نشریه جستارهایی در فلسفه و کلام
سال پنجاه و پنجم شماره 2 (پیاپی 111، پاییز و زمستان 1402)

Although the fourth dimension has gone beyond the boundaries of philosophy and is now a major concern in physics, the exact origins and history remain a mystery. Therefore, it should be investigated in the context of which philosophical problems of the Islamic world the fourth dimension was formed and then, how it developed. We will see that in the philosophical society of Iran, it has been traced back to Mullā Sadrā; we will show that, however, in the Islamic world prior to him, there are quite explicit statements in the works of Naṣīr al–Dīn Ṭūsī, Ibn Kammūna, Quṭb al–Dīn Shīrāzī, Mīrak Bukhārī, Qūshchī, Mīr Dāmād and others. In Western philosophy, the fourth dimension has been arguably traced back to the opinions of some medieval thinkers such as Anselm; but some western thinkers have correctly shown that there is no explicit statement about this in their works. In short, in this article, we will collect the views of the mentioned thinkers in a historical way and analyze them rationally. In the end, we will take a glance at the history of Ibn ʿArafa’s relevant opinion about reductional four–dimensionalism.

This article tries to reread the opinions of the two great thinkers Akhund Khurāsānī and Allameh Tabatabaei about the rule of one (qāʿida al-wāḥid) in order to explain their differences and clarify their weaknesses. Despite their noteworthy strengths the author thinks that both views can be violated: for instance, Akhund's assumption that considers this rule can be validly applied to all kinds of cause and to both real and conventional sciences, unlike Allameh's assumption that confines the rule to efficient causes including emanative and natural. Considering the intellectual foundations of these two thinkers in the principles of jurisprudence and philosophy and considering the fact that the exact explanation of this rule belongs to philosophy, it should be said, as the conclusion of this research, that the rule of one exclusively includes the emanative causes that possess and can create only one specific perfection (except for the Creator who possesses all the perfections despite His complete simplicity and unity). It is worth noting that the rule of one is not limited to a "numerically" one; therefore, the application of this rule in cases such as the issues of "being correct and more general" or "obligatory with choice" is not justified in the principles of jurisprudence and philosophy in which the above topics are not discussed.

The concept of form (ṣūrat) is a major key to understanding the market of paradise according to Ibn ‘Arabī. The view of the early mystics on this subject is limited to a brief description, which is also due to the fame of the hadith about the "market of paradise" in the Islamic tradition. From the viewpoint of Ibn ‘Arabī, who has dealt with the market of heaven more than others and in an exclusive way, various mystical functions and thoughts have been inferred and analyzed, which are as follows: 1. the market of heaven as a means of communication with other worlds; 2. the market of paradise a place to ask for everything; 3. the difference between buying and selling in this market; 4. the difference between the material world and the immaterial world is conventional, not real; 5. the market of heaven in barzakh or after the resurrection; 6. the market of heaven and the soul's evolution; 7 the market of heaven and the expansion of divine knowledge. What ties this concept to Ibn ‘Arabī's thought is his detailed epistemological explanation, which seems unique in some cases.

It seems that causality is the most important issue that has undergone changes in line with the three phases of Sadrā's philosophy. It has many dimensions and divisions and goes with the evolutions of this philosophy in various aspects. In this article, we examine five basic issues of causality based on these three philosophical phases; as for the subject of causality, for instance, according to the quiddity-oriented and non-existential view, three options can be proposed, "'every being', 'every phenomenon' or 'every contingent (essential contingency)' need a cause" while based on the second phase, it can be stated as "every contingent (existential contingency) is in need of a cause", whereas according to the third phase of evolution, it can be stated as "every manifestation is dependent on the manifested". Also, in other issues of the causality similar results can be attained that have been discussed in this article.

The concept of death inspires many philosophical reflections about human existence which can affect the human attitude and lifestyle. As two existentialists, Mullā Sadrā and Jaspers have paid attention to the issue of death and its various dimensions. The comparative and analytical comparison of these two philosophers' opinions shows that from the religious and mystical perspective, Jaspers considers the human encounter with the issue of death, as a boundary situation, one of the most effective factors in the formation of identity and finding the real Human self. By distinguishing the three stages of human empirical being from existenz, he believes that in the transcendental level of existenz, man has the ability to understand immortality or in other words "deathlessness" and the "experience of immortality" and without having an immaterial dimension, he can experience it throughout his life. On the other hand, according to Mullā Sadrā, death and immortality have a broad and systematic conception that is derived from his philosophical and religious foundations. In Sadrā's philosophy, there is a correlation between the immateriality of the soul and its immortality; the soul has different levels of existence, which can achieve the level of immateriality through undergoing the substantial movement and passing its evolutionary levels of existence. The soul does not disappear with the destruction of the body, but, because of being immaterial, it will survive forever as eternal and immortal. He considers immortality to be a graded truth which exists both in this world (through voluntary death) and in the next world.

Through a descriptive-analytical method, this article tries to analyze the meaning and reasons of identity between the Divine Essence and His Attributes, the viewpoint of Qayṣarī and how it differs from other mystics' views, and the viewpoint of Mullā Ṣadrā and how it differs from or shares with that of mystics including Qayṣarī. Qayṣarī believes in the identity between attributes and essence both in the status of Essence and in Divine Abode. According to Qayṣarī, the entification (ta‘ayyun) other mystics take as first is in fact the same as the state of oneness (wāḥidiyya), and the state of unicity (aḥadiyya) is the same as the state of the Essence. Attributes in the status of Essence have unity in an absolute and integrated way; on the other hand, in Divine Abode, which is the manifestation of Essence, the unity is considered as an aspect in the form of an illuminative relation, rather than a categorical relation which is of quiddity and necessitates multiplicity in Essence. To understand this problem, we can take help from the concept of philosophical secondary intelligibles in Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophical system in which the multiplicity of intelligibles does not necessitate the multiplicity of reality. In this philosophical system, the relationship between essence and its attributes is the same as the relationship between existence and quiddity, where existence has priority in terms of reality, and quiddity has posteriority in the metaphorical sense. In other words, in context of understanding, the attributes and aspects of the Real are hierarchically posterior to Essence.

Philosophers and theologians before Mullā Ṣadrā had diverse views about the ontological status of existence. Paying attention to their opinions is very important to understand Mullā Ṣadrā's doctrine of ontological priority of existence. On the other hand, philosophers and theologians have dealt with this issue in different positions, and in some cases, there seems to be an apparent inconsistency. In contemporary works, there is no comprehensive examination about these diverse views. This article seeks to shed light on this issue. Peripatetic philosophers considered existence to exist and most likely considered it to be an accident. Suhrawardī and his followers criticized this opinion and considered existence as a secondary intelligible and non-existent. Many later philosophers and theologians also preferred Suhrawardī's viewpoint. While denying that existence is an accident, some theologians considered it to exist outside but to be identical with quiddity. They thought that their view is immune to Suhrawardī's criticisms. According to this opinion, for existence to exist, it does not need to be an accident to quiddity. Another related problem was that philosophers maintained that the universal concept of existence has external instances called particular beings. This is incompatible with existence being a secondary intelligible. ʿAbd-al-Razzāq Lāhījī tried to resolve the inconsistency. According to Lāhījī's solution, existence is external, but does not exist in external reality. This solution can be criticized.

The theory of emanation based on "creating from being" has conflicts with the divine impermeability based on "creating not from being" in terms of its implications. This requires the accurate attention of scholars in the field of Islamization of human sciences. The article has analyzed the ontological-theological implications of the theory of emanation and criticized it based on an interpretive approach to divine impermeability. Impermeability approach negates any "birth" and "emanation" from God and introduces him with the expressions, "He neither begets nor is born" and "Nor is there to Him any equivalent". While based on the theory of emanation, begetting is accepted in God's Essence and His will is considered as an essential attribute, in the interpretive approach to divine impermeability, God's will is an attribute of action. In the intended meaning of "impermeability", God starts creation based on will and its accompaniment, that is, "Be! and it is" (the agent by will); while in the theory of emanation, the issuance of the creation is necessary from the essence of the Real, and any possibility of not issuing is ruled out, and therefore, God's will and power are limited. In the theory of emanation and its other frequently used equivalent "effusion", there is cognation between the cause and the effect; but according to divine impermeability, there is no need for cognation between the creator and the creature, and it is possible for God to create diverse and multiple beings by creating and making them without the need for an intermediary.

Javadi Amoli and Mujtahed Shabestari are considered to be important thinkers of political theology and among the most important sources of religious thought production who have actively participated in contemporary issues of political theology. Based on a comparative method, this article examines the opinions of these two in the most important issues of political theology to find their similarities and differences. The result is that their commonalities are attention to newly emerging political issues, relative coherence in their collection of political theology, the connection between the field of religion and the field of politics, the scientific and religious authority of imams, considering reason and revelation as parts of the same division and accepting reason's inherent validity, the fundamental importance of how to govern, the possibility of harmony between Islam and democracy, rejecting imposition and coercion, people's participation in the process of political affairs, the right to monitor the performance of rulers, non-imposition of opinion, freedom, justice, security, and ownership are different dimensions of human rights. The differences, however, are greater since they belong to two different paradigms/discourses with different presuppositions. While Javadi Amoli sincerely believes in maintaining and strengthening the political theological heritage, Shabestari considers this heritage completely useless in the contemporary era. Contrary to Shabestari, Javadi Amoli connects issues to God in a hierarchical manner and considers the intention of closeness to God necessary.

The Holy Quran and a number of hadiths refer to the fate of a person, that is, happiness or misery. Khwaja Yusuf Hamadani (440-535 AH) is one of the devoted- to-law Sufis who presented his distinctive views on happiness and misery in detail in the book Al-Kashf ‘an Manāzil al-Sā'irīn ilā Allah. Khwaja has also discussed this issue in Rutbat al- Ḥayāt. Al-Kashf is the most detailed work of Khwaja, but it has not been edited and published yet. In this article, based on the newly found manuscript of al-Kashf, we have extracted, examined and analyzed his views about happiness and misery. Theologically he belongs to a Maturidism. The result of this research is that Khwaja, with the support of his Maturidism and Sufi teachings, has shown that happiness originates from God's grace and misery from God's justice, both of which are God's acts that the servant obtains them through servitude. In other words, they seem to be in opposition to each other, but they both come from the Real.

Theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom are like two wings for the development of the Islamic society. Today, practical wisdom is mostly manifested in jurisprudence. The duty of jurisprudence in the current approach is to infer religious injunctions from Islamic sources. In this article, the impact of Ṣadrā's transcendent philosophy on jurisprudence and the role of jurisprudence on the system of transcendent wisdom have been investigated. The main problem of this article is why there are some shortcomings in the popular jurisprudence, and in this regard, we have come to the conclusion that jurisprudence should not be separated from ontology. Theology should be the focus of jurisprudence, not a marginal and unimportant issue. In this regard, the main goal of the article is to show the impact of ontology (of transcendent philosophy) on jurisprudence. As a result, while explaining what the science of jurisprudence is, we will explain the source of reason and the implications of the centrality of reason as a common source of jurisprudence and philosophy and its definition in terms of jurisprudence and philosophy. The intended jurisprudence of transcendent philosophy has an existential goal in the individual and social sphere and emphasizes insight in religion and awe. In the transcendent system, jurisprudence is a subset of theology, and its definition and rulings are examined in this regard. In Ṣadrian system, jurisprudence, mysticism and philosophy are not separate from each other and all are layers and levels of religion. This can lead to the correct explanation of the scope of jurisprudence. Civilization-building and anti-tyranny jurisprudence is one of the characteristics of Ṣadrian jurisprudence. On the other hand, jurisprudence is also considered as a subset of individual and social practical wisdom, and Mullā Ṣadrā's explanation of practical wisdom is very effective in directing his jurisprudence. This approach accelerates the scientific development of the Islamic society and prevents some damages; as in the jurisprudence style of the contemporary Ṣadrian jurist - Imam Khomeini - this influence caused the growth of the Muslim community. At the end of this article, these effects have been shown more vividly in the form of Motahari's jurisprudential approach.

One of the key matters in examining the scientific nature of knowledge and its methodology is the components of knowledge, that is, the subject, problems, and principles that constitute that knowledge. The subject is the central axis of the knowledge whose essential accidents are discussed in that knowledge, and the problems of knowledge are propositions whose subject is the same as the subject of knowledge or parts or instances of the subject of knowledge, and their predicate is an essential accident of the subject of knowledge. Proving the essential accidents of the subject of knowledge in the form of problems of knowledge (which is the main purpose of knowledge) is based on the principles of knowledge which are of two types: conceptual and propositional. Therefore, the principles of knowledge have a constructive role in the formation of knowledge and the proof of its problems. Because of this role and also because in today's debates regarding the nature of knowledge and methodology of science, the principles of knowledge and the clarification of its dimensions are not given serious attention, the present article focuses on the principles of knowledge and examines their role in the realization and establishment of knowledge. Of course, the contents of the principles of knowledge and the nature of each of the conceptual and propositional principles, as well as the position and method of obtaining these principles in knowledge are also explained.