing welfare status of the members of the society.* Utilitarianism in Pigou's welfare economy can act as utilitarianism; but at the same time, considering the rule of diminishing final utility, he has turned to the rule of utilitarianism.* Act utilitarianism, as opposed to rule utilitarianism, can be interpreted both in an egoistic way and in otheristic and holistic ways.* In moral philosophy, utilitarianism refers to its holistic type. Holistic utilitarianism deals with the well-being of all members of society or related intelligent people; of course, considering the welfare of the whole society does not mean that there is no need to consider the welfare of individual people at all.* The function of social welfare is different from the function of happiness. The function of happiness in utilitarianism is individual, but the utilitarian social welfare function deals with changes in the preferences of all members of the society, and the agent is not taken into account.

The application of the moral theory of consequentialism in the social welfare function of utilitarians is explained in this way that in the dependent variable of this function, the welfare of the whole society is introduced as a valuable and moral goal, and in this way, it will be related to the moral theory of utilitarianism in moral philosophy. As a result of this relationship, the social welfare function of utilitarians is normative. In this case, it is recommended to the policymakers and implementers of the welfare policies of the society to create it for the society. In this function, the moral action is that the utility of poor people should be increased, but the moral justification of the goodness of such an increase is that by increasing the utility of the poor, the utility of the whole increases more.The independent variable and the relationship between the independent and dependent variables in each welfare function do not express the moral goal; rather, their relationship with ethics depends on the dependent variable. For example, in the welfare functions of utilitarians, it is said that the welfare of poor people (independent variable) should be morally increased. This statement is based on the fact that the function relationship states: that increasing the welfare of poor people increases the total welfare that is related to the dependent variable more than when the welfare of the rich increases.Acknowledgment: We would like to thank Dr. Gilak as the respected supervisor of this project, and Dr. Alizadeh and Dr. Rafiei Atani as critics, as well as the respected officials of the Research Institute of the Hawzah and University, who made this research possible with their great help.

Genealogy and research methods derived from it, such as discourse analysis, have become widely used today, and many social issues and phenomena are studied through this approach. On the other hand, this method is not compatible with the Islamic tradition and leads to methodological relativism. In this article, we intend to examine and criticize Foucault's genealogical method by using the comparative method, from the perspective of the Islamic tradition and relying on Hamid Parsania's fundamental methodology.

Genealogy of  Michel Foucault: 

After the archaeological method and influenced by Nietzsche, Foucault proposed genealogy. In this method, based on two components of "historicity" and "power," Foucault explains the formation of physical phenomena, social structures, andscientific systems throughout history. Historicity for Foucault means the absence of a final purpose or a universal and specific future for history; thus, his account of history focuses on the present moment. He refers to the past in light of the present moment, and since the present moment, in his view, is not bound to any eternal necessity, the past is also characterized by discontinuities and lacks inherent continuity. In this perspective, knowledge and the formation of history and scientific systems are products of chance and "difference," while in the Islamic tradition, the validity of scientific theories depends on the idea of "identity" and the overall unity of history.Furthermore, for Foucault, power is both a product and a producer of history and thus, objects fundamentally form within the texture of power relations. In this view, power is not an entity or truth that can be possessed, but rather a fluid and diffuse phenomenon, lacking essence or substance. Power is the factor that creates differences between objects, and the distinction and identity of any object or discourse emerge from power relations. History, in this sense, is the field where the rituals of power operate, and consequently, humanity moves from one form of domination to another. One of the key elements of power in the genealogical method is its close connection with knowledge and epistemic systems. Accordingly, knowledge is no longer an eternal and external truth free from historical contingencies. Instead, it is the result of being embedded within a network of power relations, shaped through discourses. We encounter regimes of truth, which are products of power relations in each era. According to the relationship between power and knowledge in Foucault's genealogy, power is not exercised without knowledge, and power is also the source of knowledge. The genealogical method, in the continuation of the sociology of knowledge perspectives, does not assign any role to traditional metaphysics in the formation of scientific theories and views knowledge and science as purely historical and social phenomena, products of power relations.

Parsania's fundamental methodology, which is derived from the principles of Islamic philosophy, seeks to explain the interaction between the fixed and eternal principles of a scientific theory on one hand and its variable and historical elements on the other. This methodology, while considering the changing historical conditions, also pays attention to the core and fixed essence of each theory and its connection to an objective, eternal and per se truth. The fundamental methodology, by relying on a set of philosophical premises upon which a scientific theory is based, provides a framework for the formation of knowledge. This methodology discusses three realms: the first realm is the per se truth of a theory, which is beyond history and metaphysical and does not change over time or with individuals or societies. The second realm examines the theory within the context of the knowledge and awareness of the scholar, which is the scholar's subjective world, receiving per se truths. Finally, the third realm is the realm where the scientific theory is validated in the social andhistorical world. In summary, the first realm is the logical and epistemic world, the second is the existential dimension of the scholar, and the third is the world of society, history, and culture.Comparative assessment of two methods In light of the concept of historicity, the third realm in fundamental methodology is the realm that connects with genealogy and addresses the process of epistemic change. However, the critical and fundamental distinction between it and Foucault's genealogical method is that while it acknowledges historical multiplicity, it remains bound to metaphysics. Parsania, by considering humans as an intermediate species, believes that under this intermediate species, numerous and diverse final species can shape different social worlds and histories. Therefore, the possibility of various forms of social and historical worlds is provided under the metaphysical necessity of humanity. Furthermore, by employing Allameh Muhammad Hossein Tabatabaei's theory of "Validities (E`etebariat)", Parsania considers the attributions of social knowledge to be bound to metaphysical principles. Hence, he explains the plurality of social worlds in light of the graded unity of existence. At the end of this article, with reference to the concept of power in Islamic philosophy, especially as defined by Mulla Sadra, and its distinction from the theologians' understanding of power, we demonstrate how the concept of power in transcendent wisdom can explain both divine metaphysical power and human power. According to the definition provided by Muslim philosophers, power is "the existence of the agent such that if he/she wills, he/she acts, and if he/she does not will, he/she does not act". In this definition, power, as a divine attribute, is defined with reference to the best possible system and, therefore, does not conflict with divine knowledge. On the other hand, since power in this definition is a conditional proposition, the non-fulfillment of an action due to human power does not negate the necessity of divine action and power. In conditional propositions, the truth of the proposition depends not on the truth of the premise or conclusion, but on their interconnection. Given the definition of humans as relational beings in transcendent wisdom, human power is always dependent on and based on knowledge. In this view, human power may not be realized, but the eternal necessity of divine power is not negated, and power may or may not correspond to divine power without detracting from it. In contrast, In Foucault's view of and his genealogical method, human power, being contingent solely on human conditions, cannot correspond to per se truths. Thus, with the denial of human power’s realization, history is subject to rupture. For this reason, Foucault necessarily believes in the rupture of historical discourses and cannot consider an eternal and fixed criterion for historical changes.

In Foucault's genealogy, due to the negation of the metaphysical realm and the historical fluidity of power, there is no longer any per se reference to define science based on the idea of ​​correspondence and identity, but the idea of ​​"difference" of discourses has determined the existence of things and consequently, from an epistemological point of view, the most important feature will be the identification and distinction of one scientific theory from another. On the other hand, Parsania's fundamental methodology tries to pay attention to the constitutive role of the metaphysics (and not its regulative) in the formation of a scientific theory, and also pay attention to the role and influence of social and historical contexts (second and third world) in the process of genesis of science. According to the definition of these two components (history and power) in the fundamental methodology, it is possible to redefine a kind of genealogy according to Islamic wisdom and use it in social research.

Contemporary social sciences is incapable of catching and explaining complex and ever-changing collective relationships constantly if they don’t invest enough in generating new and innovative conceptual and methodological manners. Featuring the emergence of new trends, and phenomena, and the increasing complexity, relations of all kinds in contemporary society remind us of the need for methodological innovations. So, methodological interventions in order to carry out inter and trans-disciplinary searches justify their necessity among other things, due to the increasing globalization of local relations, which Giddens understands as a shift in time-space relations (Giddens 1401), the emergence of hybrid phenomena developing from complex relations between interpersonal elements and continuing to reproduce new connections and constructive nodes (Latour, 1993), and the highly dynamic, transformative, liquid and emergent nature of phenomena in late modernity (Bauman, 2000). Especially the latter makes it necessary to adopt methodological approaches that emphasize social dynamics rather than social statics, leading to understanding the fugitive, complex, and ever-changing phenomena that we engage in our social life increasingly. All these urge us to take into account relations in their own terms as an appropriate way of capturing new conditions.

In this respect, this article uses the method of “text analysis” and extends the interpretative-analytical method developed by Rainer Keller in the sociology of knowledge (Keller, 1402; Tawakol and Manouri, 1395), pursuing two interrelated goals: 1) developing the theoretical foundations and perspectives of qualitative research (hermeneutics of social sciences and sociology of knowledge), and by doing so 2) making the possible linkage between qualitative research and established discussions and deepening the qualitative methods of social research within the purview of qualitative paradigm (cf. Keller, 1402: 81 ff.).

 This article indicated that the relational approach is an appropriate method to understand social dynamics under the ever-changing and globalized conditions of late modern society. It also discussed that the relational approach is characterized by certain qualities, including anti-authoritative, context-sensitive (context orientation), valuation of the researcher's experiences in diagnosing and solving problems, and the suitability of the methodological approach for inter-and trans-disciplinary studies. To further explain the proposed method and provide a basis for future theoretical discussions and empirical applications, this article first highlighted the importance of emphasizing relationships in the social sciences for understanding and analyzing social dynamics. It then explained the ontological and epistemological foundations of the approach under discussion and also neglected some criticisms worthy of mention. In the relational approach "relations" is determined as the unit of its analysis, therefore, as an appropriate logic of explanation for the relational research approach, here was introduced deductive reasoning developed by Charles S. Peirce. Finally, some consequences of the application of the relational method for the pathology and social criticism of today's modern society were discussed.

Understanding emerging, hybrid, and globalized phenomena that occur in changing social contexts, social research must be open to new, hybrid, and multidisciplinary methods as well. This relational approach which starts from relations and their connections, presupposes a kind of flat ontology that avoids essentialism, which turns it into an anti-authoritarian method that grants no privilege to dualism and hierarchical order in understanding social phenomena. By adopting "relations" as the unit of analysis, additionally, this approach can go beyond the spectrums that are formed in the social sciences according to the two poles of individual/collective and/or agent/structure. The emphasis on relationships also opens up social analysis to the relationships between the human and non-human worlds and allows us to include the world of things (Dingwelt) in social analysis. Therefore, a kind of relational analysis is appropriate for a world that is increasingly characterized by the multiplicity of hybrids. Furthermore, this article proposes abductive logic as a suitable inference method for the relational method. This method is not only sensitive to the context of the reasoning processes but also opens the way for empiricism and direct and diverse forms of engagement of researchers in the research field. This point enriches the critical aspect of the relational approach, which determines the type of relationship we have with ourselves and others (animate and inanimate world), as well as the possible transformation of our future, based on how we are being in the world. In adopting a relational approach, the researcher cannot be untouched and uninvolved in the human and inhuman world around him, thus, at the end of the research, the researcher(s) and their subject(s) of research(s) would be altered than their initial state.

In recent years, the concept of time and space in human interaction has been disappearing, leading to an increase in the application of quantum theory in the analysis of political, social, and economic phenomena. However, the use of quantum theory in social sciences has been primarily instrumentalist in nature. For a quantum theory to be truly useful in social sciences, it must cover the theoretical gaps within the field. The application of quantum theory in social sciences will be useful when it can cover the theoretical gaps in it. One of the most significant theoretical gaps of social sciences over the last century has been the lack of consensus on the method of studying social phenomena; resulting in the formation of different of various paradigms and methods to study it. This article argues that the root cause of this lack of agreement lies in the concept of social reality; as it is not independent of the intentional actions of individuals. This raises the question of why social sciences, unlike classical natural sciences, are dependent on the intentional actions of individuals. To answer this question, the article introduces an analytical framework called the “quantum phenomenological approach,” which is based on idealist interpretations of quantum theory. This approach allows for the inclusion of an individual's intentional actions in their decision-making process, resulting in a reconstruction of social reality in such a way that its relation is determined with the intentional actions from a first-person perspective. This approach assumes a primitive self-awareness for the quantum particle, where reality is considered as a combination of the wave function and its collapse; in a way that the cognition of the quantum particle, its intentionality, and its experience are considered as the wave function, the cause of the collapse and the process of wave function collapse, respectively. Similarly, a quantum model of an individual's decision-making process can be presented, incorporating his intentional actions (the cause of the collapse of the decision wave function) and the experimental background (the cause of the decision wave function). The most significant implication of this quantum model is that an individual's intentional behavior is certain from the first-person perspective and his decisions are optimal from his point of view at that moment, but inherently uncertain and unpredictable for an observer in the third person.Redefining the concept of social reality using the “quantum phenomenological approach” offers several advantages, including recognizing the individual's agency and intentionality in their decision-making system, acknowledging the ontological difference between cause and reason, and the possibility of integrating holistic and individualistic approaches in a different and novel way from the common approaches formed after the 1970s in social sciences. While the whole (wave function) has causal power in the “quantum phenomenological approach,” it only includes potential states and the real state emerges when the individual applies his (her) agency and the wave function collapses. Therefore it can be shown that the reality in social sciences, unlike the classical empirical and natural sciences, is dependent on the intentional actions of the individual. In the classical empirical sciences, the researcher studies an inanimate substance without agency and intentional action; therefore, from the first-person perspective, the quantum reality is the same as the classical reality. What remains is the cognition of a person as a third-person observer of that classical reality. If the classical reality experienced by the observer is considered a quantum entity, then the researcher's perception will be dependent on the empirical context. However, the researcher’s perception can be classified into two categories consistent and inconsistent experience according to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. In classical empirical sciences, by controlling and repeating physical and environmental conditions of the experiment, one can overcome the problem of dependence on the empirical context. Because the uncertainty in this science only originates from the observation of the researcher (quantum person), making the experience consistent could solve the problem, attribute stable quantitative and qualitative features to the observations.In contrast, in social sciences, the situation is much more complicated. In these sciences, the origin of uncertainty is not only due to the intentional actions of the observers and their perception’s dependence on the empirical context, but also the agency and intentionality of the participating individuals participating in the social phenomenon as reality. Therefore, in such a world, it will not be possible to define and recognize social concepts as a common reality due to the inherent uncertainty of an individual’s decisions for an observer in the third person. This means that the definition and recognition of social realities requires a prerequisite called the institution. In fact, in a quantum model, institutions are the wave functions of shared mental states between individuals to predict their behavior for others. While the process of observing in social sciences can also be divided into consistent and inconsistent experiences, it is not possible to control human environments similar to laboratory conditions to overcome the consequences of decision-making’s dependence on empirical context. As a result, the inconsistent experiences that occur in human environments can act as the primary destabilizer of previous institutions. In such a world, the indicators and concepts attributed to social realities, which have an institutional nature, will also be affected by the consequences of the primary destabilizer, creating the transition duration in institutional changes. Therefore, social realities do not have an objective nature as realists consider. Although the mind plays a fundamental role in the formation of reality, as the interpretivists see, reality is not completely mental in nature.In contrast to classical physics, which does not account for self-awareness as a natural, biological, and physical entity different from matter, quantum theory introduces concepts such as entanglement and non-locality. The concepts have been experimentally confirmed through Bell's Delayed-Choice experiments, providing the possibility of considering subatomic particles as possessing a primitive form of mentality and self-awareness.This shift toward physicalizing consciousness without it being considered as a byproduct of classical matter has significant implications for the social sciences, potentially allowing for a return to the philosophy of consciousness rather than the philosophy of language. From the analytical framework of this research, language can also be seen as a potential whole (wave function) that is actualized through individual agency by speech. Additionally, the “quantum phenomenological approach” does not allow for the existence of abstract and transcendental rationality, as rationality is only meaningful within the context of experience. This also means rejecting the claims of critical realists such as Bhaskar and Popper, who argue that mankind's understanding of reality is based on systematic error. Similarly, Habermas perspective is also rejected due to his insistence on general and universal criteria for understanding reality. While human beings do not make a systematic error in recognizing reality, his (her) perception of reality is still relative and dependent on time and place.

The concept of hegemony and post-hegemony in the sciences is directly socially recognized and activities are defined according to the field and national context. Hegemony refers to a situation in which a temporary coalition of some social groups becomes the total social authority over other groups. Gramsci believes that the leading theory in this field is that the ruling groups must consider the cause to achieve a logical equilibrium. Lash is also an important researcher in the field of post-hegemony and has changed the description of power that challenges the concept of hegemony. In this article, the views of Gramsci and Lash are compared in terms of historical background, theoretical views, the nature of power, cultural dynamics, and mechanisms of domination with the method of comparing library documents and other types of documents. Modern developments have affected the foundations of power and hegemony and have become thecauses of emergence of dynamics that have emerged from hegemony and post-hegemony. Hegemony is the dominance of class ideologies at the borders. At the same time, post-hegemony is the fluidity of power relations and the role of active individuals and communities in resistance and creativity.1. IntroductionHegemony is a concept that is widely recognized and used in the social and human sciences, with different and sometimes contradictory interpretations depending on the field and national context. At the beginning of the 21st century, the relevance and coherence of the concept of hegemony was examined. Various theories of "post-hegemony" have emerged that attempt to provide a realistic political analysis that hegemony once offered. The most important theorist in the field of post-hegemony is Scott Lash. Lash believes that hegemony often works through "symbolic order". This presupposes a high degree of domination by the unconscious. The purpose of this article is to provide a general assessment of "Hegemony as seen by Antonio Gramsci, especially from the book (Prison Notebooks)" and "Post-hegemony as seen by Scott Lash, especially In the article (Power after Hegemony).2. Literature Review2.1. Antonio GramsciGramsci, like many theorists of his time, tried to correct the Marxist rules. He believed that culture has relative independence and that the development of thoughts and ideas or intellectual superstructures can simultaneously change both the mode of production and the intellectual superstructures of society. This happens through the forces of government. The ruling class can secure consensus on its power through ideological means. According to Gramsci, this is necessary for the hegemony of civil society and he sets it against the repressive government. Gramsci refers to the hegemonic means of television channels, the family, schools, churches, newspapers, etc., which connect people to the ruling power instead of oppressing them. According to him, oppression and domination belong to the government, but hegemony is specific to civil society. (Anderson 1976:53).2.2. Scott LashThe post-hegemony in Lash's theories emphasizes the decentralized and dispersed nature of contemporary society. It challenges traditional concepts of power and control and moves beyond the idea of a dominant hegemony to show how cultural, social, and economic forces operate in fluid ways. Lash's work focuses on the rise of information technologies and their impact on social structures, highlighting the shift from stable hierarchies to dynamic, self-organizing systems. In the post-hegemonic era, the concept is immediate and values and realities are presented to us as raw sensory data. Post-hegemony is better understood under the term "communication". Finally, the positivism of the age of hegemony gives way to post-hegemonic empiricism. (Scott Lash: 2007)3. MethodologyThe method of the present study is studying the documents that were used to collect data from various databases. Recent books and articles, reference works, and articles written by theorists were used to collect accurate and unambiguous data.4. Discussion and ResultsGramsci developed the concept of hegemony based on the role of culture and ideology in maintaining the ruling class’s power. Hegemony is exercised through consent rather than coercion, and cultural institutions and media play an important role in this regard. Subordinate groups can challenge power structures through cultural and social resistance.About the fragmentation and decentralization of power in contemporary society, Lash has proposed the concept of post-hegemony. In post-hegemony, power is distributed across different places and networks, digital media and globalization play an important role, and different actors control and compete for power.5. ConclusionDespite their similarities, Gramsci's and Lash's theories on power and hegemony have important differences. Gramsci, a Marxist philosopher, proposes the concept of hegemony, according to which the ruling class maintains its ideological power through cultural institutions and the media. He points to the role of centralized institutions and the influence of ruling class ideologies in social control.Lash introduces the concept of post-hegemony, which deals with the dynamics of power in the digital age. He argues that power in contemporary societies is dispersed and fluid, exercised through networks and digital platforms. These developments offer new spaces for resistance and creativity and challenge the dominant ideology or ruling class.To summarize, the comparison between Gramsci's hegemony and Lash's post-hegemony shows important changes in the way power is distributed and exercised. Gramsci emphasizes control by centralized institutions, while Lash emphasizes the dispersion of power and the active role of individuals and communities in the digital age. Post-hegemony offers new insights into the challenges and opportunities of social change in the face of decentralization and greater individual agency.