فصلنامه ذهن
سال بیست و پنجم شماره 1 (پیاپی 97، بهار 1403)

The issue of this article is to introduce the general field of science and religion and explain its importance. For this purpose, after defining the desired meanings for "science", "religion" and "theology", we address the question "Why does theology relate to science?". After that, we will describe the various stages that non-sensory knowledge will enter into the process of scientific theorizing, and in this section, we will refer to some of the accepted theses of the philosophy of science of the second half of the 20th century. Then, we will define naturalism and show its place as one of the irreplaceable foundations of the modern experimental science, and we will depict the theological consequences of its acceptance. Finally, looking at the contrast of naturalism with theism on the one hand and the falseness of naturalism on the other hand, we will establish the necessity of a monotheistic worldview in the process of understanding nature.

Belief in the substantiality of the human soul is a fundamental point of view for Ibn Sina and is considered one of the foundations of Ibn Sina’s anthropology. The issue of the substantiality of the soul is fundamental for Ibn Sina, because it justify the issue of the immortality of the human soul, and for this reason, he defends this doctrine in detail and citing several types of reasons. Instead, most of the contemporary views in the philosophy of mind deny the substantiality of the soul and consider it as a property derived from physiological and brain processes. Although Avicenna's main reason for the separation of the soul is based on the distinction of intellectual perception from other bodily processes, at the same time, by utilizing other proofs and by using the phenomenological approaches of perceptions and reflection on the relationship between the soul and the body, he also defend the separation and substantiality of the soul and uses this in the construction of the famous proof of the man suspended in space and has benefited from this kind of experimental evidence. In this article, while introducing Ibn Sina's point of view, his arguments are examined from a comparative point of view, taking into account the contemporary views of philosophy of mind and advances in biological and neuroscience, and this teaching will be critically examined.

One of the divisions of knowledge proposed in Mulla Sadra’s Philosophy is its division to simple and compound. In his philosophy,this division corresponds to the same division of ignorance. As he occasionally addresses in his works, simple knowledge is a kind of knowledge in which someone knows something without being conscious of his knowledge and its object, while compound knowledge is a kind of knowledge in which the knower knows something and is conscious of his knowledge and its object. In this paper, in the context of discovery we have used the method of content analysis and in the context of justification the method of conceptual and rational analysis of ontological and epistemological foundations. Our aim is to answer this main question that what is simple and compound Knowledge, and what are the origins and capacities of this division, based on Mulla Sadra’s philosophical bases. We have shown that although this division is one of Mulla Sadra's innovations, its roots are found in Avicenna’s thought, specifically the distinction he makes between consciousness and consciousness of consciousness. In the second part, it has been presented that this division has capabilities to explain some of the most important philosophical topics, including the innate knowledge (ilm fetri) and the knowledge of corporeal beings. Besides, this division has the capacity for conducting comparative philosophical studies in some areas related to the consciousness studies in the contemporary philosophy of mind, including the levels of self-consciousness and the difference between conscious and unconscious mental states.

According to the most important explanationist view in epistemic support, the doxastic attitude to a proposition is epistemologically justified for one Provided that the doxastic attitude fits the evidence that one has. Different theories attempt to answer this question that a doxastic attitude under what conditions fit the evidence and reasons that one has. In this article, I discuss explanationist fit view about epistemic support According to this view, p fits S’s evidence, e, at t iff either p is part of the best explanation available to S at t for why S has e or p is available to S as a logical consequence of the best explanation available to S at t for why S has e. After explaining this view, while expressing and evaluating its most important problems, I show that this view can be defended in epistemic support.Keywords: justification, epistemic support, McCain, best explanation, explanationist fit.

Focusing the breath on a particular subject is one of the most interesting axes in self-research. In the process of focusing the active ego, it focuses all its attention in a central and focal point, and for this purpose it must avoid the distribution of its perceptual and stimulating powers; therefore, the focus is compatible with unity and contradicts plurality. On the other hand, some strong souls are empowered while enjoying a high concentration on various activisms, and have become the manifestation of "the absence of dignity as dignity"; the main question is with what analysis can we create a consensus between the concentration of the ego that requires "unity" and the carrying out of a particular action with the various actions of some people? How do "concentration" and "plurality" come together together? This research is the rational-analytical burden of solving this problem. In the light of intrinsic evolution, the human self achieves a degree of vitality and population of power which becomes a mass of meanings and truths in a steady, at this stage the ego, while paying attention to its essence, contains a great deal of the truths of existence. In the light of the spontaneous movement of the ego,

In the view of cognitive linguists, Metaphor is called conceptual metaphor and its most important cognitive function, understanding abstract concepts through concrete concepts and can turn on the linguistic nature of religious texts which is very abstract and far from sensory experience based on objective concepts. the concept of divine mercy as one the abstract concepts in sahifa sajjadieh used in various metaphorical forms and reveals for reader its linguistic analysis, literary beauties and the view of imam Sajjad in connection with it. The present research was investigated ontological metaphors of concept of divine mercy in sahifa sajjadieh on this basis and with a descriptive-analytical method and in the light of the principles of Jackel's cognitive metaphor and reached that imam has used many fields of phenomenal or material metaphor (with the highest frequency: 50 percent),container metaphor, and recognition metaphor in order to explain the concept of mercy and has made his intended concepts understandable for reader in the form of sensations. Analysis of examined cases in sahifa sajjadieh is in harmony with of the principles of Jackel's cognitive metaphor (the ubiquity hypothesis, domain hypothesis, model hypothesis, uni directionality hypothesis, necessity hypothesis, creativity hypothesis, focusing hypothesis) and approves them .