نشریه حکمت سینوی
پیاپی 69 (بهار و تابستان 1402)

There are two general methods for interpreting and analyzing khārijī and ḥaqīqī propositions: first, by analyzing them within a unified logic; second, by assigning separate logics to khārijī and ḥaqīqī propositions. So far, most interpretations and analyses of khārijī and ḥaqīqī propositions have been carried out using the first method within either traditional logic or a branch of modern logic, while the second method has rarely been used for this purpose. In this article, we aim to use the second method and demonstrate that the appropriate logic for ḥaqīqī propositions is classical predicate logic, while for khārijī propositions, it is predicate-free logic. We show that non-classical predicate-free logic restricts the rules of introduction and elimination of the quantifiers on the existence of khārijī objects, making it the most suitable logic for khārijī propositions. In contrast, classical predicate logic, which does not restrict the quantifiers on the external existence of objects, is more suitable for ḥaqīqī propositions. Additionally, we illustrate that by incorporating modal logic and temporal logic into classical and free predicate logics, the principles and rules of ḥaqīqī and khārijī propositions become more distinguishable, resulting in more distinct logics. In particular, we demonstrate that the Barcan Formula, the Buridan Formula, and the converse Barcan Formula hold true for ḥaqīqī propositions and are proven in classical modal and temporal logics, while they are false for khārijī propositions and remain unprovable in free modal and temporal logic.

One of the important topics in Avicenna's psychology is the question of whether imagination is material or immaterial. The prevailing view in Avicenna's expressions leans towards its materiality. However, there are instances where he expresses doubts about the materiality of imagination or necessitate the immateriality of imagination. Therefore, Avicenna's perspective on this matter can be categorized into three positions. Firstly, there are instances that affirm his belief in the materiality of imagination, as seen in his book Al-Nafs min Kitab al-Shafa, where Avicenna provides arguments for the material nature of imagination. Secondly, there are instances such as those found in his work Al-Mobahasat, where he introduces the issue of the materiality of imagination and imaginary perceptions with an accompanying sense of doubt. Thirdly, there are positions like the final section of his Al-Isharat wa Tanbihat, where he advocates for the non-materiality of imagination and imaginary perceptions. In this paper, considering "transcendence” as a foundation in Avicenna's thought, these three approaches will be elucidated, and emphasis will be placed on the perspective advocating the immateriality of imagination in Avicenna's thought. It is posited that, in line with Avicenna's transition from peripatetic philosophy to transcendental wisdom, his ultimate stance leans towards the immateriality of imagination. Although he may not have had the opportunity to thoroughly explain it, this aspect of his thinking can serve as inspiration for philosophers like Mulla Sadra in their inclination towards the immateriality of imagination.

Anxiety disorders are called the major mental disorders of the contemporary time and are the most common psychiatric disorders among children. The purpose of this research is to study anxiety in contemporary psychology and Sinavi wisdom and discover the positions of agreement between them. The main question of the present article is, what are the coordinates of anxiety in the Sinavi wisdom and contemporary psychology, and what are their common features? In order to answer this question, a comparative method with a scientific approach has been used. Some of the achievements of the research are as follows: study the concept of anxiety in psychology and Sinavi wisdom, study the types of anxiety from those two perspectives, study the causes of anxiety and also study the symptoms and consequences of anxiety in those two schools. Other findings of the research are that; Just like psychology, which divides anxiety into normal and abnormal in terms of source, this division has been confirmed in Sinavi's wisdom. Biological and cognitive causes, along with the physical and non-physical consequences of anxiety, are among the other commonalities of these two School of thought.

The impact of non-epistemological factors on the process of knowledge formation is a fundamental question that has captivated the attention of epistemologists. These factors, encompassing psychological, sociological, and other influences, play a significant role in shaping the knowledge formation process. Can we discuss the influence of non-epistemological factors on knowledge in Avicenna’s psychology? According to Avicenna, knowledge is primarily under the sway of psychological factors. He advocates for a psychological-ontological epistemology by introducing the factor of passion in the knowledge formation process and endeavors to elucidate its connection with consciousness. Avicenna consistently engages in ontological analyses of psychological factors affecting knowledge. This paper employs a phenomenological approach to analyze Avicenna’s perspective on effective non-cognitive factors, yielding the following

(1) non-epistemological factors play a crucial role in directing consciousness and the knowledge formation process; (2) movement only occurred when passion arises or when we confront with the sensation of excitement, as every movement follows a passion. Passion possesses an independent ontological nature and cannot be defined solely under the perceiving or motivating powers. Passion imbues coherence to consciousness, determining and reinforcing the perceiving power to make judgments related to the good and the bad. Avicenna's epistemology is not devoid of natural aspects, but this research, putting the natural factors in parenthesis, considers the psychological factors solely from an ontological standpoint. A phenomenological interpretation is derived from Avicenna’s expressions, emphasizing the quality of knowledge emergence and its connection with psychological factors. By establishing the superiority of the motivating power over the perceiving power, a model of ontological-psychological epistemology in Avicenna's philosophy is deduced.

The aim of the present study is to organize Avicenna’s meta-ethical thought, providing a foundation for understanding the ethical system derived from his opinions. The primary focus is on determining Avicenna's overarching approach to the existence of moral attributes and propositions. In response to this inquiry, the author seeks to articulate three models of reductionism rooted in Avicenna's perspectives. These reductionist models could be crafted at the levels of conventional attitude, philosophical attitude, as well as Avicenna's mystical and monotheistic stance towards moral truths, so that it could be possible to establish coherence among them. This article begins by examining Avicenna’s viewpoint in accordance with his logical principles, introducing his constructivist approach – aimed at fame and intellectual agreement – as a model of reductionism at a conventional level. Subsequently, Avicenna's attitude is explored through the philosophical science of the soul and the truth of the happiness of the human soul, leading to the introduction of a form of moral reductionism based on Avicenna's philosophical opinions. Finally, attention is given to his mystical and monotheistic perspective, presenting yet another model of reductionism. The research concludes that, based on Avicenna's discussions in the field of ontology, it is not feasible to adopt a true realist position, as there is no independent truth for moral attributes.

Avicenna is a political philosopher with a coherent intellectual system. Utilizing this intellectual framework, he analyzed the issues prevalent in his society and subsequently prescribed an ideal order. The key question is: what type of state does his philosophical system deem efficient, and what mechanisms does he advocate for it? It is asserted that, in Avicenna's political philosophy, the state thrives on the governance of the just and prophetic leadership. On one hand, measures grounded in Sharia laws and civic participation are instituted to prevent societal members from the perils of deviation, oppression, and injustice, serving as a deterrent. On the other hand, moderation and equilibrium in society are established through the application of justice. This article employs a philosophical method, both probative and argumentative, to demonstrate Avicenna's intellectual prowess concerning the efficacy of government based on the tenets of his political philosophy. The research findings highlight that the efficiency of the state hinges on preventing corruption in society, the state, and the political system. Moreover, state effectiveness results from the implementation of strategic policies fostering justice and balance, along with the enforcement of laws that contribute to prosperity in both the present world and the hereafter. Lastly, the efficiency of the state is contingent upon contemporary management practices rooted in experiences, expert opinions, and current requirements.

Perception and issues related to the quality of its attainment are crucial in Avicenna's philosophical discussions. He stands as the lone Muslim philosopher attempting to present a coherent theory on forgetting and recalling. Examining the possibility of forgetting and recalling in any scientific subject, and their occurrence for all people, is of utmost importance from the standpoint of epistemology in Avicennan philosophy. This aspect has been investigated in the present research in an analytical-descriptive manner. The questions addressed in this research include: What is the truth behind recalling and forgetting, the degrees of each, and the distinction between recalling and learning? Avicenna's discussions in this field are grounded in his theory about obtaining forms and their entrance into the mind from the outside world, as well as his categorization of different types of sensory, imaginary, apprehensive, and intellectual perceptions. Forgetting is a common attribute among humans and some animals, while recalling scientific forms is unique to humans. The non-materiality of imagination power and its perceptions, coupled with sensory evidence, fundamentally challenges Avicenna's perspective in this field. Learning is the acquisition of a new scientific form, marking a transition from the unknown to the known. On the other hand, recalling involves re-perceiving the scientific form that was previously apprehended.

The necessity of a prophet's presence in the leadership of Medina and the intricate relationship between prophecy and politics have long captivated scholars in Islamic philosophy. Avicenna, recognizing this connection, linked the prophet to the active intellect as a singular entity independent of the self. He established this relationship in developing a theoretical framework for the leadership of the citizens of Medina. Consequently, Avicenna's exploration of the nexus between politics and prophecy, grounded in religious sources and Avicennan philosophy, stands as a noteworthy achievement in political philosophy. This study endeavors to answer a pivotal question: On what basis did Avicenna validate the connection between prophecy and politics, and which theoretical framework did he rely on to deem the prophet fit for leadership in Medina? Employing a descriptive-analytical case study, this paper delves into a specific facet of Avicenna's political views. Applying Wilhelm Dilthey’s methodological hermeneutics in an interpretive approach, it concludes that the prophet's connection to the active intellect, serving as a link between the perceptible and rational worlds, justifies his political and religious leadership in Medina. Avicenna posited that, with strong intellectual, imaginative, and creative powers—the sources of miraculous acts—the prophet becomes indispensable for guiding Medina toward salvation in both the worldly and the hereafter. The prophet's leadership reaches its pinnacle by aligning his imaginative power and intellective soul (acquired intellect) with the active intellect, along with the realization of the revelation phenomenon, ultimately leading the people to happiness. According to Avicenna, the prophet's intellectual power is inclined to receive the light of the active intellect, attaining a level akin to the holy intellect. This connection prompts people to recognize its absence within themselves, compelling them to adhere to the laws of Sharia. Avicenna thus demonstrated that for citizens to attain salvation, the prophet's leadership is imperative due to his profound connection to the active intellect.

The primary focus of this research is the critical analysis of Avicenna's argument for demonstrating the existence of the soul in living beings. The objective is to reconstruct this argument and expose its inadequacy in proving the presence of a soul in plants. Avicenna's argument, as presented in the opening sections of the 'Book of Soul' in his al-Shifa, revolves around establishing the existence of souls in all living entities, equating it with proving the form of the species in all bodies. Avicenna asserts that the five essential characteristics—sense, voluntary movement, nutrition, growth, and reproduction—do not originate from the physical form of objects. Therefore, he posits the existence of a source, referred to as the soul, in certain bodies. This soul is considered the form of their species or similar to it, serving as the origin of these five characteristics. However, Avicenna's argument, grounded in inference through the best explanation, remains incomplete due to a lack of comprehensive exploration of all possible avenues and neglecting potential objections. The authors initially reconstruct Avicenna's argument by drawing on interpretations by Nasir al-Din al-Tūsi and Sadr al-Mutallahin. Subsequently, after highlighting the limitations of these two interpretations, they offer their independent reconstruction, considering all possible divisions. Nevertheless, this argument falls short in proving the existence of a soul in plants, primarily due to objections regarding certain invalidated physical foundations that reject temperament as the source of movement.

The subject of the present research is the nature of the five arts from the perspective of Al-Farabi, which has been investigated through a descriptive-analytical method. The five arts of logic are based on education and Al-Farabi's attention to the social dimension of human beings. Al-Farabi divides each of the conception and assertion sciences into two categories: perfect and imperfect. Each of these sciences includes rational and demonstrative, and imaginative and persuasive methods. Imperfect conceptions and assertions, according to the quantity and quality of contradictions, have degrees. Al-Farabi considers the reason for choosing persuasive and imaginative methods for educating the public to be the weakness of their perceptual faculties. This weakness arises from the nature and sensory foundation of humans, their inclination towards matter, and their engagement with sensory and imaginary knowledge. The art of demonstration is recognized as the ultimate goal of all logical arts and the true object of the theory of epistemological realism. Demonstration is considered the noblest of arts because it makes impossible the human retreat from their belief or from their recent convictions, and because of the inherent truth of its resulted propositions. Philosophy, as a demonstrative way to achieve beauty, is considered the highest rank of true knowledge. The commonality of the materials of persuasive arts lies in the possibility of contradiction of belief with external factors and their differences lies in the quantity and quality of contradictions discovered by them. Al-Farabi's attribution of the terms ‘way’ and ‘possession’ to dialectic indicates his conception of it as a differentia in the practice of debates. The speculative knowledge of rhetoric has more oppositions than dialectical knowledge. Fallacy, as an art with speculative premises from dialectic and doubtful premises from philosophy, is recognized as an art of seduction of the audience and also as a warning against fallacies. The common ground of fallacy definition with the ultimate aim of imitating truth with falsehood indicates the extensive domain of imitation and its role as the most important tool for fallacious reasoning. The class of imaginations, with its motivating role from the power of perception, takes precedence in performing actions.

In Avicenna's epistemological model, the human soul is likened to a mirror that accepts perceptions, which consist of accidental qualities. So, perception is a kind of representation. The soul has two perceptual domains: the intellectual immaterial domain, which represents universals and essences, and the sensory and imaginal material domain, which represents the characteristics of present and past perceived things. In this model, the appearance of sensory, imaginal, and intellectual perceptions is explained by the theory of impression and abstraction. Explaining how this epistemological model is shaped, it could be imagined that the philosopher introspectively considers phenomenal states of perception, identifies their characteristics, and then seeks to explain them based on his ontological foundations, ultimately proposing a theory of knowledge informed by this consideration. Avicenna recognizes phenomenal characteristics such as subjectivity, accidentality, universality, and particularity among perceptions, and based on his ontological grounds, he establishes an essentialist epistemological model that implies the unity of the perceiver and the object of perception.

One of Avicenna's renowned intuitive arguments that emphasizes the individuality or distinct existence of the soul is the thought experiment of the 'flying' or 'suspended' man. This argument takes various forms in Avicenna’s works. The central concept across all versions is the imperative nature of cessation or detachment from the soul's faculties to attain self-awareness and confirm the inniyyah (particular existence) of the self. In other words, a focus on particular existence is only achievable through detachment from both external and internal faculties. This detachment unfolds in three stages: withdrawal of attention from the external world, turning attention inward to the internal sphere, and ultimately confirming the Inniyyah, representing the deepest layer of the self in Avicenna’s perspective. Avicenna employs the same approach in his treatise Hayy Ibn Yaqzan, framing it as a journey to acquire knowledge about God. In this treatise, we witness the rational soul's journey, guided by the active intellect, towards higher principles. This journey is predicated on the detachment from faculties. Avicenna consistently adopts this approach in the pursuit of self-awareness and knowledge of God. This methodology is rooted in the interference of the soul's faculties in its path and the necessity of detachment from these faculties for the fulfillment and completion of this journey. The rationale behind this lies in Avicenna's distinctive perspective on the faculties and their relationship to the soul.