Comparative Analysis on properties of Induction and Experience in Ibn Sina and Popper's Philosophies

Experience and induction are of the basic issues of contemporary philosophy of science that have been considered by Ibn Sina and Popper’s philosophies. Ibn Sina by referring to some principles including essential derivation, the accidental rule and the hidden syllogism, tries to separate experience from induction, and consider for experience a kind of conditioned certainty and universality. Moreover, his division of induction into complete and incomplete ones has its specific significance. Popper, by considering the problem of impossibility to obtain universal inferences through induction, tries to resolve the problem of induction by introducing the principle of transference indicating equality of logical approaching and the principality of psychology. He, then, through theory of Falsification, renders a universal and empirical criterion for testing empirical theories. Popper and Ibn Sina’s resemblance is their critical approach to the problems of experience and induction by struggling for explaining their epistemic aspects in sciences and practical human life. But finally although they both have not restricted scientific method to experience and induction, but some differences can be found among them. Popper, while, has regarded the experience as a criterion for separating science from non-science, but does not consider any authentic base for it. Ibn Sina, however, believes that experience is one of self evidences which played an effective role in growth of human knowledge. In this paper, by comparative explaining and analyzing Ibn Sina and Popper’s viewpoints concerning induction and experience, has been tried to show merits and efficacies of Ibn Sina’s points of view.