نشریه جستارهایی در فلسفه و کلام
سال چهلم شماره 2 (پیاپی 81، پاییز و زمستان 1387)

Cosmological argument has been one of the most significant philosophical and theological arguments in religious traditions of different religions. In the western Theo-philosophical tradition, there have been both different interpretations and numerous criticisms presented about this argument. In this article, the most important of those arguments and their criticisms are both taken into consideration, and where necessary, the degree of validity of the criticisms has been pointed out, as well.

The misconception (shubha) of absolute nonexistent – which we have named as paradox – is not an amusing brainteaser; rather, it is one the significant epistemological issues. Its importance can be looked upon from two different viewpoints: research and educational. It is significant from the research viewpoint because it challenges propositions which constitute the foundation of our thinking and knowledge, propositions such as impossibility of contradiction, vicious circle, and endless chain. It is also significant from the educational viewpoint, since it has been dealt with in the two widely used texts Bidāya and Niḥāya, albeit very briefly. This very brevity and succinctness has been misleading so as it has put the philosophy students into difficulty and confusion and prompted some of the eminent contemporary philosophy researchers to accuse the author of these books as having uttered ramblings. For many years this issue has confounded the minds of many of the intellectuals and challenged them to try to find a solution for it. Ṣadr al-Muti’allihīn Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā) – the greatest intellectual of all ages and the unrivalled genius – has dealt with this paradox and the similar propositions in his unique treasure, Asfār, and proposed some solutions which can be traced back to the writings of others, as well. In this article, I first made a study of the background of the paradox of absolute nonexistent and delved into the paradoxes parallel to it in nature and destiny, and then clarified Mullā Ṣadrā's responses by exploring his words and indicated that he has given two responses in solving this paradox. Next, in light of these responses, I proceeded to reappraise ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī (ra)'s words in order to reveal that, although succinct and ambiguous, his words are far from being labeled as rambling. Finally, after giving a report and assessment of post-Mullā Ṣadrā researches, I picked out one of his two responses, as well as a solution by one of the intellectuals preceding him, which with certain rephrasing and restructuring, I regarded as qualified.

Most theologians, either Muslim or Christian, have sought to find a way in which an undersanding, however incomplete, of God would be possible. The Muslim philosophers have brought up gradational predicates and Saint Thomas Aquinas maintains that attributes are analogically attributed to God which is a borderline between the homonym and the univocal. With reference to various sources, the present article explicates the viewpoint of Aquinas in respect to analogy, then compares it with the current viewpoint of the Islamic philosophy, and finally critically reviews and evaluates it. It will further be noticed that the insistence on the subsumption of the analogy under homonym will leave the problem unresolved and understanding the attributes will still remain impossible; however, acceptance of a single meaning and admitting to its firmness and infirmity will not leave much of a difference between the analogy and equivocal predication common in Islamic philosophy.

Despite the fact that in classical Islamic philosophy, the discussions concerning the principality and mentally-positedness of existence and essence and epistemology have so far been regarded as two divergent and separate discourses, it is tried in this paper to stress the quite pivotal role of the epistemological viewpoint in adopting any of the two perspectives of the principality of existence or principality of essence through elucidating the fundamental and authentic relatedness of these two areas. In the first part of the paper, after unveiling the correlation between the supposition of essentialism and the conventional inference from science – i.e., belief in essential tautology – and statement of the incompatibility of the supposition of principality of essence with such inference and belief, especially the explication of the futility of the presented solutions in solving the doubts (shubhas) of mental existence, it is proven that adopting a new inference and pattern in knowledge (ma‘rifa) is necessary. In the next part, then, with a deliberation on the meaning of essence (māhiyya) and the essence of meaning, the dual, relational, and apparent reality of science is rationally explicated and analyzed. According to this new approach to the reality of science, which is rubricated as the theory of phenomenology of meaning, the divergence supposed to exist between principality of essence and principality of existence is refuted and admission to the principality of both is accepted. In the final part of the paper, the age-old problem of unity and multiplicity is dealt with and it is attempted, based on the theory of phenomenology of meaning, to uncover the hidden mystery of the horizontal multiplicity and semantic contradictions and to give befitting answers to the problems of mental existence.

This writing addresses Divine Will from the viewpoints of the two great philosophers, Ustād Muṭahharī and Spinoza. It aims at clarifying the similarities and discrepancies existing in their viewpoints concerning the question whether God has a Will or not; and in case He does, is His Will absolute and free? In this line, the article proceeds to compare the views of the two philosophers on the following issues: Divine Intellect, Divine Will, the relation of intellect and will to God, God's Power, the relation of free will to God or Divine Destiny and Providence, unfree agent (mūjab), necessary through the Other (wājib bi al-ghayr), God's free Will, God's Knowledge as being active.

In the second half of the 2nd/8th century, the Ismā‘īlī sect, who believed in the Imamate of Ismā‘īl, the second son of Imam Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq (A.S.), was formed. The Ismā‘īlīs brought up specific views concerning Imamate. From their point of view, the world of being can not survive a moment without the existence of an Imam and that mankind is always in need of a teacher, leader, and infallible Imam. The Ismā‘īlīs made great efforts to trace the existence of Imamate back to the beginning of creation. To this end, they presented special theories and interpretations of history and Prophethood.According to one of these theories human sacred history consists of seven periods during which mankind achieves perfection. Every period is formed by the emergence of a Prophet who is also called Nāṭiq along with his Waṣī (legatee) who is also called Ṣāmit (silent) or Asās (base). After them, seven Imams appear who attain Imamate one after another. Undoubtedly, Neo-Platonism has been influential in the formation of this idea.Nāṭiq is the medium for the revelation of ordinances from God to people; Asās is the authority for interpretation of the ordinances; and Imam expresses the interior and the exterior of sharī‘a (law).In the first six periods, Adam (A.S.), Noah (A.S.), Abraham (A.S.), Moses (A.S.), Jesus (A.S.), and Muḥammad (S.A.W.) were the law giving Prophets and with the coming of every new Nāṭiq the previous sharī‘a would have been abrogated. Of course, the ancient Ismā‘īlī sources were of divergent opinions on this issue.In order to better elucidate this issue, the Ismā‘īlīs have made specific esoteric interpretations of Imamate and the popularity of the number seven. This period of time, which is dedicated to each Nāṭiq, may be a period of manifestation or a period of concealment; moreover, it may be a greater period or a lesser period, each one of which is explained in detail in this article.The present article addresses this issue with the use of the ancient theological and historical sources of Ismā‘īlīs.

Attaining and understanding the truth will not be feasible except through mystical wayfaring, which would be possible only through assimilation into sharī‘a (religious law) and comprehension of its mysteries; the spiritual states and discourses of a sālik (mystical wayfarer) is the realization of this notion. In the course of writings by the dignitaries of knowledge and thought, the legacy of works on theoretical and practical wayfaring and spiritual journey are available like a radiating sun to those thirsty for the pure thoughts and those seeking to arrive at the fountainhead of truth. The sages and divinely endowed scholars have each stated a portion of these mysteries and tried to provide the interested seekers with rays of Divine Light which had radiated on their hearts; thus, leaving behind plenty of books on such issues as mysteries of sharī‘a, moralities, and theoretical and practical mysticism.Among these dignitaries, was the prominent mystic, Nūr al-Dīn Muḥammad Kāshānī, renowned as Nūr al-Dīn Akhbārī, belonging to the scholarly and mystic-nourishing household of Fayḍ Kāshānī and one of the disciples of Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshānī and ‘Allāma Majlisī, who like other friends of Allah were unknown on earth and well-known in heavens. Thus, given the importance and necessity of knowing these noble figures and editing their manuscript works to be presented to the cultural community which is rated among the genuine intellectual and ideological sources, it is attempted in the present article to give a brief biography of the above-mentioned scholar and an introduction and contextual analysis of the valuable and unsurpassed manuscript, Miṣafāt al-Ashbāḥ wa Mijalāt al-Arwāḥ, known as The Book of Thinking, from among the works of this divinely endowed scholar and prominent mystic, which I have edited myself as well.