Ibn Sina's Theory of Efficient Causality and Special Divine Action

Ibn Sina’s theory of efficient causality includes the definitions of metaphysical and natural efficient causes. In the first section، these definitions and two theses about their relation will be introduced. َAccording to the first thesis، natural efficient causes do not bestow existence and therefore they are not metaphysical. The alternative thesis defends bestowing existence by natural efficient causes، although this ontological status is restricted only to conferring existence of motion. In the second section، I will argue that، according to Ibn Sina، natural causes bestow existence and therefore they are metaphysical. To do that، textual evidence and second definition of efficient causality will be appealed. Bestowing existence by natural efficient causes threatens، prima facia، Ibn Sina''s theory of divine causality as a deistic theory. However، I will finally try to show that bestowing existence by natural causes leads to a theory which respects special divine action، and so it is not deistic.