مجله تاملات فلسفی
پیاپی 1 (بهار 1388)

Al-Farabi and Avicenna have enumerated so many kinds of conditionals and produced a massive literature in their successors’ works. Two important kinds are the “cogent” and the “contingent,” which, in turn, are divided into more particular varieties. In this paper, I consider the “cogent conditional” and some kinds thereof. Four significant discussions here are:1. the cogent conditional’s relation to the contingent conditional and to the general condition,2. analysis of the kinds of the cogent conditional, 3. logical analysis of cogent conditional and of its kinds in Modern Logic and representing the relation between cogency and necessity, 4. the truth conditions of cogent conditional.In the recent decades, the logical analysis of the cogent conditionals and their truth-conditions has been widely discussed. But the discussions have generally been fulfilled in different ways, which are sometimes inconsistent with each other. It has even been proposed to use three-valued tableaux to analyze the cogent conditionals. In this paper, I will quote the key phrases from Ancient Logic to criticize the contemporaries’ analyses and thereby to introduce mine.

This paper is concerned with analysis of neopragmatist attitude of Richard Rorty about objective truth. According to Rorty, the aim of inquiry is not discovering of "objective truth "as considered by previous thinkers. Rorty believed that conceptions like Truth, Reality and Realism are similar conceptions. Hence rejecting objective truth requires the rejection of realism. Objective truth in metaphysics has been described as ahuman and ahiostorical features. Therefore, Rorty believes that the aim of inquiry is empowerment of human situation and creation of solidarity and untimely intersubjectivity agreement. But this article wants to show that the solidarity and intersubjectivity agreement have some features which objective truth has them.

Present century is distinguished from other centuries by its Information-Technology character. It is easy to see with wonder how Information-Technology has reduced the world to a global village through internet, satellite, and so on. Therefore, the question is that whether in such a world –global village-moral values are workable and possible? Religious education, in general, aims at producing desired changes in new generation. This goal was always fulfilled through building limited condition and making barriers. In present century it is impossible to keep new generation away from other cultures due to Information-Technology. It means in global village, making barriers does not work, and in such a world how one can educate religion? The aim of this paper is to display the role of religious education in global village by giving a spiritual notion of humanity.

God's attributes is one of the crucial issues in theology. This is being discussed in two aspects: the relation of attributes to God's essence, and the relation of different attributes with each other. The question, on one hand, is whether or not God possesses any attribute, and on the other hand, it can be questioned what is the relation between attribute themselves. The traditional answers in this regard are divided into two approaches, agnosticism and anthropomorphism. However, both approaches face some problems. In this paper, it will be attempted to show that how philosopher's explanation of God's attributes puts them into trouble, and will be argued that both approaches to God's attributes are faced with some problems.

Whereas Plato believes that the soul belongs to another world and defines it as an order different from the body, Aristotle whose opinion were more concentrated on the disquisition and state of real function of creatures of this world, had emphasizes on announcing his idea about the essence and nature of the creatures. Similarly, he had analyzed the living creatures in the soul definition and described it as the form of the body. Platonous believes, Soul is a part of an entire soul and factor of the triple Aghanim which its one side is faced to the territory of the Nous and the other side is tends to the material world and body, in the other world, it is the ring of the connection of the spiritual and material world. Ibn Sina's base of his religious beliefs for proving spiritual immortality of Soul in defines Soul as abstract and as the perfection of the body. The concepts proposed by Platonous and sages of ancient Persia about Soul, were the revelation for Suhrawardi, the Ishragh sect philosopher of the Islamic world to know it moral and the Anvare Modire phenomena and called as the light of Eshbbodies which is responsible for controlling the body. All mentioned philosophers faced to the some difficulties and paradoxes in the way of defining the relation of Soul with the body. Therefore, Mulla Sadra affected from previous thinkers and based on his vital innovations in existence precedes essence in a new way, which in addition of being true and strong, it is free of regarding problems.

This paper undertakes a conceptual examination of the separation between religion and politics that has become a defining feature of most contemporary nation-states. Underlying this separation, and most definitions of the political and the religious that are produced in modern thought, are a set of dichotomies between the natural and the supernatural, the profane and the sacred, and the immanent and the transcendent, where the religious is considered in contrast to the public, secular and mundane. This paper proposes to call the distinction between the political and the religious into question, since both consist in directing attention. Instead, it proposes that a more fundamental dichotomy lies between intrinsic and extrinsic modes of evaluation: where religious life responds to what is taken as intrinsically valuable, secular thought responds to representations of what others take as valuable. The primary medium for the representation of secular values in the modern world is money. Nevertheless, since most money is created as debt, it functions in practice as an obligation, as if it represented intrinsic values. The result is a direct conflict between religious and economic values. The example of money, insofar as it results in the giving of attention, illustrates how even the most secular phenomena may be at once political and religious.

Given our natural proclivity towards intolerance and the harmful consequences that result, is there a way to view religious and moral diversity as goods? That is, are religious and ethical diversity so good that any civil society should tolerate them? Would it be better if everyone were somehow or other persuaded or forced to agree about fundamental moral and religious ideas? In this essay I shall defend the epistemic and moral goods of moral and religious diversity and, therefore, of the importance of the virtue of tolerance.